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ABSTRACT 
Francis Mensah Sasraku 
 
Regulatory Structures and Bank-Level Risk Management in Ghanaian 
Banks  
Keywords: Bank Capital Maintenance; Bank Profit Mining;  Resolution; Bank 
Safety; Bank Stability; Financial System; Financial Globalisation; Regulation ; 
Systemic Risks  
 
This research examines the impact of certain bank-specific variables on bank 
stability in Ghana, in the context of the existing regulatory structures.  The 
thesis examines this issue along two main themes. 
The first part of this study examines whether two of the commonly used 
measures of banking stability, the CAMELS and the Z-Score, provide similar or 
different results in assessing the stability of banks in Ghana.  The results of this 
study show that the use of the CAMELS and the Z-score measures could lead 
to different outcomes in terms of bank stability in Ghana.    This suggests that 
the traditional micro-prudential CAMELS framework should be complemented 
with the Z-score which inherently has both micro and macro-prudential 
characteristics of signaling weaknesses in bank stability, and to enhance the 
management of bank stability. 
The second part of the study examines the impact of some bank-specific 
variables on bank stability.  Using the panel data approach, the results show 
that while bank size, regulatory governance, regulatory independence and 
origin impact significantly on the stability score, there was no significant impact 
in terms of interbank borrowing and non-performing loans.  Further analysis 
using the Blinder –Oaxaca decomposition also suggests that foreign banks in 
Ghana exhibit relatively higher levels of stability compared to local banks.   
The policy implications of these findings suggest that the liberalisation of the 
banking sector should be accompanied by an effective micro- and macro-
prudential supervisory regime in order to manage the stability of the constituent 
banks and the banking sector as a whole.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE THESIS 
 
The Bank of Ghana (BOG) has progressively adopted the regulatory standards 
and protocols proposed under the international Basel capital standards and the 
Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCPs).  Compliance with 
BCPs is expected to promote bank soundness or stability (Barth et al. 2013). 
However, adequate supervisory measures must be in place to bring about 
corrective action when there are regulatory violations, or when depositors are 
threatened in any other way (Haldane 2012a).   
 
Early detection of bank distress enables supervisory authorities to undertake 
prompt corrective actions (PCAs) designed to minimise the negative 
externalities and bailout costs due to bank distress. To this aim and from 
empirical literature Nicholae and Maria-Daciane(2014)  show that the CAMELS 
(which stands for capital adequacy; asset quality; management quality; 
earnings; liquidity; and sensitivity to market risk) supervisory system is the most 
popular model being used and adopted by the central banks of many countries.  
 
Comparatively, CAMELS warning system is not used by all the central banks 
having the aim to supervise (Nicholae and Maria-Daciane 2014).  This contrasts 
that of the developed economies central banks’ supervisory system in recent 
years. Comparatively, the Fed Bank uses the Risk Bank SEER model and the 
SCOR model for measuring bank performance deterioration.  European Union 
countries, including France use for example, SAABA –an early warning system, 
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SIGAL –a support system of examinations on site and ORAP – a rating system 
off-site, while Germany uses the BAKIS system (Nicholae and Maria-Daciane 
2014). 
 
Bank supervisors of developed and developing countries like Ghana have 
developed their own early warning statistical models for the last two decades, 
which are based on diversely heavy sets of economic and financial variables. In 
the empirical literature, prediction of bank distress has been primarily focused 
on the identification of leading indicators that contribute to generate reliable 
early warning systems (EWS). Such signals may be grouped into two broad 
categories: market-based measures and accounting-based measures 
(Chiaramonte et al. 2015).  They suggest that, the first group of indicators relies 
mostly on the market prices of bank equity, bond spreads and credit default 
spreads to estimate a bank’s distance to default.  
  
Empirically, Hagendorff and Kato (2010) used market prices of bank equity to 
estimate bank distance to default, while Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) used 
credit default swap(CDS) spread to measure distance to default. Ötker-Robe 
and Podpiera (2010) had earlier used the CDS spread as a measure of banking 
stability. Chiaramonte et al.(2015) contend that market –based indicators of 
bank distress have several advantages.  Firstly, they are generally available at 
high frequency, providing more observations and shorter lags than financial 
statements data. Secondly, they are forward-looking since they incorporate 
market participants’ expectations. Chiaramonte et al.(2015) argue in support of 
Čihák (2007) who stated that market indicators are not subject to confidentiality 
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biases as may be the case for some accounting data, i.e., those reported solely 
to supervisory authorities. 
 
Currently financial stress indices (FSIs) are widely used by policymakers.  The 
FSI is used as an instrument for monitoring financial stability and even for 
activation of macro-prudential policies (Višíček et al. 2016). A financial stress 
index measures the current state of stress in the financial system by combining 
several indicators of stress ranging from market pressures, external 
vulnerability, banking system vulnerability and financial markets vulnerability 
into a single statistic((Višíček et al. 2016).  
  
From policy perspective, reliably predicting increases in financial stress is 
crucial as it allows policy makers some time to take measures to alleviate 
stress.  Vermeulen et al.(2015) show that spikes in financial stress may appear 
very abruptly.  Empirically, they used a sample of 28 OECD countries and 
estimated their financial stress index into a single statistic.  Their results 
suggest that even though their FSI is clearly related to the occurrence of crisis, 
there is only a weak relationship between the FSI and the outset of a banking 
crisis.  They therefore suggested that policy makers should be aware of the 
limited use of FSIs as early warning indicator.  Another limitation is that they do 
not capture interconnectedness and depend on market prices which make the 
point to distress uncomfortably short from a policy perspective (Vermeulen et al. 
2015).  
 
Višíček et al. (2016) recently examined which variables have predictive power 
for financial distress in 25 OECD countries.  Again they found that the potential 
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drivers of financial distress differ across countries and may differ as well across 
episodes.  Financial stress, they argued is hard to predict.  They further stress 
that the lack of predictability implies that policy makers need to be equipped 
with flexible tools to respond quickly to emerging financial stress, since long 
policy lags may aggravate the financial stress episode and the negative effects 
on the real economy.  Furthermore, the evidence showed that whereas their in-
sample -fit of the country model was able to track most of the FSI dynamics, the 
out -of -sample were far less impressive (Višíček et al. 2016). 
  
Nevertheless, the quality of market prices is conditional to the degree of liquidity 
and transparency of financial markets where bank stocks, debentures and credit 
default swap(CDS) are traded. As a matter of fact, the usefulness of market-
based indicators is severely affected in case of illiquid and opaque markets.   In 
support of their critique on the use of market –based indicators, the Ghanaian 
stock market for example, only trades in stocks and it is yet to develop its bond 
and credit default swap(CDS) market.  Its nascent nature also affects its liquidity 
(Yartey 2006; Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 2015).  Moreover, since market-
based indicators are usually available only for large and listed banks, they can 
be used just for a relatively small fraction of banks, especially in Ghana. 
 
Chiaramonte et al. (2015) contend that the second group of indicators of bank 
distress probability is dependent on financial and accounting values. Accounting 
data form the basis for assessing the vulnerability of banks from the 
perspectives of regulators (Schwartz et al. 2014). The simplest are accounting 
ratios derived from bank accounting information.  Two commonly used 
indicators are the loan-loss provision and loan –loss reserves ratios as higher 
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levels can indicate greater bank risk (Casu et al. 2015: 663).  According to Casu 
et al. (2015) the ratios are considered indicators of credit risk, which partly 
reflect the quality of the loan portfolio, since variations in provisioning across 
banks may reflect different internal policies regarding loan classification, reserve 
requirements and write-off policies.  As such researchers have sought to use a 
broader indicator of bank risk, namely, insolvency risk as measured using the Z-
score indicator (Casu et al. 2015).  Empirically, Poghosyan and Čihák (2011) 
cited in Chiaramonte et al. (2015:113) suggest that there is general agreement 
in banking literature that support the ability of CAMELS variables to assess 
banks in terms of their financial vulnerability and to predict bank distress. The 
recent work on the use of CAMELS as a tool to assess banking stability in Brazil 
by Marques Periera and Saito (2015) resulted in outcomes which support the 
general empirical view on the relevance of the CAMELS in assessing banking 
system vulnerability.  
 
In recent studies, some efforts have been devoted to complement the CAMELS 
variables with book-based indicators, such as the Z-score (Klomp and De Haan 
2012; Mergaerts and Vannet 2016).  The Z-score is a bank specific indicator of 
distance to default from insolvency that combines profitability, capitalisation and 
the standard deviation (volatility) of profits (Casu et al. 2015: 724).  Casu et 
al.(2015) further indicate that  the Z–score depends positively on both profits 
and capital ratio and negatively on profit variability, so a higher (lower) Z-score 
indicates that the bank is more (less) stable or the less(more) likely it is that the 
bank will fail.   
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The empirical attractiveness of Z-score of banks is the fact that it does not 
require strong assumptions about the distribution of returns on assets (Strobel 
2011). This represents an interesting advantage of Z-score, especially from a 
practitioner’s point of view (Ivičić et al. 2008). Contrary to market-based risk 
measures, which are quantifiable only for listed financial institutions, the Z-score 
can be computed for an extensive number of unlisted as well as listed banks.  
The Z-score also has flexibility and allows for the evaluation of various bank 
variables either as endogenous in evaluating business strategies and potential 
herding or exogenous in systemic assessment (Köhler 2015). Hesse and Čihák 
(2007) argue that the Z-score is an objective measure, as all banks face the 
same risk of insolvency in case they run out of capital and therefore its 
methodology is non-discriminatory. The Z-score further allows the researcher to 
compare the risk of default in different groups of institutions, which may differ in 
their firm characteristics, but face the risk of insolvency (Čihák et al. 2012). 
 
Despite its advantages, the Z-score is not immune from some caveats. Firstly, 
as for the other accounting-based measures, its reliability depends on the 
quality of underlying accounting and auditing framework, which is a serious 
concern in less-developed countries (Chiaramonte et al. 2015).  Secondly, as 
pointed out by Čihák (2007), the Z-score, as well as other market-based 
measures like the distance-to-default look at each bank separately, potentially 
overlooking the risk that a distress in one financial institution may cause a loss 
to other financial institutions in the system. Thirdly, Casu et al (2015) argue that 
the Z-score is a static and backward –looking measure at a point in time.  They 
stress that even if it accurately reflects portfolio quality and risk, managers are 
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likely to have timing discretion over it, which may be exercised in a manner that 
will minimise regulatory costs. The few available results on the predictive power 
of Z-score are mixed. Poghosyan and Čihák (2011) suggest  that when the Z-
score is added to the baseline predicting model, the coefficient in front of the Z-
score variable is insignificant, suggesting that the Z-score scarcely contributes 
to predict bank distress.  
  
On the contrary, Vazquez and Federico (2015) who examined a bank-level 
dataset that covers about 11,000 U.S. and European banks from 2001 through 
2009 found that the probability of failure seems to be relatively more influenced 
by bank risk profiles, particularly as reflected in the pre-crisis Z-score, and by 
bank operating environments.  Again, Lepetit and Strobel (2015) compare 
different existing approaches to the construction of Z-score measures, using a 
panel of banks from 15 EU countries, USA and OECD countries covering the 
period 1998–2012. Their results indicate that the log of the Z-score emerges as 
an attractive and unproblematic insolvency risk measure to use (even as a 
dependent variable in standard regression analysis), giving now more rigorously 
founded support to its emerging use in the literature.  
 
A recent study also by Chiaramonte et al.(2015) using probit and 
complementary log–log models, finds that specifications that use the natural 
logarithm of the Z-score show a good predictive power for identifying  banks in 
distress. In particular, their key results indicate that the Z-score performs as well 
as CAMELS variables, but it has the advantage to be more parsimonious than 
CAMELS Models, because it demands less accounting and questionable data 
(i.e., the covariates to be used in CAMELS related analyses).  
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Such a result, they argue, is extremely valuable for those stakeholders (i.e., 
investors, depositors, financial analysts, etc.) who rely solely on public available 
information and look for simple and trustable measures of bank soundness 
(Chiaramonte et al. 2015). Again, they find that the predictive ability of the Z-
score holds even, using a different computational approach which takes into 
account the average of returns on assets over a three year period.  In assessing 
the predict power of the Z-score according to different bank characteristics, they  
further find that the Z-score is slightly more effective when the organisational 
and productive complexity of banks increase along with public incentives to 
scrutinise bank riskiness, as it is the case for large banks (Chiaramonte et al. 
2015). 
 
The thesis therefore investigates bank stability using the accounting –based 
supervisory risk assessment tools. It makes use of the two accounting –based 
principal methods of CAMELS Model and the Z-score to ascertain the level of 
bank stability in Ghana.  It also examines the relationship between the 
regulatory structures and bank–level risk activities and bank stability in Ghana.  
It is therefore useful to introduce a definition of financial system stability. 
 
1.2   FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY 
 
The financial system of a country according to Cecchetti and Schoenholtz(2015) 
has six parts each of which plays a fundamental role in the country’s economy.  
Those parts are money, financial instruments, financial markets, financial 
institutions, government regulatory institutions and central banks.  Casu et al. 
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(2015: 162) suggest in broad terms that financial stability entails maintaining an 
efficient flow of funds within the economy and confidence in the financial 
intermediaries. 
 
1.2.1 Banking Stability 
Banking stability is traditionally assumed if bank failures are absent (Schaeck et 
al. 2009).  A bank is considered insolvent when its liabilities exceed its assets 
and its net worth becomes negative.  A bank is deemed to have failed if it is 
liquidated, merged with a healthy bank under government supervision or 
pressure or rescued with state financial support (Casu et al. 2015: 227).  
 
Monnin and Jokipii (2010) further point to a state of banking stability to include 
“normal” reductions in banking sector stability – i.e. a level of instability that can 
regularly be observed but that does not translate into a banking crisis.  
According to Schinasi (2004) a financial system is said to be entering a range of 
instability whenever it is threatening to impede the performance of the economy 
and is in a range of instability when it is impeding performance and threatening 
to continue to do so.   
 
1.3   FINANCIAL CRISES AND TYPES 
 
Casu et al. (2015) define a financial crisis broadly to include features of financial 
fragility, bank panics and contagion, when financial markets experience volatility 
and financial firms suffer illiquidity and insolvency.   Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
distinguished two types of crisis: (i) currency and sudden stop crisis; and (ii) 
debt and banking crisis.  
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However, this classification is not necessarily exclusive since some crises are 
“twin crises” when currency depreciation exacerbates the banking sector 
problems through banks’ exposure to foreign currency or “triplet crises” where 
there is a simultaneous occurrence of three or more crises (Casu et al. 2015). 
A currency crisis occurs when the value of a country’s currency depreciates 
substantially in a short period of time (Kim et al. 2013).  A sudden stop or a 
capital account or balance of payments crisis can be defined as a sudden (and 
often large) decrease in international capital inflows or a sharp reversal in 
aggregate capital flows to a country, likely taking place in conjunction with a 
sharp rise in its credit spreads (Casu et al. 2015).    
 
A debt crisis occurs when a country defaults on its sovereign debts. A debt 
crisis is identified by the presence of a debt rescheduling agreement or 
negotiation, arrears (amount past due and unpaid) on principal repayments or 
interest payments, and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt rescheduling 
loan agreement (Allen and Carletti 2010).  
 
1.3.1 Banking Crisis and Systemic Banking Crisis 
When the default or failure of a bank brings about a loss of confidence in the 
banking systems that leads to a run on banks as individuals and companies 
withdraw their deposits, authorities are faced with a banking crisis (Casu et al. 
2015). A banking crisis is identified by specific events such as bank runs on 
retail and wholesale deposits , credit crunch externalities, mergers, takeovers 
and government interventions (BOE 2009), or by quantitative thresholds such 
as the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets exceeding 10% or the cost 
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of rescue operations being more than 2% of GDP (Demirgüc¸-Kunt and 
Detragiache  2005).  However banking crisis becomes ‘systemic’ when the ratio 
of non-performing assets to total assets exceeds 20%, in addition to bank 
closures of at least 20% of banking system assets or the fiscal restructuring 
costs of the banking sector is more than 5% of GDP (Casu et al. 2015:248). 
 
These concepts will guide our interpretation of the level of stability of Ghanaian 
banks in this research and the supervisory tools that can be deployed by the 
regulator to monitor bank risk taking as well as vulnerabilities in the financial 
system. 
 
1.4  CONTEXT OF THE STUDY  
This study focuses on the banking sector in Ghana, which is a very important 
component of the country’s financial system.  Banks are at the heart of the 
financial system in Ghana.  Banking is a highly regulated industry and the use 
of the word ‘bank’ is technically determined by law (Cranston 2002). 
  
The liberalisation of the Ghanaian banking sector has led to the influx of foreign-
based banks from both developed and developing economies, notably the UK, 
Nigeria, Togo, Libya and India among others. However, the regulatory and risk 
governance frameworks of their parent institutions vary, from a high rigour 
regulatory regime (UK and India and South African banks) through medium to a 
low rigour regulatory regime (West African and Libyan banks respectively) (De 
Mendonça et al. 2010).   
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The degree of regulatory rigour is measured by a country’s level of 
implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the Basel 
(II and III) and the compliance with the BCPs (Enoch et al. 2015). Although an 
earlier empirical study about the relationship between the BCP and bank 
soundness has been found to be insignificant (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
2011), a recent study using the global BCP and stability index analysis by Barth 
et al.(2013) empirically shows that many countries including Nigeria though 
have not fully implemented all the key features of the BCPs but have 
strengthened the degree of their regulatory rigour and capital regulation 
stringency are marginally, and positively associated with bank efficiency.   
 
 A further empirical evidence from Enoch et al.(2015) shows that Nigeria 
classified as having a medium level regulatory rigour has implemented 50-80% 
of the BCPs, a deposit insurance scheme, adopted the IFRS and has a 90 day 
asset classification policy.    This contrasts with South Africa which is classified 
as high, has completed the Basel II and is currently implementing Basel III, over 
80% of the BCPs, and has a 90 –day asset classification policy as a regulatory 
measure (Enoch et al 2015).  India like the UK is currently implementing the 
Basel III (Reserve Bank of India 2014).  The UK regulatory system classified as 
high rigour is currently implementing Basel III, has a deposit insurance scheme, 
a strong accounting and corporate reporting culture and history (King 2013).  
Togo, Libya and Ghana as countries that have not implemented the Basel II can 
be described as low rigour in their regulatory posture.  
 
Ghana, though has adopted the IFRS since 2009, has implemented less than 
50% of the BCPs, has no deposit insurance but enforces a 90-day asset 
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classification policy (Enoch et al. 2015).   Against this background is the 
absence of an explicitly defined safety and resolution system should there be 
bank failures (IMF 2013a). Such situations provide many challenges to 
regulatory design and effectiveness (Nier 2009). 
 
The increased presence of foreign banks in Ghana raises issues on whether 
they should be regulated on the current Basel II and III standards or continue to 
face the potential risk of regulatory dialectic (Casu et al. 2015:205) from a bank 
originating from a high or medium rigour regulatory regime or country.  The 
expected benchmark, the Basel II and III requirements are therefore critically 
examined below.  
 
 
1.5 THE BASEL CAPITAL REGULATIONS AND STABILITY: BASEL II AND 
III 
Bank regulation is concerned primarily with ensuring that banks are financially 
sound and well managed (Chaudhry et al 2015).  The current international 
capital regulations the Basel III, proposed by the Basel Committee has evolved 
from Basel I and Basel II.   Under the 1988-Basel I bank capital regulation, the 
capital required to fund a loan portfolio is a minimum 8% of assets, whatever 
the riskiness of bank loans or the degree of credit risk diversification(Dermine  
2015).  The aim of Basel III is to increase the ratio of total capital ratio– from 8% 
to 10.5% in 2019 – and to increase the Tier 1 capital ratio (now called Core Tier 
1 ratio) – from 4.5% to 6% in 2019 – in order to strengthen the capital 
requirement in Basel II(Dermine 2015).  
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Beyond capital requirement strengthening, liquidity ratios, countercyclical capital 
buffer, systemic surcharges and a raw leverage ratio will be introduced 
progressively. Consequently, the main goal of Basel III compared to Basel II is 
that: (i) it strengthens the micro-prudential regulation that existed in Basel II; 
and (ii) it introduces macro-prudential regulation to avoid systemic 
crisis(Nyantakyi and Sy 2015). 
 
Goodwill and deferred tax assets are to be deducted in the calculation of 
common equity Tier 1 Capital.  Hybrid capital instruments with an incentive to 
redeem through features such as step-up clauses, which, under Basel II 
counted towards Tier 2 Capital and up to 15% of the Tier 1 Capital base, will no 
longer be eligible as capital.  Under Basel III only dated subordinated debt will 
be deemed Tier 2 Capital.  There is an additional Global Systemically Important 
Bank(G-SIIB) Surcharge consisting of tangible common equity of 1-2.5%.  This 
makes the minimum total capital, plus conservation buffer, countercyclical 
buffer, and G-SIIB charge total between 11.5% and 15.5% (Dagher et al. 2016)  
 
The Basel II risk-based capital regulation, adopted in June 2004, applies a 
formula that captures better credit risk (Basel Committee 2004).  The framework 
includes three pillars: capital regulation, bank supervisors’ oversight and 
information disclosure. Pillar 1 capital regulation requires bank capital to cover 
annual credit losses with a 99.9% confidence level. The degree of credit risk 
diversification is assessed under Pillar 2 by bank supervisors who can adjust 
the capital adequacy requirement (Dermine 2015).  
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The Pillar 2 process is therefore essentially the second phase of Basel II and 
involves an assessment of the additional capital that is required to mitigate 
those risks that are not adequately covered by Pillar 1. The process is itself a 
two-tier one that involves a bank carrying out an internal assessment and the 
regulator reviewing and evaluating this.  In effect, the adequacy of a firm’s 
capital needs to be assessed both by the bank and the banking regulator (Basel 
Committee 2004).  
 
This therefore involves: (1) an internal capital adequacy assessment process 
(ICAAP), which the firm will be required to carry out; and (2) a supervisory 
review and evaluation process (SREP), which will be conducted by the banking 
regulator as part of its risk assessment of the bank.  Although the Basel II 
capital regulation also covers market and operational risks, the essence of 
Basel II internal-rating based (IRB) approach was retained in the revised Basel 
III capital regulation (BCBS 2014a). 
 
However, Pillar 1 risk-weighted Basel II/III capital ratio has been criticised for 
several reasons:  insufficient capital in a recession, complexity, open to gaming 
(Haldane 2012b), lack of robustness, and fear of excess leverage in the 
economy (Dermine 2015).  During the financial crisis, it was also observed that 
highly leveraged banks that experienced failure or distress were still showing 
strong risk-based capital ratios (BCBS 2014c).   
 
Protagonists of the simple non-risk-based capital requirement, the leverage 
ratio (LR) argue that it can potentially alleviate issues surrounding model risk in 
the calculation of risk-weights or even the outright manipulation of risk-weights 
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(Jarrow 2013).  The leverage ratio hinders excessive on-balance sheet and off-
balance sheet leverage by limiting a bank’s total assets (including off-balance 
sheet) in relation to its equity since it is not based on risk-adjusted assets.  
 
Indeed, the crisis has shown that there can be circumstances under which 
sophisticated concepts for risk measurement fail and there are also indications 
of deliberate optimisation of risk-weighted assets by banks (“gaming”) (Grill et 
al. 2015; Dermine 2015). Dermine (2015) further argues that its raison d’etre 
has been the need to limit the probability of a bank run when there is imperfect 
information on the value of bank assets. That is, it also provides a simple and 
transparent back-stop to safeguard against model and measurement error in 
risk based capital requirements (European Systemic Risk Board 2015). 
 
Grill et al. (2015: 123) suggest various reasons why a leverage ratio (LR) 
requirement may be beneficial. Most importantly, highly leveraged banks have a 
lower loss-absorbing capacity and are arguably less resilient to shocks. This is 
of particular concern if the build-up of excessive leverage concerns the entire 
banking sector, as witnessed in the run-up to the financial crisis. By capping the 
total amount of leverage banks can achieve, a leverage ratio (LR) requirement 
ensures that banks with a large share of low risk-weighted assets hold 
additional loss-absorbing capacity. The LR may therefore present a better 
measure for containing aggregate risk and reduce the fragility of the financing 
structures where risk weights are mis-specified or risks are otherwise not 
captured.  LR addresses the potential risk of unsustainable growth of leverage 
in a way that risk-weighted floors do not (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2014b: 4-5).  
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Notwithstanding these potential benefits, the LR has been criticised by market 
participants and other stakeholders.   For example, the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS 2013) report argues that the 
proposed Basel-III capital leverage ratio of 3 per cent is too low or 33.3 times 
leverage multiplier is too high, and that it should be substantially higher than this 
level.   
 
Admati and Hellwig (2013) favour an equity ratio of 30% or more and argue that 
it will not reduce the lending capacity of banks; rather, it will increase it because 
banks will become less risky and able to raise equity more cheaply from the 
capital market. Because the leverage ratio is implemented on a gross and non-
weighted basis, it might encourage banks to increase their exposure to high-
risk, high return lending and could potentially increase their risk exposures and 
lending to SMEs.  
 
While these concerns are generally valid, they need to be assessed in the 
context of the overall prudential framework (rather than in isolation): increased 
risk-taking should raise banks’ risk-weighted assets, provided that the risk 
weights are properly determined, so that at some point the risk-weighted capital 
framework becomes binding again. Hence, the potential for a marginal increase 
in risk-taking owing to an LR requirement should be limited as long as both 
approaches to capital regulation are mutually reinforcing (Grill et al. 2015).  
The above discussion therefore suggests that a trade-off from imposing a 
leverage ratio (LR) requirement should exist, even when abstracting from model 
risk and risk-weight manipulations. On the one hand, it should enhance banks’ 
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loss-absorbing capacity and their resilience; on the other hand, there is a 
potential incentive to increase risk (Kiema and Jokivuolle 2014).  
 
In terms of Basel III and banking stability, Grill et al. (2015) using a simple 
theoretical model, in the spirit of Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) and empirical data 
show that the increased incentive to take risk is more than outweighed by the 
increase in loss-absorbing capacity from higher capital, thus leading to more 
stable banks. These results are confirmed within an empirical analysis on a 
large sample of EU banks. Their empirical estimates suggest that banks bound 
by the LR increase their risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio by around 1.5-
2 percentage points more than they otherwise would, i.e. without the LR 
requirement.  Importantly, this small increase in risk-taking is more than 
compensated for by the substantial increase in capital positions for highly 
leveraged banks, which results in significantly lower estimated distress 
probabilities for banks bound by the LR. 
 
1.5.1 CRITICAL REVIEW OF BASEL II AND III IN THE GHANAIAN CONTEXT 
Basel III outlines various measures to raise the quality, consistency, and 
transparency of the regulatory capital base, focusing largely on the definition of 
Tier 1 capital.  In Ghana, the capital structure of banks and its complexity are 
largely a straight forward composition of common shares and retained earnings 
and thus already fulfil Basel III quality requirements (Fuchs et al. 2013).  
Secondly, the leverage ratio may offer an important safeguard in Ghana where 
regulatory capacity to ensure effective spotty risk assessment and modelling 
capacity introduced into risk capital calculations is gradually being upgraded 
(Fuchs et al. 2013).  
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For a developing country like Ghana, Nyantakyi and Sy (2015) argue that some 
probable flaws in applying the Basel in the developing countries relate to moral 
hazard and too big to fail (TBTF) institutions due to local influence of banks.  
Their suggestions reinforce Honohan and Beck (2007) empirical studies on the 
crises in sub-Saharan Africa which show that the crises on the continent were 
caused by governance related problems both in the banks and the regulatory 
systems. 
 
The implementation of international capital standards in Ghana and in other 
sub-Saharan countries have also been critiqued by Fuchs et al.(2013) who 
studied the financial regulation in Africa.  They suggest that the overall level of 
capital is still relatively high but regulators are confronted with a more delicate 
art of managing banking stability. Regulators have to deal with capital levels on 
the one hand, against the historically high macroeconomic volatility which 
makes increased levels of capital and liquidity a necessity on the other.  And 
without investments in supervisory capacity, capital provides the only stability 
anchor. Even though Ghana for example is yet to implement the Basel II and 
Basel III subsequently, the main criticism of the Basel II and III, in the African 
context is that it does not trade-off between the two stability anchors- capital 
and capacity-but it does contain elements that increase demands on capital and 
supervisory capacity at the same time (Fuchs et al. 2013). 
 
Even with said high capital proposed by Fuchs et al.(2013), their capital 
requirement argument can further be critiqued as being nominal in 
measurement, and not in real terms.  Real capital levels are therefore low which 
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also limits their effectiveness on financing large and long term projects to 
transform the Ghanaian economy.  Therefore, their argument that further capital 
increases are likely to have little impact on stability, especially compared with 
the much higher expected benefits of investing in supervisory capacity is not in 
sync with the developmental role expected of the banks.  
 
Another critique is to consider the initial level of capital at which banks are being 
requested to increase their capital.  Current capital levels of Ghanaian banks 
are too low compared regionally and internationally.  For example, using an 
average exchange rate of ₦197: 1 USD in early 2016 (Bank of Nigeria 2016) 
the minimum paid up capital of banks licensed in Nigeria is ₦25billion (Ikpefan 
2012) is equivalent to $127 million. Compared to banks licensed by the 
Ghanaian regulator, which is currently around $32 m using an average 
exchange rate of 3.8 GHS:1 USD in 2016(Bank of Ghana 2016).  The minimum 
paid up capital of a licensed Ghanaian bank is about a quarter of a Nigerian 
bank licensed by the Bank of Nigeria. 
 
The earlier critique is reinforced by the need to develop a countercyclical capital 
buffer regime under Basel III.  Fuchs et al. (2013: 167) further argue that the 
focus of the proposed measure is on the deviations of private sector credit as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and not on absolute private 
sector credit growth.  This again is problematic.   They empirically cite the 
Ghanaian case where credit to GDP has more than tripled in a decade, with 
nominal credit growth frequently rising above 30%, but the ratio of credit to GDP 
has remained below the trend level in the years before the crisis.  The high 
trend momentum they argue, was caused by a fast growth from a low base of 
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credit to GDP, and would be more challenging to authorities to determine the 
buffers.  
 
Therefore in Ghana as in other developing countries in general, buffers need to 
be triggered by also looking at nominal private sector growth. In Ghana where 
the conduct of risk-based supervision is in its nascent stage, it is unclear how 
the Bank of Ghana would institute a regime that goes even further than to exert 
judgment, as well as communicate and enforce decisions (Fuchs et al.2013: 
168). 
 
The issue of Basel II and III capital regulations, coupled with the influx of foreign 
banks in Ghana extend into the research motivation and problems which follow 
this section. 
 
1.6.0  MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
 
This thesis is motivated by the following reasons.  First, in theory, financial 
liberalisation is expected to improve financial sector infrastructure in five broad 
ways namely: competition with efficiency gains through provision of fresh funds; 
transparency through compliance with the financial reporting standards; greater 
degree of integration into international financial markets; improved corporate 
governance; and potential completeness of both local and global markets 
(Schmukler 2008). The liberalisation of the Ghanaian banking sector was in line 
with this view of participating in financial globalisation.  
 
Following the lead of existing literature, notably Casu et al. (2015: 583), it is 
expected that foreign banks would contribute to greater efficiency and resilience 
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of the financial sector, both because foreign presence implies greater borrowing 
in local currency(thereby minimising currency mismatches) and because foreign 
banks can help emerging economies recapitalise their banking systems.  
Another interesting argument is that if foreign banks dominate the banking 
sector, governments are less likely to bail out banks when they have solvency 
problems.  The lower likelihood of bail-outs therefore encourages more prudent 
behaviour by banking institutions, increases discipline and reduces moral 
hazard (Claessens and Van Horen 2012).   Furthermore, foreign banks may 
also help to enhance financial stability by enabling greater lending 
diversification and by improving risk management practices (Casu et al. 2015).     
 
In spite of its benefits, liberalisation of the financial sector also carries some 
risks.  Opening a weak domestic financial sector to large capital movements is 
potentially risky, if the domestic financial sector does not manage risk properly, 
does not have sufficient reserves and capital and, does not have the right 
incentives, large capital inflows and outflows can create severe problems in the 
domestic financial sector (Schmukler 2008). This argument is reinforced by the 
banking crises in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s 
which have been attributed to these factors (Čihák and Schaeck 2010).  It is 
therefore imperative that liberalisation of the banking sector in Ghana is 
accompanied by a strong and effective micro- and macro-prudential regulatory 
and supervisory regime.    
 
Another argument is that the entry of foreign banks requires that the business 
environment is stable in terms of exchange rate, inflation and controlled fiscal 
policy to assure investors that the value of their investment is protected (Moyo 
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et al. 2014).  This period of study is however characterised by increased 
depreciation of the cedi, excess public sector borrowing and rising inflation.   
 
Remarkably, the annual reports of banks indicate that banks have continued to 
perform well.  These are confirmed by the Bank of Ghana stability reports using 
the CAMELS variables. Non-performing loans (NPLs) to total gross loans in the 
Ghanaian banking sector was 16.2% in 2009, 17.6% in 2010, 14.1% in 2011, 
13.2% in 2012 and 12.0 in 2013 (Bank of Ghana, 2014:10).  The NPLs to total 
credit ratios reported by the banks in Ghana have persistently stayed between 
the crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2005) and systemic crisis (Casu et 
al. 2015) thresholds since 2009. This conflicting situation suggests that the 
CAMELS framework might not be adequate in capturing the risks inherent in the 
banking system.  
 
Further reports from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that there 
exists the motivation for banks to practically underestimate their NPLs in order 
to shore up their capital (IMF 2011, 2013a).  These arguments are reinforced by 
Beck et al.(2011) who show that in Ghana, systemic distress is concentrated in 
state-owned banks and a number of small, locally owned banks that face 
liquidity problems because of their dependence on the public sector and 
wholesale funding.   One of the motivations for this research therefore follows 
from the seemingly conflicting results from the Bank of Ghana financial stability 
reports and other measures of financial stability.  
  
Again, the influx of foreign banks into the Ghanaian banking sector whilst 
bringing real benefits may also pose challenges to the stability of the Ghanaian 
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banking sector.  In theory, due to the diversification benefits enjoyed by foreign 
banks they face lower likelihood of defaults and hence should have a positive 
effect on the stability of the host county’s banking system.  However, foreign 
banks could also become conduit for contagion, transmission of shocks from 
their home country to the host country, and thus negatively affecting the stability 
of the host country’s banking system (Casu et al. 2015: 584)  
 
 This is particularly important if the parent company of the foreign bank can take 
decisions that are good for the parent but bad for the subsidiary in the host 
country.  If this were the case, it can lead to instability in the foreign bank in 
Ghana as in the cases of the failures of Ghanaian subsidiaries of Bank for 
Credit and Commerce (BCCI) and Meridian BIAO in 1991 and 1995 respectively 
that resulted from the large foreign exposures to their parent banks 
(Brownbridge and Gockel 1995). It is noted that, countries with advanced levels 
of legal regulation and capital adequacy implementation in their banking 
systems are more likely to have lower levels of country risk (Kim et al. 2013).  
 
 Again Casu et al.(2015) point out that, a large foreign banking presence can 
reduce information available to host country’s supervisors.  The implication is 
that, the level of regulatory rigour and risk governance practices of the parent 
company of a foreign bank operating in Ghana can be an important determinant 
of its stability.  The research therefore is motivated by the desire to evaluate 
whether the influx of foreign banks is promoting or undermining banking 
stability. 
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1.7.0 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The research principally aims to investigate the stability of Ghanaian banks 
using the Z-score as an alternative measure of bank stability against the current 
CAMELS variables.  As discussed under section 1.1 in this chapter, where the 
empirical evidence to support the comparative validity of the CAMELS and Z-
score for identifying banks in distress was examined, Beck et al.(2013) 
document that the Z-score remains as one of the main measures of bank 
stability and bank risk-taking. 
 
Given the varying levels of regulatory rigour and risk governance practices of 
the parent companies of the foreign banks operating in Ghana, this study also 
examines whether there are any differences in the stability of foreign banks 
operating in Ghana when compared to that of local banks.  The study explores 
further whether the origin of a foreign bank operating in Ghana influences its 
stability.  Bank size, asset quality, the level of interbank borrowing and external 
borrowing represent bank –level variables or bank-level risk taking activities 
(Krause and Giansante 2012; De Johghe et al. 2015). Likewise, risk 
governance and the regulatory independence of banks are regulatory variables 
that do affect bank stability (Doumpos et al. 2015).   
 
 The third objective therefore is to examine the relationship between the 
regulatory and bank-level risk taking variables and bank stability in Ghana.  
Such insights will help policy makers to assess the trade-offs in policy options 
that will promote increased stability of the banking sector and their possible 
effectiveness in Ghana.   
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1.8.0   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The research objectives lead to the following research questions: 
1.  What is the overall level and nature of bank stability of licensed banks in 
Ghana?  The research will empirically examine the level of stability of all 
the sample banks using the two stability measures to ascertain if they 
report the same level and pattern of stability.  
 
The nature of stability will involve considerations as to how the level of 
stability in the foreign banks differ or are similar to that of the local banks 
and their level of significance on bank stability in Ghana . The question is 
similar to some of the themes undertaken in empirical studies by 
Mulyaningsih et al. (2015) in Indonesia; Lee and Hsieh (2014) in Asia 
and Claessens and Van Horen (2012) globally. Again the pre-
capitalisation period from 2009 to 2011 will also be compared to 2012 
and 2013 stability scores to ascertain the impact of parity in capitalisation 
on the stability levels using both measures.  
 
2. How do the current regulatory design and bank-level risk management 
practices impact on bank stability in Ghana?  Given the multidimensional 
nature of regulatory design challenges, Nier (2009) argues that it is likely 
that no single structure will be optimal for all countries, regardless of the 
state of development of the financial sector and other contextual 
circumstances.   
 
An effective regulatory design in the Ghanaian context, should take into 
account how banks have effectively complied with risk governance 
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standards required by the Bank of Ghana and BCP 21 which requires 
disclosure of information to ascertain the state of financial information 
and also as envisaged in the International Financial Reporting Standards 
for financial disclosures (IFRS7); financial assets measurement (IFRS 9); 
and for fair valuation of assets and liabilities (IFRS 13).   
 
In addition, the regulatory independence of banks from the central bank 
and government influence through shareholding or control in relation to 
the ability of the central bank to take corrective action when banks fail to 
meet prudential regulation as required under BCP 22 (Doumpos et al. 
2015) is examined.  Again, the effect of licensing which allows for the 
entry of banks with varied origin will be assessed as required under 
chapter 2 of the BCP.  These regulatory measures guide the licensed 
banks on their day–to–day activities and risk taking (Agoraki et al. 2011).   
 
Bank level risk management considers risk–taking activities which 
manifest in their size either absolute or systemic (Berger and Bouwman 
2013; Chaudron and De Haan 2014), non-performing loans (Ghosh 
2015; Casu et al. 2015) and funding requirements that lead to interbank 
–borrowing and debt as against the use of stable deposits and core 
deposits (Hahm et al. 2012). 
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1.9.0   BANK REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND BANK –LEVEL RISK 
TAKING: THE ISSUES 
 
Experiences in the United Kingdom and the United States show that the tax 
payer had to underwrite most of the bank failures which is synonymous with 
state ownership failures (Molyneux et al. 2014).  The impact had been 
minimised due to the existence of a safety net and preparedness such as the 
existence of deposit insurance, adequate resolution options, procedures and 
contingency plans for information and coordination of activities.  There were 
also procedures for communication across different but responsible authorities 
at home and abroad (BOE 2009; Giese et al. 2013).   
 
The current Ghanaian regulatory structure lacks these institutions creating an 
implied or tacit impression that the existing risk management systems in banks 
should be able to signal banking sector weaknesses to assist in proactive and 
intrusive regulation of banks at the firm level.  In other words, there is the 
expectation by the Ghanaian regulatory authorities that, the routine bank 
examination carried out by the banking supervision, prudential returns, capital 
adequacy regulation applied in a less complex though a growing banking 
system can be relied on as adequate to stem potential bank failures and 
needed signals for proactive regulatory action (IMF 2011, 2013a). 
 
Another characteristic of the Ghanaian regulatory structure is the paucity of data 
for meaningful quantification of some of the emerging key macro risk 
assessment variables.  This situation has inevitably led to limited research and 
insight into the current risk management practices of individual banks that may 
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have serious and or potential systemic effects.  The bank-level risk 
management steps taken by individual banks are currently evidenced by their 
annual reports, central bank supervision, site visits and use of legal mandates 
(IMF 2011).   
 
Besides both state-owned and foreign-owned banks have experienced a high 
degree of non-performing loans.  NPLs erode the capital base, increase 
vulnerability to liquidity strains and reduce capacity of banks to withstand 
financial shocks. The high non-performing loans also raise the question about 
the stability of Ghana’s banking sector and how it could be made more stable 
through regulatory measures.  
  
Empirical studies on countries bank stability using the Z–score had focused on 
developed and middle income economies (Altunbas et al. 2011; Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga 2010). However, recent work on banks stability by Klomp and De 
Haan (2012), had involved the use of both CAMELS variables and the Z-score 
to assess the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risks in 
developing countries.  
 
The gap in the literature has been that, the recent work by Chiaramonte et 
al.(2015), had focused on the comparative assessment of the Z-score and the 
CAMELS using the European case.  Second, cross-country studies on bank 
stability which included Ghana for example by Cubillas and González(2014), 
Claessens and Von Horen(2012) used only 12 and 14 Ghanaian banks in their 
samples respectively, while Klomp and De Haan (2012) had included 4 banks 
that have assets above $500million.   Again the data had focussed on the pre-
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crisis period.  Therefore, the current work is to fill the gap of exclusion bias due 
to the threshold used to select the samples set, increase the sample size and 
increase the currency of the data in assessing the stability of Ghanaian banks.   
 
Again, prior work by Honohan and Beck (2007) and Beck et al. (2011) on 
banking stability in sub-Saharan Africa which included Ghana examined the 
effects of the Ghanaian banking sector characteristics by pointing to individual 
characteristics of the selected components of the CAMEL but did not establish 
the composite CAMELS or use the two stability measures comparatively in their 
studies.   
 
The recent literature on bank sector by Adusei (2015) who used return on 
assets(ROA) and return on equity(ROE) as proxies for bank stability, had 
focussed on rural banks which account for 5.1 per cent of banking assets in 
Ghana (IMF 2013a) and not on commercial banks, the focus of this research.   
 
Earlier Alhassan et al. (2014) also examined bank stability in Ghana by using 
asset quality as a proxy for bank risk-taking but looked at the drivers of assets 
quality to determine their relationships.  Again the literature on governance a 
key plank of banking regulation and bank stability in Ghana is scare with the few 
by Bopkin (2013) and Adusei (2012), had focused on the instruments of 
governance (boards and their sizes, structure and chief executive officers 
(CEOs) tenure) and firms performance and efficiency including some listed 
banks but excluded most of the Ghanaian banks used in this research.  Using 
banking data from 2009 to 2013, this research examines both bank stability 
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matrices and in particular the relationship between the Z-score and bank-level 
risk taking and bank regulation variables in Ghana.  
 
1.10.0   METHODOLOGY 
 
This study employs quantitative data collection and data analysis procedures to 
deal with different aspects of the research problems.  Out of a population of 27 
licensed universal banks in Ghana, a sample of 20 is studied because seven 
banks do not satisfy either the minimum of five years in existence with audited 
financial statements or unavailable data items due to non-disclosure. The share 
of the excluded banks to total assets of the industry is also insignificant as 
shown in chapter 2. 
 
The period of study was chosen as it coincided with the period immediately after 
the global financial crisis and the simultaneous reaction by the Ghanaian 
regulatory authorities in 2009 to introduce a new capital regulation that required 
that all universal banks to increase their equity capital from GH¢20million to 
GH¢60 million or its dollar equivalent of $60 million.  In 2009, one new Ghana 
cedi was exchanged for or equivalent to one US dollar. The sample includes 
nine local banks and eleven foreign banks.  The local banks consist of six state 
and joint quasi-state-owned banks and three private banks.  The foreign banks 
are dominated by eight regional banks from Togo and Nigeria, two from the UK 
and one from South Africa.  
 
The second reason for the choice of the period 2009 -2013 is that by 2009, all 
licensed banks had complied fully with the IFRS which allowed for an effective 
comparison of accounting figures. Since the research uses accounting based 
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figures for analysis, the uniformity in standard of accounting brings additional 
benefit of international interpretation of results (Bushman and Williams 2012; 
Beatty and Liao 2014).  
 
The type of data used in this study is mainly secondary.  Data was sourced from 
the investor relations offices of sampled banks in Ghana, the internet, annual 
Pricewaterhouse banking survey reports which covered the period from 2009 -
2013, and the use of library resources for comparative articles on bank stability 
measurements. 
 
Bank stability is measured using the Z-score computed from the return on 
average assets (ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE) and capital to total 
assets ratios (CAR)( Barth et al. 2013; Lepetit  and Strobel, 2015).  This is 
calculated for each bank in the sample for the year over the period 2009-2013.  
 A bank-level panel regression analysis is then used to assess the drivers of 
bank stability and to address the research questions above.   
 
Using a panel data analysis, a test of panel data for autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, and violations of exogeneity, linearity, normality were used 
to determine the choice of model to ensure the reliability of results and their 
robustness.  For example, the tests for the use of any linear model, fixed or 
random effects model and generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators 
were based on the outcomes of the validation and robustness tests using the 
Hausman, Breusch-Pagan and Hansen Tests. 
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1.11.0  RESEARCH OUTPUT AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The research has produced two important findings.  Firstly, it uses the CAMELS 
composite score as the basis for assessing the stability of banks as against the 
current use of the CAMELS as standalone variables in many research works 
(Klomp and De Haan 2012; Beck et al. 2013). 
 
Secondly, the Z-score rating index used in this study can be used as an 
additional monitoring tool for the Ghanaian regulator subject to the regulator’s 
capacity to validate the quality of the accounting figures on which the figures are 
calculated.  It can be used to rein in the management of banks who exceed their 
regulatory multiplier limits.  Because assets are not risk weighted like the LR 
under Basel III it can be used to neutralise the inherent risks of asymmetric 
information on the part of individual banks, risk shifting arising from the current 
CAMELS assets risk weighting, business model conflicts, cross-border 
risks(Dermine 2015).  
  
This study contributes to knowledge and bank management practice in two 
areas.   Firstly, by documenting and advancing incrementally the understanding 
of current Ghana bank stability structures from the information derived from the 
data analysis. The analysis has shown that the overreliance on an individual 
CAMELS variable rating should be used with caution. The research shows that 
in assessing the stability of banks the Z-score rating should be compared to the 
CAMELS composite rating for banks in the jurisdiction before any proper, 
balanced and effective conclusions on the quality of their stability can be drawn.   
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Again, by expanding on the process of ‘bank profit mining’ the research has 
shown how local and foreign investors can use their group structure or 
conglomerates to protect their investments as an implied response to the 
frequent nominal increases in minimum bank capital required by the regulator.  
This type of regulatory dialectic (Casu et al. 2015) is detrimental to the stability 
of the banking sector and therefore supports the arguments put forward by 
Anginer et al. (2014) that regulatory measures should be well instituted to 
monitor and protect depositors. 
 
In sum, this study contributes to knowledge and policy by exposing the inherent 
weaknesses in the existing assessment of bank fragility in Ghana, suggest 
measures to improve the assessment of fragility, and critically analyse policy 
options and their trade-offs in bank regulation in Ghana.  These rearrangements 
are important to minimise the incidence of regulatory arbitrages both locally and 
across borders and to correct the imbalances created by not sequencing the 
liberalisation of the banking sector in an integrated manner.  
 
The findings therefore support the urgent need to scale up the implementation 
of micro-prudential, macro-prudential, safety and resolution measures which 
reflect the needed regulatory structures required to realign incentives to banks 
to protect their franchise value as suggested by Honohan and Beck (2007) and 
Fuchs et al.(2013).  Such regulatory measures will minimise distortions in bank 
risk-taking incentives and result in sustainable banking sector stability in Ghana. 
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1.12.0  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
This research is limited to the regulation and risk management of Ghanaian 
banks from a top-down approach. Although it discusses regulatory design 
dimensions of stability definition, measurement, monitoring and controlling, it 
does not consider the tactical application of risk measures at bank operational 
level. Two interlocking tensions were recognised.   
 
First, the study does not take into account the possible impact of other financial 
market institutions such as savings and loans, rural banks, finance houses, 
cooperatives and credit unions operating in Ghana. The second is the 
considerable segment of financial activities outside the banking sector due to 
the large informal sector and a large segment of unbanked customers typical of 
developing countries like Ghana (Fuchs et al. 2013).   
 
This situation has put a severe limit on interpretation of the research findings, 
such as those relating to non-performing assets due to the paucity of 
interlocking information between the formal banking sector and the large 
informal sector.  
 
 1.13.0  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
  
This thesis is organised into eight chapters beginning with Chapter 1. This 
chapter provides an introduction to the thesis and covers the main reasons why 
the research is worth doing.  This chapter therefore covers the background to 
the study, motivation for the research and its objectives, research questions, an 
overview of the contribution of the research and limitations to the research.  
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Chapter 2 discusses the Ghanaian environment, risk and regulatory regime.  It 
provides the facts relating to the case study and the effect of the post 2008 
banking deregulation.  It critically examines the literature on the Ghana 
regulatory regime and the nature of bank-level risk taking activities.  The gaps in 
the literature to support the purpose of the research are examined to reaffirm 
the need for this research. 
 
Chapter 3 sets out to analyse the literature on the research on bank regulation 
and bank-level risk management practices.  Specifically, it examines the main 
planks of banking regulation that include entry, exit and resolution, prudential 
supervision, accounting and corporate governance.  It further provides a review 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on how these strands of literature 
emanating from these planks relate to banking stability measured by the Z-
score and other components of the CAMELS as stability proxies.  The literature 
is further critiqued to identify gaps in the literature to support current and future 
research. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the research philosophy and discusses the theoretical 
perspectives of the conceptual framework which is framed on the gaps 
identified in the literature in chapters 2 and 3.  The framework is then used to 
develop the research hypotheses that are examined in Chapter 7 to answer the 
research questions and justify the choice of the covariates in the research 
model.  
  
Chapter 5 explains the methodology used in the study, which includes the 
selection of the sample and the data collection method.  This chapter also 
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discusses the variables used to measure, conceptualise and operationalise the 
hypotheses, and includes a discussion of the statistical techniques employed to 
analyse the data. The chapter is divided into two.  The first part of the chapter 
will present the methods to be used to undertake the descriptive statistics of the 
comparative CAMELS variables and the Z-scores.  
 
The second part discusses, the dependent (Z-score) and independent variables 
namely: bank size; interbank borrowing and debt; non-performing loans; risk 
governance; regulatory independence; and origin.  These variables are defined 
and the bases of their measurements are further explained.  The theoretical and 
empirical sources of how the variables are measured are further discussed.    
Since linear regression models will be used to assess the panel data, the OLS 
assumptions become important to identify violations of these assumptions and 
therefore provide the basis for the choice of appropriate methods to be used in  
Chapter 7.  The underlying OLS assumptions of normality, homoskedasticity, 
linearity, no multicollinearity and autocorrelation, are defined and the required 
diagnostic tests carried out.  These tests are provided as an appendix to this 
thesis.  The theoretical framework for the tests of panel data using the 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests which are used to support the choice of 
estimation techniques involving static panel data are also discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the results of the univariate analysis of the data.  Here 
descriptive statistics compare the CAMELS and Z-score scores among the 
sample banks.  Correlation analyses and analysis of variance of foreign and 
local banks are compared to answer the first research question on the relative 
stability of licensed banks.  The comparative outcomes of using the composite 
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CAMELS and the Z-score index are discussed.  The policy implications of the 
findings and recommendations which include the need to improve the regulation 
on accounting for loan losses, minimisation of profit mining incentives and the 
need for deposit insurance are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the empirical results. The empirical results based on the 
pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects, and GMM models will first be 
discussed, followed by an analysis of the results based on the key research 
findings. The robustness or sensitivity of the results to the potential presence of 
autocorrelation in the panel data will be addressed by using the GMM HAC 
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) option. The policy implications and 
suggested recommendations of the key research findings are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the thesis.  It discusses the contribution 
of the research to the banking industry, bank management and practice and 
academia.  It points out the main limitations of the study as well as potential 
avenues for future research and improvement.  
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CHAPTER 2 
GHANAIAN BANKING ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND REGULATORY REGIME 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the environment in which banks are regulated in Ghana.  
It critically examines the literature on the Ghanaian banking regulatory 
structures and discusses further how they impact on banking system stability. 
 Historically, the structure of Ghana’s economy has been dominated by the 
primary sector, characterised by the production and export of primary products 
such as cocoa, gold, bauxite, foodstuff and timber (IMF 2014a). Ghana’s 
economy has shifted from an agricultural producing economy in the1980s to a 
service economy. Commerce, transport and other allied services now contribute 
more to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)(IMF 2014a).   
 
An analysis of the components of the country’s GDP shows that the services 
sector accounts for over 59% of the GDP and employs about 47% of the active 
labour force.  Banks form a critical part of the tertiary or services sector, which 
account for 48% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)(IMF 2014a).    
Table 2.1 shows sectoral output and employment shares in 1980 and 2013. 
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Table 2.1: Sectoral Employment and Output Shares in 1980 and 2013 
 1980 2013 
Sector Percentage 
(%) of 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
(GDP) 
Percentage 
of 
employment 
Percentage (%) 
of Gross 
Domestic 
Product (GDP) 
Percentage of 
Employment 
Agriculture 60 62 26 42 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
1.2 0.5 8 1 
Manufacturing 8.10 8.2 7 10 
Other Secondary 
Sector 
 3.7 1.3 11 4 
Tertiary Sector 27 28 48 43 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service and IMF Country Report 2013  
 
Ghana mainly exports non-processed oil and non-oil commodities.  Soft 
commodity exports notably cocoa, still forms the anchor of its foreign exchange 
earnings, followed by remittances and hard commodity exports like gold and 
other minerals(IMF 2013a).  
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Post 2002 saw further legal reforms that allowed for increased liberalisation of 
the banking sector, leading to an influx of regional and international banks 
(Bawumia 2010). The influx of the new banks enhanced competition in the 
banking sector and further banking reforms saw the abolition of the 35% 
secondary reserve requirement that required banks to invest in government 
securities. These reforms made expansions into new products and services 
possible for the banks (Bawumia 2010).  Data from the World Development 
Index (WDI 2015) showed that real per capita income in Ghana had increased 
from USD 575.0 in 1980 to USD 752.1 by 2013.   
 
On the economic front, Ghana’s qualification for debt relief under the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the accompanying fiscal and 
monetary policy stance resulted in a significant reduction of the debt burden by 
the end of 2008(IMF 2014a).  
 
This situation has changed rapidly since the end of 2008. In 2008, Ghana’s total 
public debt stood at GH¢10.14 billion (33.6% of GDP), equivalent to $7.57 
billion (IMF 2011). In the last five years, however, the stock of public debt has 
increased to GH¢49.7 billion (57.4% of GDP), equivalent to about $20.12 billion 
at the end of 2013 (IMF 2014a). At the same time, there has been a dramatic 
increase in central bank financing of government recently (i.e. equivalent to the 
printing of money).  Figures from the IMF show that net domestic financing of 
government exceeds the Bank of Ghana’s own target (IMF 2015).  
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2.2 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON REGULATION AND 
 BANKING SYSTEM STABILITY 
Persistent deviations from the Bank of Ghana’s actions and its set targets raise 
concerns about the Bank of Ghana’s independence as well as the credibility of 
its inflation target regime (IMF 2013a). Levine (2012) suggests that a lower 
degree of central bank independence indicates weakness in the administrative 
and regulatory governance. The outcome also follows from the corruption of 
regulation, with appointments and extension of retirement age of senior officials 
of the Central Bank (Levine 2012).    Under such an environment, political 
objectives can get in the way of effective monetary policy and hence weakening 
the credibility of the central bank in restraining government borrowing.  Indeed, 
a policy commitment that is consistently breached cannot be credible. 
 
The economic effects included the rapid deterioration of the domestic currency, 
the cedi. Studies on banks in emerging and developing markets show that 
depreciation of domestic currency can have a detrimental effect on bank 
performance and stability.  Degryse et al. (2013) found that local currency 
depreciation increases banking system fragility in Asia and Latin America while 
Moyo et al. (2014) who examined 16 sub-Saharan countries including Ghana 
between1995 and 2010 found similar evidence for sub-Saharan Africa.  They 
stress that the stability of the banking system in a liberalised and competitive 
economy is contingent on government pursuing sound macroeconomic policies 
and enhancing the effectiveness of institutions to allow the banking sector to 
thrive. 
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2.3 THE STRUCTURE OF GHANA’S BANKING SYSTEM 
At the apex of the banking system in Ghana is the Bank of Ghana established in 
1956 to provide the monetary policy of the government.  Section 3,subsections 
(1) and (2)  of the Bank of Ghana Act 2002, Act 612 expanded the Bank of 
Ghana’s role to include the support of the general economic policy of the 
Government ; promotion of economic growth ; and effective and efficient 
operation of banking and credit systems in the country, independent of 
instructions from the government or any other authority.  
 
The Bank of Ghana currently supervises 27 licensed universal banks, as well as 
other quasi-banking institutions which consist of savings and loans companies, 
mortgage finance companies, leasing and finance houses and discount houses 
(BOG 2014). Other powers relating to banking supervision and licensing are 
defined under the Banking Act of 2002 and 2004.  In addition is the Payment 
Systems Act, 2003 which regulates Ghana’s payment systems and processes.   
There are 136 rural and community banks operating under the umbrella 
association the ARB Apex Bank coming under the supervision of the Bank of 
Ghana as a way to promote financial inclusion in rural areas in 2013(BOG 
2014).  The recent co-operative credit union regulations,2015  LI. 2225 places 
all co-operative associations whose banking model is largely that of the 
stakeholder value(SHV) firmly under the supervision of the Bank of Ghana.  
Microfinance firms are also regulated under the Microfinance Operating Rules 
and Guidelines (2011) (BOG 2011) in pursuance of the provisions of the Non-
bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774) and the Banking Act, 2004 (Act 
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673) as amended by Act 738. Figure 2.1 illustrates the range of institutions 
supervised by the Bank of Ghana. 
Figure 2.1: The Structure of the Ghanaian Banking System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Illustration. 
 
Table 2.2 shows the composition of the Ghanaian financial system and their 
relative importance represented by the share of assets.   The financial system in 
Ghana consists primarily of banks (IMF 2013a) and other quasi-financial 
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institutions, insurance and pension funds. The insurance and pension funds are 
regulated by the National Insurance Commission and the National Pensions 
Regulatory Authority (NPRA) respectively.  Other investment firms are regulated 
by the Ghana Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).   
 
The universal license also allows banks to operate in the activities regulated by 
the other independent regulators.  This situation suggests the possibility of 
regulatory arbitrage, overlaps, loss of economies of scale and scope due to 
overlaps which affect the efficient transmission and interpretation of information. 
Lower efficiency in the resolution of conflicts that may also arise due to different 
goals concerning supervision, can create a potential for financial instability as 
systemic risks can arise from a section of the financial system outside the 
control of the Central Bank (Doumpos et al. 2015). 
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2.4.0 BANK REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND BANK STABILITY IN 
  GHANA 
The discussion on the Ghanaian regulatory structure and banking stability 
relationship follows the five main planks of regulatory structures namely: entry; 
exist; supervision and regulation; accounting; and corporate governance (Ellis 
et al. 2014).  These five planks therefore provide the framework on which the 
main strands of literature for discussion in this chapter are developed. 
 
2.4.1 ENTRY AND ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS 
The IMF(2011b) study of the Ghanaian banking system shows that before 2009, 
the sector, had been dominated largely by state-owned banks with Barclays 
Bank and Standard Chartered Bank as important foreign banks.  However, 
liberalisation of the banking sector led to the influx of foreign de novo banks 
from Nigeria, Libya, South Africa and some acquisition of local banks through 
the direct foreign purchase of shares (IMF 2014a). De novo banks are banks 
that enter the local market, set up new operations, compete for customers and 
business opportunities (Mulyaningsih et al. 2015). Entry activities cover 
licensing and restriction of activities.  
   
The Banking Act 2004 recognises that banks can face a grave crisis when they 
are overexposed in some particular markets, geographic areas, or economic 
sectors.  As required under sections 41- 49 of the Banking Act 2004, the 
following limits on exposures have been set.  The regulatory regime limits all 
licensed banks’ exposure to any one person or a group of persons to not more 
than 25% of the net own funds of the bank. Again, for the purposes of 
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subsection 42(2) the limits of the aggregate of unsecured financial exposure 
shall not exceed 10% of the bank’s net own funds. However, the limit set does 
not apply to transactions between banks and licensed non-banking financial 
institutions, except otherwise specified by the Bank of Ghana.  
 
From the empirical literature, Cubillas and Gonzàlez (2014) looked at the effect 
of bank liberalisation as a mechanism to encourage entry, restricting activity 
and risk taking. Theoretically, they argue that financial liberalisation influence 
bank risk through bank competition, removal of controls on international capital 
movements, and the relaxation of restrictions on banking activities.  Notably, 
they find that in developing countries like Ghana, liberalisation negatively affects 
banks stability, not as a result of changes in competition but by expanding 
opportunities to take risk.  Klomp and De Haan (2015) found that activity 
restrictions reduce the risk of large and foreign owned banks.  Another strand of 
literature looks at competition on bank stability in developing or emerging 
countries including Ghana (Amidu and Wolf 2013; Beck et al. 2013; Moyo et al. 
2014).   While Beck et al.(2013) found that an increase in competition which 
erodes banks’ pricing power, increases banks risk taking behaviour and 
negatively affects financial stability,  Amidu and Wolf (2013) conclude that 
competition increases stability through banks’ decision to diversify their portfolio 
in response to a competitive environment.   
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2.4.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF GHANA’S BANKING SYSTEM 
The second strand of literature relates the licensing regime to the ownership of 
licensed banks and their effect on banking stability (Bertay et al.2015; Mecagni, 
2015;  IMF 2014a).  There are 27 commercial banks operating in Ghana as of 
2013 (BOG 2014).  Fourteen of these banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks 
and their market share is estimated at 51 per cent of bank assets. British banks 
dominate, but the combined share of banks from the Africa region is larger, 
particularly from South Africa, Nigeria, Togo and Libya (IMF 2011, 2013a).   
 
The banking sector therefore has two ownership structures namely, public (also 
known as state-owned (SB)) and private banks.  The private banks are further 
classified into foreign and domestic.  The international banks are further 
decomposed into pan- African, regional and multinational banks (Mecagni et al. 
2015). 
 
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the shareholding of the 27 banks in Ghana.  
As at December 2013, 12 of the banks were Ghanaian-owned banks, 4 of which 
are state-owned banks. The state has a controlling interest through direct and 
indirect shareholding by the government, the BOG, and the state-controlled 
pension fund—the SSNIT. The SBs account for 29% of banking system assets, 
one of the highest in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Public banks control over a 
fifth of assets and credit and a quarter of deposits. Their share of bank assets in 
2012 had declined to about half of what it was in 2005(IMF 2013a). 
 
The remaining 15 banks are a combination of pan- African banks (PABs), 
notably Ecobank, Zenith Bank, Union Bank of Africa; Access Bank and Stanbic 
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Bank. Standard Chartered Bank, Barclays, SG-SSB Bank are subsidiaries of 
international and multinational banks.  First Atlantic Bank, International 
Commercial Bank (currently a subsidiary of the First National Bank of Nigeria), 
Guaranty Trust Bank are subsidiaries of regional banks.  
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 Table 2.3. Overview of the Shareholding of Banks in Ghana 
 Bank Classification and 
Mode of Entry 
Main shareholders at end of 2013 
1 Barclays Bank (Ghana) 
Ltd 
Foreign / De novo Barclays Bank Plc: 100% 
2 Standard Chartered 
Bank (Ghana ) Ltd 
Foreign /De novo Standard Chartered 
Holdings(Africa)BV: 69.42% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 30.58% 
3 SG-SSB Limited  Foreign/ Acquisition 
of Local Bank 
SG Financial Services Holding: 52% 
Non- Controlling Interest: 48% 
4 First Atlantic Bank 
Limited  
Foreign/ Acquisition 
of Local Bank 
Kedari Nominees Limited: 83.10% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 16.90% 
5 International 
Commercial Bank 
(currently First National 
Bank) 
Foreign/ Acquisition 
of Foreign Bank 
ICB Financial Group: 100% 
6 Guaranty Trust 
Bank(Ghana Limited) 
Foreign/ De novo GTBank Plc: 95.37% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 4.63% 
7 Ecobank  Foreign/ De novo Ecobank Transnational Incorporated 
(ETI):68.93% 
Non – Controlling Interest: 31.07% 
8 Zenith Bank(Ghana ) 
Limited  
Foreign/De novo Zenith Bank Plc: 98.07% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 1.93% 
9 Access Bank(Ghana) 
Limited 
Foreign/ De novo Access Bank Plc:100% 
10 UBA  Foreign/ De novo UBA Holding: 91% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 9% 
11  Stanbic Ghana Foreign/ De novo Stanbic Africa Holdings Limited: 
96.52% 
Non- Controlling Interest: 3.48% 
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Table 2.3 Overview of the Shareholding of the Sample Banks in Ghana (Continued) 
12 Ghana Commercial 
Bank (GCB) 
State-owned 
Bank(SB) 
SSNIT: 29.8% 
MOFEP: 21.4% 
Non- Controlling Interest:48.8% 
13 Agricultural 
Development Bank 
(ADB) 
State –owned 
Bank(SB) 
MOFEP: 51.8% 
BOG(FIT): 48.2% 
14 National Investment 
Bank  
State-owned 
Bank(SB) 
MOFEP: 86.4% (55% when counting 
preference shares) 
BOG(FIT): 3.5% (45% when counting 
preference shares) 
15 Prudential Bank 
Limited 
Local Bank /Privately 
owned   
J.S. Addo Consultancy:24.82% 
Mr. Kwesi Atuah:12.46% 
Trustees of PBL Staff Provident 
Fund:11.18% 
Mr. N.K. Omaboe:10.43% 
Ghana Union Assurance:10.29% 
Non-Controlling Interest:41.11 
16 CAL Bank  Local Bank/ Privately 
Controlled 
SSNIT: 33.18% 
ADPI Holding:28.66% 
Non-Controlling Interest:38.16% 
17 Fidelity Bank Plc Local Bank/ Privately 
Controlled 
Africa Capital LLC: 43.26% 
SSNIT:13.58% 
ENO International LLC:12.64% 
SIC Life Company Limited:6.07% 
Non –Controlling Interest:24.45% 
18 UT Bank Ghana 
Limited  
Local Bank/ Privately 
Controlled 
UT Holdings Limited:40.45% 
Deustsche Investition und  
Entwicklungsgesellschaft(DEG) 
MBH:13.52% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 46.03% 
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Table 2.3 Overview of the Shareholding of the Sample Banks in Ghana (Continued) 
19 HFC Bank Limited Local Bank/ Privately 
Controlled 
Republic Bank Limited: 40% 
SSNIT:26.18% 
Other Private and Quasi- State 
Holdings: 33.82% 
20 Unibank Ghana Limited  Local Bank/ Privately 
Controlled  
HODA Group: 100% 
List of Excluded Banks from Research 
21 Merchant Bank Ghana 
Limited 
State-owned 
Bank(SB) 
SSNIT: 90.2% 
SIC:9.8% 
22 Bank of Baroda Foreign/ De novo Bank of Baroda, India:100% 
23 Energy Bank Foreign/ De novo Global Fleet Group: 100% 
24 Sahel Bank Foreign/ De novo Banque Sahole- Saharienne Pour 
L’Investissement et Le Commerce 
Tripoli(Libya) :100% 
25 Bank of Africa(BOA) Foreign/ through 
Local Acquisition 
Bank of Africa West Africa: 93.35% 
Non-Controlling Interest: 6.65% 
26  Royal Bank Local / Privately 
Controlled 
Alhaji Abdul Aziz Iddrisu and Family 
(Ghanaian share ownership): 100% 
27 Capital Bank Local / Privately 
Controlled 
Ghanaian Ownership:100% 
Bank of Ghana (BOG), Financial Investment Trust (FIT), Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (MOFEP), Social Security National Investment Trust (SSNIT), State Insurance 
Company (SIC). 
Source: Bank of Ghana; Annual Reports of the 20 Banks from 2009-2013 and IMF Country 
Report 2013a. 
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Table 2.4 Comparative Ownership in the Banking Sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 2010-2011 
 State Ownership Foreign Ownership  
 2000-2003 2010-2011 2000-2003 2010-2011 
Middle Income 
Countries 
0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 
Low Income 
Countries  
0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 
Source: Adapted from Mecagni et al. 2015. 
 
The ownership structure of the sample banks brings together diverse public 
institutions, with different mandates and objectives. First the regulator, the Bank 
of Ghana has stakes in Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the National 
Investment Bank (NIB).  The stakes are held through the Financial Investment 
Trust (FIT).  
 
Comparing the ownership levels in Table 2.4, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that 
despite the increased share of assets of foreign banks in Ghana, foreign banks 
ownership of assets is relatively low compared with other middle income 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa by 2011(Mecagni et al. 2015) due to the high 
incidence of state-owned banks and their asset holdings (IMF 2011). 
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Figure 2.2: Comparative State ownership of banks assets in SSA  
 
Source: IMF Country Report No. 11/131 
Figure 2.3 shows the comparative level of foreign ownership of total commercial 
bank assets in eight major economies in sub-Saharan Africa in 2011. 
Figure 2.3: Comparative foreign ownership of banks assets in SSA  
 
 
Source: IMF Country Report No. 11/131. 
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The ownership structure has implications on the stability of the banking sector.  
The empirical literature shows that state-owned banks have different objectives 
from private banks (Brei and Schclarek 2015), while that of private banks have 
different perspectives depending on whether they are de novo banks or not 
(Mulyaningsih et al. 2015).  
 
There are recent cross-country studies on bank ownership structure and 
banking stability capturing Ghanaian banking, from authors including Bertay et 
al. (2015) and Mecagni et al. (2015). In addition, there are many country studies 
on Ghana by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2011, 2014a).   The 
discussion by Bertay et al. (2015) which relates to Ghana, is based on the 
lending pattern of state-owned banks as to whether they are procyclical or not.  
They conclude that for developing countries including Ghana, credit or asset 
growth by state banks is procyclical in that state banks have a stabilising role 
particularly during a banking crisis.   
 
Mecagni et al.(2015) discussion is also based on the role of evolving trends in 
sub-Saharan Africa. They show that since 1990, banking systems in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) have steadily shifted from majority state-owned banking 
to private banking and toward higher levels of foreign ownership (Table 2.4).  
 
In fact, the restructuring of state-owned banks and financial liberalisation 
allowed the entry of foreign banking institutions and contributed to higher 
competition.  They find that state-owned banks have lost market share to 
foreign banks. The country-specific studies by the IMF (IMF 2011, 2014a) also 
show that the degree of foreign ownership in Ghana is also comparable to other 
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sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries but state ownership is among the highest 
as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
A review of the Banking Act, 2004, shows that the design of the entry and 
activity restriction appears to be less stringent.  For example, interbank 
borrowings and asset holdings do not have any restrictions.  Without such 
restrictions, monetary policy through the use lender of last resort, open market 
operation(OMO) to influence interest rates become less effective as banks 
borrow among themselves rather than through the central bank.   
 
Again there is no attempt to pursue any structural regulation, which may involve 
restrictions on retail and investment activities (Gambacorta and van Rixtel 
2013).  The literature is also scarce on the effects of the emergence of cross-
border banking groups that have seen the growth in their cross-border 
transactions, which are still not regulated effectively. 
 
In addition, the BOG’s role as a shareholder and as a regulator creates a 
conflict of interest situation which impairs its independent supervisory role and 
undermines banking stability (IMF 2014a).  Ghana’s financial system is currently 
dominated by foreign-owned banks.  The implication of the dominance of 
foreign banks is that, cross-border contagion becomes an important risk and 
therefore requires that the monitoring of these banks is strengthened (Mecagni 
et al. 2015). 
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2.4.3.0 SUPERVISION AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION IN GHANA 
The risks posed by the banks – both public- and private banks call for a review 
of the current prudential regulation and supervision.   
 
Specifically, section 23 of the Banking Act 2004 states that all licensed banks 
will maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10% computed in the manner 
that the Bank of Ghana may determine.  Again banks are required to hold 11% 
of their current account holding (domestic) and foreign current account balances 
(foreign) at Bank of Ghana (BOG 2014).   
 
Given the specificity of its financial system and the earlier Ghanaian financial 
crisis experiences, the current policy focus of the regulator has been on capital 
buffer and liquidity as a matter of priorities (Beck et al. 2011).  Ghana’s capital 
and liquidity regulation combines the mechanical role of capital as a buffer to 
absorb shocks and the incentive role of capital to promote effective screening, 
monitoring and thereby reduce the probability of default (Mehran and Thakor 
2011).   
 
The empirical literature on capital regulation and stability in Ghana has been 
discussed by Klomp and De Haan(2014,2015), Cubillas and Gonzalez(2014), 
and IMF (2013a, 2015). The comparative measure of capital regulation in 
Ghana and in sub-Saharan Countries is illustrated in Figure 2.4.  Figure 2.4 
shows that the level of capitalisation is comparable to other sub-Saharan 
banking systems.  However, the issue of bank size and complexity of activities 
including the share of pan-African banking assets (Mecagni et al. 2015) need to 
be considered in evaluating the quality of the level of capitalisation. 
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Source: IMF (2013a) and WDI (2015) 
 
More importantly, is the stability of the currencies which none is convertible 
which affects the quality of banks capital levels as a measure of stability buffer 
because they are largely nominal. 
 
Klomp and De Haan(2015) using data for 1238 banks located in 94  developing 
and emerging countries including Ghana, discussed the strand of literature on 
developing countries on how bank regulation and supervision impact on bank 
risk taking (measured by the bank’s Z-scores) and found that stricter banking 
regulation and supervision increase the stability score. Earlier, Klomp and De 
Haan(2014) studied 371 banks from 70 non-industrial countries including 
Ghana and found that stricter capital regulation and supervisory control 
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decrease banking risk.  Liquidity regulation and activities restrictions also 
restrain banking risk but only in the case of a high level of institutional quality. 
 
Cubillas and Gonzàlez(2014) discussed the impact of capital requirements on 
bank stability in countries that have liberalised their banking sector and find that 
capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalisation 
on financial stability in developing countries. 
 
 The IMF (2013a, 2014) country study reports on Ghana used capital adequacy 
as a proxy for stability.  The entire Ghanaian banking sector was stress tested.  
They concluded that banks in Ghana have adequate buffer at bank level and in 
the system in aggregate.  
 
In modelling the stress test (IMF 2013a, 2014a) for example on Ghanaian 
banks, the assumptions involved in both tests were that 17% of all loans were 
classified as loss, in addition to an exchange rate shock of 51.2%. 
The stress test results in 2013, show that only about two-thirds of all the banks 
would stay above the regulatory minimum capital requirement (IMF 2014a).  
 
 
2.4.4.0 ACCOUNTING FOR BANKING SUPERVISION AND MONITORING 
The regulatory system requires that licensed banks account for their activities in 
a transparent manner (Ratnovski 2013).  Accounting is necessary to promote 
transparency given the opacity of many bank-level transactions between the 
banks and their customers.  
 
In this respect, Section 53 (1) of the Banking Act 2004 mandates that the Bank 
of Ghana shall, for the purposes of supervision, require a bank to submit to it 
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any information or data relating to the assets, liabilities, income, expenditure of 
that bank, or any of that bank’s affairs, in the prescribed form, at an interval and 
within the times that the Bank of Ghana may stipulate, and that the bank shall 
comply with the requirement.  
 
This micro-prudential role of regulation is exercised through data collection of 
financial, operational and compliance activities of banks for monitoring the 
stability of individual banks.  The responses from the individual banks to these 
micro-prudential requirements are fashioned as Bank Supervision Department 
(BSD) Reports. They cover critical issues that trigger systemic risks and bank 
failures. The accounting reports are also used to assess the performance of 
banks.  
 
The Bank of Ghana employs the CAMELS framework to obtain information on 
capital adequacy, asset quality or levels of non-performing loans which 
specifically affects the level of incomes and return on assets and equity. Again 
the level of assets impaired affect the level of liquidity and where assets 
structure may represent mismatches in terms of currency, the risk of instability 
is increased.  Therefore, the method of recognising and calculating asset 
impairments is very crucial for ascertaining banking stability.  In addition 
earnings (E), liquidity (L) and sensitivity to market risks(S) by banks form part of 
the reporting requirements.  These reports are consolidated under the Banking 
Supervision Department (BSD) Reports. These reports are also used for the 
macro-prudential role of the bank through effective stress testing and qualitative 
assessment of the capital planning processes used by banks. 
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The issue of the quality of NPLs disclosures by Ghanaian banks leads to the 
plank of regulatory structure involving how banking risk-taking is accounted for 
in the Ghanaian jurisdiction.  Čihàk et al.(2013) submit that non-performing 
loans do significantly affect asset quality due to less demand by regulators to 
pursue dynamic provisioning to accommodate deterioration in assets.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows the comparative NPLs to Gross Loans (in per cent) of 
selected SSA Counties.  This figure shows the level of assets deterioration in 
Ghana is comparatively high. 
 
 
Source: IMF (2013a) and WDI (2015) 
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The literature suggests that there are further issues of underestimation due to a 
lack of dynamic provisioning despite the introduction and adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) by 2009 in Ghana (IMF 
2011). 
Comparative supervisory standards with respective accounting estimation, 
compliance with BCP requirements, deposit insurance and asset classification 
is presented in Table 2.5 below.  The table shows the low degree of 
implementation of the BCPs in the various sub-Saharan African countries. 
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Table 2.5 Summary Comparative supervisory standards by Country 
  
Country  
Accounting 
Standard  
Capital 
Adequacy 
Standard  
Basel Core 
Principles  
Deposit 
Insurance  
Asset 
Classification 
1 Angola  National  No Basel II 
yet 
<50% No Deposit 
Insurance 
<90 days 
2 Botswana  IFRS Basel II in 
progress 
>80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
3 Burundi  IFRS Plan Basel II in 
progress 
<50% No Deposit 
Insurance 
>90 days 
4 Cape Verde IFRS Basel II in 
progress 
50-80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
<90 days 
5 Ethiopia IFRS Plan No Basel II 
yet 
N/A No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
6 Gambia IFRS Plan No Basel II 
yet 
N/A No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
7 Ghana IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
<50% No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
8 Kenya IFRS Parts of 
Basel II/ III 
50-80% Implemented  90 days 
9 Lesotho IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
N/A No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
10 Malawi  IFRS Basel II 50-80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
11 Mauritius IFRS Basel II 50-80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
12 Mozambique IFRS Basel II 50-80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
>90 days 
13 Namibia IFRS Parts of 
Basel II 
N/A No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
14 Nigeria IFRS Basel II in 
progress 
50-80% Implemented  90 days 
 
 
 
 
 
  
65 
 
Table 2.5 Summary Comparative supervisory standards by Country Cont’d 
15 Sierra Leone IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
N/A No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
16 South Africa IFRS Basel III >80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
17 Swaziland IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
N/A No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
18 Uganda IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
50-80% Implemented  90 days 
19 Tanzania IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
>80% Implemented  90 days 
20 Zambia IFRS No Basel II 
yet 
>80% No Deposit 
Insurance 
90 days 
Source: Enoch et al.(2015)  
 
These supervisory standards define the scope of the Bank Supervisory 
Department’s (BSD) reports that are mechanisms to reinforce regulatory 
measures (Marques Pariera and Saito 2015) and to be more specific, in 
keeping with the capital, liquidity and accounting regulations.  
From 2013, these BSD reports have been disaggregated into 98 regulatory 
reports and cover the requirements of bank stability, money laundering and 
international compliance issues, currency stability, management of monetary 
and fiscal policy interface.  These reports provide information for monitoring 
changes in banking risks for regulatory action.  These reports have the 
necessary legal backing from the Banking Act 2004, the Companies Act 1963, 
Act, 179), Payment Systems Act, 2003 (Act 662) and Foreign exchange Act 
2006, Act 723. 
Critically, the reports do not capture the needed consolidated balance sheet 
reporting of the foreign banks to help the regulator to prevent recycling of capital 
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by foreign conglomerates that have subsidiaries in Ghana. Again the reports do 
not have the same degree of rigour that are assigned to the measurement of 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), net stable funding ratio (NSFR) and leverage 
ratio(LR) under Basel III due to a lack of capacity to effect implementation.   
The critique of the literature suggests that early implementation of Basel II and 
III regulatory capital requirements will improve the quality of banking supervision 
and monitoring in Ghana. 
 
2.4.5.0 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING STABILITY 
The commercial banks in Ghana have adopted the shareholder value (SHV) 
maximisation concept as their business model (BOG 2013).  Compared with 
their counterparties in the developed countries, they are not involved in 
origination, hold and distribute (OHD) approach to risk taking. Governance 
guidelines have been introduced in 2013 to promote the status of risk 
management in Ghanaian banks (BOG 2013).  
 
The SHV maximisation model, in keeping with the scope of operations 
hypothesis by Boone et al.(2007) stresses that the governance structure should 
reflect the scope and complexity of operations.  The Bank of Ghana therefore 
introduced the governance guidelines to ensure that enterprise risk 
management is not only integrated in the management of Ghanaian banks but 
also an embedded culture (BOG 2013).  Boards of all banks should have Risk 
Committees with a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) appointed as a key requirement.  
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The use of value at risk (VAR) in assessing the individual level of portfolio risks 
is also being encouraged to strengthen the level of risk rigour. 
 
The main critique of the literature is that they are limited in scope and depth in 
relating corporate governance to bank stability in Ghana, if any, is remote. 
Empirical literature on corporate governance and banking stability in Ghana is 
scarce and the few focus on listed firms which include some banks, with 
emphasis on corporate governance characteristics (board size, structure, CEO 
tenure) and firm performance and efficiency ( Adusei 2012; Bokpin 2013). 
  
2.4.6.0 EXIT OR BANK SAFETY AND RESOLUTION (SYSTEMIC  
 MACRO –PRUDENTIAL) REGULATION 
The strand of literature on exit covers that of bank safety, depositor protection 
and bank resolution (Ellis et al. 2014). It also discusses the possibility of 
individual banks in distress or the whole banking system and the role of the 
central bank in promoting the safety and soundness of the financial system 
(Casu et al. 2015:191). 
 
The Central Bank theory expects the Bank of Ghana to play the lender of last 
resort function by providing liquidity and collateral, lower interest rates or pursue 
expansionary monetary policy, loosen collateral standards, support critical 
institutions, open special liquidity facilities in response to the macroeconomic 
circumstances of the financial system (Nier 2009).  In this respect, the Bank of 
Ghana adopted an inflation targeting policy for its monetary policy in 2007 in 
line with stability measures as pursued in crisis countries as a proactive 
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measure for any contagion from external forces due to the changing asset 
holding structure in the Ghanaian banking sector (IMF 2011).   
  
However, this change-over to an inflation targeting framework has not resulted 
in a more fundamental change in liquidity management, which continues to be 
based on reserve money targeting. Most banks participate in the interbank 
market, which is predominantly overnight and securitised (IMF 2013a).  
 
On issues relating to banking sector resolution, the Banking Act 2004 (Sections 
13, 14, 28, 60A, 60B, 62, 67 and 68) empowers the BOG to take remedial 
measures against institutions under stress, appoint an advisor to bank 
management, appoint a conservator, revoke the license of a bank, declare a 
moratorium, and appoint a liquidator.  It also has blanket powers to facilitate 
mergers, wind up or take whatever action is needed.  However, the legal 
framework lacks depth and is not stringent, allowing for regulatory forbearance 
(IMF 2013a).  The current law does not distinguish between a temporal 
administration and bankruptcy. Again, there is no deposit insurance scheme, to 
deal with pre-processes of bank administration. In other words, the current 
regulatory framework has to be strengthened to allow the Bank of Ghana to 
exercise bank resolution options ranging from liquidation to purchase and 
assumption capacity and all its variants including bridge bank facility and open 
branch assistance, in keeping with international best practices (IMF 2015; Casu 
et al. 2015).  
 
The review of the existing literature does not show the direct effect of not having 
a deposit insurance scheme.  In a recent study by Dermirgüç–Künt et al.(2015) 
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Ghana was identified as one of the few remaining countries without an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme after the financial crisis as shown in Table 2.5 above.  
Compared to Nigeria that has introduced a deposit insurance scheme, this 
indicates a serious regulatory structural gap because it can serve as a key 
driver of financial sector inclusion and depositor protection (Mecagni 2015). 
 
In the case of bank safety, the net effect of the lender of last resort (LLR) has 
been the growth in interbank borrowing increasing the degree of 
interconnectedness (BOG 2014). The possible effect has been the blurring of 
the distinction between systemic liquidity provision and unconventional 
monetary policy by the central bank (Nier 2009: 10). However, the current role 
and posturing by the Bank of Ghana shows that there has not been an effective 
preparedness towards the transition from lender of last to a market maker of 
last resort (MMLR) (Nier 2009: 10) an additional role of central banks arising 
from the current financial crisis (Oganesyan 2014).  
 
2.5.0 SUMMARY OF CRITIQUE AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE ON 
GHANAIAN REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND ITS STABILITY 
OBJECTIVES 
The critique of literature on Ghana’s regulatory structure on stability follows two 
dimensions.  The first follows a strand of literature which examines how 
regulators have effectively implemented the BCPs in their respective 
jurisdictions or in Ghana.   The second is the critique of the literature on Ghana 
on the basis of the five planks of its regulatory structure. The aim is to identify 
the gaps in the literature.  
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2.5.1 COMPARATIVE BCP FRAMEWORK AND GHANAIAN REGULATORY
  FRAMEWORK 
The BCP framework is centred on seven pillars (BCBS 2012).  The first is 
based on the preconditions for effective banking supervision which requires that 
the central bank should have its independence, supported by a legal framework 
to that effect in carrying out its mandate with respect to stability and monetary 
policy.  The current independence of the central bank has been criticised for 
overbearing political influence on its monetary policy particularly in the financing 
of the public sector borrowing requirements (IMF 2014a).  The incidence of 
regulatory forbearance; regulatory arbitrages as banks introduce 
bancassurance products that are regulated by an Insurance Commissioner, 
while the investment firms are also regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission(SEC), where regulatory controls are less stringent provide a 
window for shadow banking(IMF 2011) which is a major issue for systemic 
risk(FSB 2016). 
The second pillar is on licensing and structure. Ghana’s approach to 
privatisation has been gradual and systematic, from partial sale to the full 
privatisation of banks to assure deposit safety and also to minimise the political 
complexities surrounding the disposal of state assets. In Ghana, the Bank of 
Ghana has remained as the functional regulator despite the licensing of 
universal banks.  This has created co-ordination problems between the central 
bank and the other regulators as experienced in the UK (BOE 2009; Haldane 
2012a; Doumpos et al. 2015). 
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The third pillar is on prudential regulation and supervision.  The focus has been 
on capital adequacy and liquidity regulations.  However, Basel II has not been 
implemented to date as compared with other middle income countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (Mecagni et al.2015).  The challenge is whether Ghana can 
leapfrog and implement the new Basel III standards. There is no literature on 
the possible effects of the new international regulation on Ghanaian banks. 
Moreover, the leverage ratios, LCR and NSFR ratios are yet to be considered 
as macro and micro-prudential controls compared to what is reported in the UK 
(Yan et al.2012) and in Japan (Koto et al. 2010) .   
The fourth is the methods of on-going supervision.  Currently, this is largely 
through on-site visits and the evaluation of BSD reports.  Given the influx of 
foreign banks and their dominance or control over total banking assets and 
liabilities, the absence of consolidated and cross-border colleges is a matter of 
concern (Mecagni et al.2015).  Although the CAMELS framework is being used 
to assess the stability of banks, alternative measures need to be tested.  The 
recent stress testing of the entire banking system needs some improvement 
with the emphasis on credit risks, credit concentration risks, interest rates and 
currency depreciation shocks (IMF 2013, 2014a).  Additional variables should 
include the withdrawal of funds by holders of government bonds, notably the 
international banks, significant (for example a 30 % fall) in foreign remittances, 
collapse of one of the pan-African banks among others (Enoch et al. 2015). 
The fifth pillar is on the information requirements and in particular the 
accounting standards used to provide banking sector information (Beatty and 
Liao 2014).  Although the banking sector has adopted the IFRS since 2009, 
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issues relating to loan provisioning and disclosures still remain as a challenge 
particularly given the various ways that assets, liabilities and incomes have to 
be accounted for either on an accrual basis, amortised or in the case of 
provisioning whether it has to be dynamic and recognised immediately or later 
(Beatty and Liao 2011; IMF 2015).  There is also the problem of possible 
recycling of loans which also affects the disclosed income levels and the 
possibility that interest in suspense can filter through as recognised incomes 
(IMF 2011).  Again under-provisioning reduces the resilience of the banking 
systems to adjust to shocks as provisioning fall short of losses (Chan- Lau 
2012). 
Risk weighting of assets have also been undermined by the government’s non –
compliance with servicing of its own debts.  In the area of accounting, dynamic 
provisioning is yet to be adopted for regulation and the effect of such a method 
of recognising loan provisioning is yet to be tested to ascertain its effect on the 
entire banking system stability (IMF 2014a). 
The Bank of Ghana has to some extent been able to exercise its power to 
revoke the licence of banks which fail to comply with regulatory norms.  For 
example, in 2001, the licenses of two local banks, the Co-operative Bank and 
the Bank for Housing and Construction were withdrawn because they could not 
satisfy the minimum capital expected of licensed banks.  However, such 
measures are ex-post and ex-ante measures are rather needed to minimise the 
economic effects of such potential violations as transparency may not be 
verifiable (Ratnovski 2013). 
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The final pillar is on cross-border banking.  Consolidated accounting and 
supervision is yet to be effected.  A supervisory college has also not been 
instituted (Enoch et al. 2015).   
 
2.5.2 CRITIQUE OF LITERATURE ON REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND
  THE FIVE PLANKS OF REGULATION 
The literature on Ghana’s regulatory structure and its stability follows five 
strands.  The first considers the effects of changing structure due to the 
liberalisation of the banking sector.  It stresses the impact of liberalisation with 
caution but does not consider all the banks with material effect on stability. 
Cubillas and González (2014) considered only 12 major banks, while Klomp 
and De Haan(2015) considered only 5 banks major banks in their sample from 
Ghana.  This means that the small and medium sized banks were excluded 
thereby missing the possible effect on the outcome of the research if these 
banks were included in their research.  Another challenge is that the study 
covered different periods, some before the crisis and others after.  For example, 
Cubillas and González (2014) study covered the period from 1991 to 2007, 
While that of Klomp and De Haan(2015)  covered the period from 1999 to 2008.  
Both studies fall outside this research period in this study.  Also the 
methodology used either by Cubillas and González (2014) or Klomp and De 
Haan (2015) differs contributing to mixed results.  Overall the granular effects of 
local and foreign banks were not fully analysed. This research will take into 
account most of the state and the major local and foreign banks that will 
account for 96 per cent of the entire banking assets which contrast the size of 
banks selected from Ghana by Amidu and Wolfe(2013). It will therefore 
  
74 
 
examine if foreign banks impact positively or negatively on bank stability in 
Ghana. 
 
The second strand also looks at accounting and its impact on the stability levels 
by using stress tests to complement the use of CAMELS to ascertain the 
degree of stability.  The two IMF stress tests were bias in their assumptions by 
concentrating on the effects of NPLs, credit concentration and exchange rate 
fluctuations and did not consider the effects other relevant variables such as the 
degree of interconnectedness measured by the level of interbank lending as 
identified by the influential Bank of England study on financial system stability 
(BOE 2009).  The research will re-examine the impact of NPLs on bank stability 
to ascertain if they impact significantly on bank stability or not. Another gap to 
be filled is that the research will also examine the impact of bank 
interconnectedness on bank stability in Ghana.  Alternative studies have used 
the Z-score notably, Klomp and De Haan(2015).  Given these identified gaps in 
the literature, the current research therefore employs the same Z-score as an 
alternative measure of stability to that of capital adequacy ratio used in the 
stress tests.  The current work while employing the use of the Z-score will also 
rely on accounting data since most of the banks excluded in the cross-country 
literature on Ghana are not on the stock market. 
 
The third strand looks at compliance with the capital and liquidity regulation in 
Ghana.  The critique is that there is no study to show if the criteria of the current 
Basel II and III liquidity and capital standards are applied, what the status of the 
stability of banks would be.  This research will therefore use Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) thresholds as an index for the Z-score to ascertain the degree of 
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stability of Ghanaian banks as compared with the standard CAMELS 
framework.  
 
The fourth strand looks at corporate governance and banking stability but 
indirectly through bank –level performance.  The existing literature had focused 
on board size, structure, and composition but not on compensation and risk 
management skills. Empirical work on the emerging role of risk governance on 
banks in Ghana during the post crisis period is scare.   This research will 
therefore examine how risk governance impacts on the stability of banks. 
 
Another strand of literature measured stability by using asset quality as a proxy 
by Alhassan et al.(2014). The critique follows the assertion by Casu et al.(2015) 
that the stability indicator used here is only an indicator of credit risks and not 
broad enough to reflect the entire risk taking activities as the insolvency risk that 
will used in this research. 
  
The next strand looks at the protection of banks as going concerns, depositors 
and mode of managing banking resolutions.  The literature only recognised 
Ghana as having implicit insurance but did not discuss the appropriate deposit 
insurance type for developing countries and how they can mitigate potential 
moral hazard issues raised. The issue is the central bank’s role as lender of last 
of last resort.  It is yet to be tested if the liquidity instruments currently available 
to the central bank are adequate to provide the needed agility as market lender 
of last resort (MLLR) should there be a situation of systemic bank failure(Nier, 
2009).  The alternative had been the central bank and government directly 
participating in direct banking activities to assure depositors that their deposits 
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are safe.  In a cross-country study including Ghana, Bertay et al.(2015) also 
took into account only 4 Ghanaian banks in ascertaining the performance of 
state and private foreign banks.  This also indicates limited granularity in their 
research findings with respect to Ghana.  This research will include almost all 
the state-owned banks and examine if government and central bank 
participation in banking is impacting positively or negatively on bank stability in 
Ghana. 
 
The next chapter will review prior empirical studies on the relationship between 
bank stability and regulatory structures and bank-level risk taking using 
examples from the developed and developing countries in order to identify other 
gaps in the literature.   
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on regulatory 
structures and bank stability.  It reviews the literature on the five key planks of 
any well-defined regulatory regime: entry – that is, competition policy; exit – that 
is resolution policy: regulation – that is, supervisory policy; accounting – that is, 
auditing and valuation policy; and governance (Ellis et al. 2014) and how they 
affect banking sector stability.  The literature review therefore focuses on the 
main strands of literature on how these five key planks affect banking sector 
stability. 
 
3.2 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND BANKING STABILITY 
The literature on prudential regulation follows two strands in the form of capital 
regulations and supervision and how they impact on bank stability.  Depending 
on the type of tool used, its objectives and scope of application, capital 
regulation and supervision, is classified into micro-prudential or macro-
prudential (ECB 2014). Regulations have been the dominant way of ensuring 
the stability of banks (Chaudhry et al. 2015).   
 
3.2.1 MICRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
Micro-prudential regulation is the traditional approach to bank regulation and 
concerns the stability of individuals and the protection of clients of the 
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institutions.  It examines the responses of an individual bank to exogenous risk 
but does not incorporate endogenous risk neglecting the systemic implications 
of common behaviour.  It comprises, for example bank entry restrictions, capital 
requirements, restrictions on bank activities, how instruments are listed, traded, 
sold and reported and measures of value and riskiness of assets, etc.( Ashton 
2013).  Haldane (2012b) argues that the safety of individual banks is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for systemic stability.  
Conduct of business regulation examines how firms operate in financial 
markets.  Part of this role is to ensure customers are protected from bad advice; 
firms do not become insolvent before contracts are fulfilled; and customers have 
some protection from misrepresentation, incompetence and misselling (Ashton 
2013). 
The main criticisms levelled against micro-prudential regulation have been 
supervisory problems associated with the lack of effective information and 
coordination due to their structural nature and weak legal backing.  The second 
was regulatory capital arbitrage, the process of inflating a bank’s capital 
adequacy ratio without increasing the actual safety or soundness of the bank.  
This is done mainly through securitisation, off- balance sheet transactions, 
exploitation of inconsistencies in Basel risk prices. Another factor is the strategy 
of banks that leads to a decrease in the regulatory measure of risk-weighted 
assets by more than the actual risk exposure of the bank, making the bank look 
safer than it actually is. The existence of regulatory capture also neutralised the 
very importance of these indicators. Moreover, overreliance on the belief or 
hubris that ‘market knows best’ also created regulatory complacency 
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(Fullenkamp 2013).  These features were complicated by the manifestations of 
financial deregulation and liberalisation and the rise of the sophisticated risk 
management technique the value at risk (VaR).  
However, the recent financial crisis has brought out a strong critique of the 
pervasive use of VaR by regulators. Jobst (2012) argues that it is important to 
recognise that VaR, the dominant form of risk measurement in the financial 
sector, was invented by banks as an internal risk management tool for 
comparing risks across desks and asset classes within a bank. It was never 
meant to be a tool for regulating banks. The need for economic foundations for 
a systemic risk measure is therefore more than an academic concern.  In this 
regard, Acharya et al. (2010 a,b) believe that the lack of such a measure is at 
the root of practical failures of regulation. 
 
3.2.2 MACRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
Giese et al.(2013) argue that macro-prudential policy seeks to maintain financial 
stability by explicitly accounting for the ‘externalities’ arising from the behaviour 
of individual institutions as well as the structure of the financial system. Macro-
prudential tools have been proposed to counter the pro-cyclicality of the banking 
system caused by risk-related capital adequacy, ‘mark-to-market’ accounting, 
and backward looking provisioning against bad and doubtful debts. Examples of 
these are countercyclical capital and liquidity requirements, and non-risk related 
capital (‘leverage’) ratios; a levy on the outstanding debt multiplied with a factor 
of average time-to-maturity of a bank; and a levy on non-core liabilities (Hanson 
et al. 2011); and forward looking provisioning, for which allowance has been 
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made via changes in the international accounting standards to permit forward 
looking ‘general’ provisioning (Gaston and Song 2014).  Macro-prudential 
supervision therefore focuses on reducing asset price inflation, and thus the 
need to insure against bank failure; it hence protects taxpayers from the need 
for bail-outs (Haldane 2010). 
 
The European Central Bank (ECB 2014) argues that in spite of the frictions that 
may arise between them, micro- and macro-prudential policies overall 
complement each other, and that the two policy domains play an equally 
important role in ensuring financial stability. To benefit most from their 
complementarities, it is essential that there are constructive cooperation and 
information sharing between micro- and macro-supervision to ensure the 
improvement of social welfare by aligning private incentives with social 
objectives (Giese et al. 2013). 
 
3.2.3 THEORETICAL LITERATURE ON REGULATORY CAPITAL AND 
  BANK STABILITY 
Many theories suggest that capital improves a bank’s survival probability. First, 
the monitoring-based papers by Allen et al.(2011) and Mehran and Thakor 
(2011) suggest that higher bank capital induces higher levels of borrower 
monitoring by the bank, thereby reducing the probability of default or otherwise 
improving a bank’s survival odds indirectly by increasing the surplus generated 
by the bank– borrower relation. The asset-substitution moral hazard theories 
argue that capital attenuates the excessive risk- taking incentives induced by 
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limited liability and government protection, and that banks with more capital 
optimally choose less risky portfolios ( Mehran and Thakor 2011).  
Some theories seem to suggest that higher capital does not promote stability 
(Besanko and Kanatas1996).  On balance, however, most theories, especially 
the more recent ones, predict that capital positively affects bank survival. 
Cole and White (2012) use proxies for the CAMELS components and other 
factors to explain bank failures during 2009. They find that capital is one of the 
factors explaining failure. Beltratti and Stulz(2012) examine what explains bank 
performance during the recent subprime lending crisis and find that capital is 
one of the determinants.  
While higher capital is undoubtedly useful, it is important to realise its 
limitations. First, while the cost of bank capital appears modest in steady state, 
the cost of building up capital quickly may be significant. This makes bank 
capital scarce during and after recessions. Second, banks often obtain new 
capital from passive shareholders (such as preferred equity holders or 
institutional investors), who are unable to influence bank risk taking (Acharya et 
al. 2012a, b). Thus, higher bank capital provides risk absorption capacity but 
does not correct risk attitudes.   
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3.2.4 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON CAPITAL REGULATION AND BANK 
STABILITY 
Many country studies about the introduction of the Basel III capital regulation by 
Barrell et al.(2009); Kato et al(2010); Wong et al.(2010); Miles et al.(2011) using 
prediction models conclude that capital regulation promotes stability. 
Another group of writers; Yan et al.(2012); Calmes and Thiertet (2013); King 
(2013);Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014); Hong et al(2014) using regression and 
accounting based methodologies also conclude that the Basel capital reforms 
impact on liquidity which also lead to improved banking sector stability.   
A number of studies, Klomp and De Haan (2012); Berger and Bowman (2013) 
compare the impact of capital ratios on low risk and high risk and small and 
large banks. Contrary to the above, Klomp and De Haan (2012) find that the 
impact of regulation and supervision on bank risk taking is not uniform with the 
finding that regulation and supervision do not have an effect on low risk banks.  
Berger and Bowman (2013) find that capital enhances the survival of medium to 
large banks only during a banking crisis.  They conclude that capital ratios 
correlate positively with the stability of small banks. Likewise, low risk banks are 
less affected by capital ratios. 
The majority of empirical studies by Barrell et al.(2009); Kato et al(2010); Wang 
et al.(2010); Miles et al.(2011); Calmes and Thiertet (2013); King (2013); 
Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014); Hong et al. (2014); Vazquez and Federico 
(2015) used liquidity(LCR and NSFR), capital ratios and Z-score as proxy 
measures of bank-level stability.  The majority of the studies conclude that the 
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introduction of leverage capital ratio notably LR and LCR will improve stability.  
Specific country studies by Barrell et al.(2009); Kato et al(2010); Wang et 
al.(2010); and Miles et al.(2011), found that Basel III capital and liquidity ratios  
will improve bank stability.  
3.2.5 CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Tables 3.1a- 3.1c show the summary of literature on prudential regulation and 
bank stability.  The critical review of empirical literature shows that they are 
largely post crisis literature.  Empirically they do not reflect full implementation 
yet which will take effect in 2018. Bank stability criteria have not been defined 
consistently with varying variables.  Methods of estimation also yield different 
results.   On balance capital regulation positively affects banking stability. 
However, it is unclear how the whole architecture performs over the cycle, 
considering also that risk weights themselves may be cyclical and that there are 
also countercyclical buffers. In addition, critics of the leverage ratio suggest that 
it incentivises riskier lending. This is not decisive however. Research at the ECB 
showed that this effect is small and outweighed by the benefit of greater loss 
absorbing capacity (Grill et al. 2016).  
Finally, the evidence of the impact of Basel III on sub-Saharan countries’ 
banking system is scarce because most are yet to implement the Basel II 
except for South Africa (Enoch et al. 2015). 
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3.3.0 PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION AND BANK STABILITY 
The prudential supervisory activities of regulators include: licensing, 
authorisation, chartering of financial institutions(‘fit and proper’ test); the on-
going monitoring of the health of an institution and financial system, especially, 
asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity, internal controls; the sanctioning or 
imposition of penalties in cases of non-compliance; and crisis management, 
including insolvency procedures.  Supervisory regulations typically include loan 
classification, stringency provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines, 
and regulations fostering information disclosures and private sector monitoring 
of banks (Ashton 2013). 
3.3.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
The first theory holds that a strong official supervision of banks can improve 
their corporate governance, known as the “supervisory power view.” The 
second is the “political/regulatory capture view,” which argues that politicians 
and supervisors do not maximise social welfare; they instead maximise their 
own private welfare.  The third is the “private empowerment view” which argues 
that bank supervisory policies should focus on enhancing the ability and 
incentives of private agents to overcome information and transaction costs, so 
that private investors can exert effective governance over banks (Ashton 2013). 
In their highly stylised model, Buck and Schliephake (2013) introduce 
supervision and capital standards as parameters that respectively govern the 
banking sector directly and indirectly in the development of efficient banks.   In 
their model, supervisory effort is endogenised. The model output leads to their 
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argument that if countries are not homogeneous with respect to their 
supervisory efficiency or degree of capturing, any international capital 
requirement standard such as the Basel Accord, that neglects supervisory 
efforts leaves room for free-riding, and thus may even destabilise the global 
financial sector. Their model suggests that the implementation of binding 
minimum supervisory standards is essential for international financial stability. 
3.3.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Several studies examine the effectiveness of bank regulation and supervision 
on bank stability, and the empirical evidence on the relationship are mixed.  
Demirgüc¸-Kunt et al. (2008), who focus on bank-level indicators for 203 banks 
from 39 countries, report a positive correlation between bank soundness using 
the Z-score and the overall index of Basel Core Principles (BCP) compliance as 
an indicator of good regulation and supervision.  
 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) found no convincing evidence that tighter regulation in 
general was associated with better bank performance in their sample of 164 
large banks (assets in excess of $50billion in 2006) from 32 countries during the 
crisis or with less risky banks before the crisis. Similar findings are reported by 
Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2011). Employing data of 3000 banks from 
86 countries, they do not find support for the hypothesis that better regulation 
and supervision result in sounder banks.  
 
 However, there is also some evidence suggesting that better regulation 
reduces bank riskiness. Using data of almost 200 banks from OECD countries 
for the period of 2002 to 2008, Klomp and De Haan (2012) show that while bank 
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regulation has little impact on risk taking by low-risk banks, it significantly alters 
the behaviour of high-risk banks.  Similar results are reported by Klomp and De 
Haan (2015a) for a sample of emerging and developing countries.  
Carretta et al. (2015) extend the literature on supervision and bank stability 
examining the supervisory cultural orientation on bank stability. Using a sample 
of 6,000 banks in 15 EU countries, they reported that supervisory culture 
oriented towards power distance and normative are not effective in increasing 
stability.  On the other hand, greater supervisory cultural orientation to 
collectivism increases stability. 
 
Shehzad and De Haan (2015) identify different types of powers assigned to 
supervisory agencies before the recent financial crisis and examine the extent 
to which these powers are related to riskiness of banks in high-income OECD 
countries during the crisis. They conclude that monetary penalties may lead to 
reduced effort by management in deciding on the selection of loans given the 
lower monetary incentives. In contrast, supervisory powers to introduce 
organisational changes that put the managers’ jobs and owners’ profits at risk 
can induce more discipline. 
 
3.3.3 CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
  AND BANK STABILITY 
Tables 3.2a and 3.2b present some empirical literature work on prudential 
supervision and bank stability. There still remains lack of uniformly defined and 
internationally accepted supervisory standards due to the unobservability and 
non-contractibility of supervisory standards (Buck and Schliephake 2013). Again 
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countries are not homogeneous with respect to their supervisory efficiency or 
degree of capturing banking risk, due to variations that exist in supervisory 
culture, structure and scope of supervisory activities.   
 
Supervisory importance also varies depending on whether the sample is 
developed, emerging or developing country.  This leads to mixed results about 
the significance of supervisory activities as a standalone measure in 
guaranteeing banking stability.  Again differences that exist between bank –
based and market based financial systems lead to different measures of 
stability measures in the examination of the relationship with supervisory 
practices.  The research undertaken so far does not provide the indices that 
reflect the stance of regulators as being active or passive during the crisis. 
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3.4.0 BANKING ENTRY AND BANKING STABILITY 
The liberalisation of the banking sector to competition both within and across 
borders of countries has led to two strands of literature that the role of market 
structure emerges as a crucial topic.  Both economic theory and empirical 
evidence are inconclusive about the impact of increasing banking market 
concentration on financial stability (Uhde and Heimeshoff 2009). 
3.4.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
More precisely, the impact of competition and market concentration on the 
probability of a financial crisis appears to be of primary interest. There are two 
opposing theories “competition-fragility” and “competition –stability” nexus with 
the predictions of theory being ambiguous (Bretschger et al. 2012). 
  
A positive relationship between market concentration and financial system 
stability is observed when more concentrated markets allow banks to earn 
higher profits, which serve as a buffer against unexpected shocks 
(concentration-stability hypothesis). On the contrary, higher market 
concentration is associated with lower financial stability when market power 
induces banks to charge higher interest rates to borrowers, so that borrowers 
take excessive risks and raise the risk of default and destabilisation 
(concentration-fragility hypothesis). 
 
In their theoretical models, Martinez- Miera and Repullo(2010) and Hakenes 
and Schnabel (2011) and show that a lower correlation of loan defaults makes it 
more likely that fiercer competition harms stability.  If default correlation is high, 
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one expects to see a reduction in the probability that competition–fragility view 
is favoured over the competition-stability model (Beck et al. 2013).   
 
 Freixas and Ma(2013) developed a model in which leverage is made 
endogenous.  Their model shows that the effect of competition on stability 
differs from different measures of bank stability and different types of banks.  
This finding may explain the inconclusive results in the competition-stability 
nexus from the empirical literature (Bremus 2015).   
  
Berger et al. (2009), using data for banks in 23 industrialised countries, had 
earlier shown that the two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield 
opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on 
stability in banking.  
 
3.4.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Many empirical studies (Turk- Aris 2010; Agoraki et al. 2011; Beck et al. 2013; 
Fu et al. 2014) support the competition–fragility hypothesis.   Beck et al. (2013) 
study results suggest that an increase in competition is associated with a larger 
rise in bank fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic 
fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance 
and more effective systems of credit information sharing. 
Contrary to these empirical results, many studies (Uhde and Heimstoff 2009; 
Amidu and Wolfe 2013; Mirzaei et al. 2013; Cihak and Schaeck 2014) support 
the competition–stability hypothesis. 
 
  
95 
 
This hypothesis is confirmed by Čihák et al. (2013). They show that banks hold 
higher capital ratios in more competitive environments in the context of 
European banking. Amidu and Wolfe (2013) reach a similar conclusion in the 
case of developing and emerging countries.  
 
 Čihák and Schaeck (2014) suggest that efficiency is the conduit through which 
competition contributes to stability. Mirzaei et al.(2013) utilising data from 23 
emerging economies and 17 Western European countries for 1929 banks over 
the period 1999 to 2008, evidence highlights that profitability and stability 
increase with an increased interest margin revenues in a less competitive 
environment for emerging economies.   
 
There are other empirical studies (Berger et al. 2009; Tabak et al. 2012; 
Cubillas and Gonzalez, 2014) that provide mixed results and stress that the 
effect of competition on stability depends on institutional structures, capital 
market development, the economic environment and the stringency of 
regulation and supervisory standards. 
 
Tabak et al. (2012) use bank data from 10 Latin American countries from 2003 
to 2008 and find evidence that the relationship between competition and risk-
taking is non-linear. That is, both high and low levels of competition significantly 
increase bank stability, while the opposite is true under moderate competition. 
Cubillas and González (2014) analyse the channels through which financial 
liberalisation affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4,333 banks 
in 83 countries, including Ghana, from 1991 – 2007.  They conclude that 
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financial liberalisation increases bank risk-taking worldwide but through different 
channels depending on economic development or institutions. 
 
 Also, Moyo et al. (2014) using information on more than 600 banks in 16 SSA 
countries over the period 1995-2010, they document that banks are more stable 
in countries with competitive banking systems (higher level of H-statistic) but 
conclude that there is no clear-cut relationship between competition-stability 
and competition-fragility, as this is contingent on government pursuing sound 
macroeconomic policies and enhancing effectiveness of institutions to allow the 
banking sector to thrive. 
 
3.4.3 CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ENTRY AND BANK 
  STABILITY 
Tables 3.3a – 3.3d present some empirical literature work on entry and bank 
stability. There is no academic consensus on whether bank competition leads to 
more or less financial soundness. Some studies support the competition-fragility 
view, while others find positive links between competition and bank stability (see 
Table 3.3a -3.3c). These studies differ in their samples and in the measures of 
competition employed. Channels whereby competition impacts bank soundness 
remain imperfectly known.  Known theoretical models had focussed on closed 
economy set ups.  The recent use of open economy through foreign loans and 
foreign direct investment to address the issue by Bremus(2015) can be seen in 
that light.  The modelling of a bank’s risk taking and leverage decisions explicitly 
in a framework with heterogeneous banks could allow for the shedding of light 
on the stability implications of international banking competition. 
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3.5.0 BANKING RESOLUTION AND BANKING STABILITY 
In almost all countries, bank regulation involves the provision of a government 
safety net for banks and their depositors. In fulfilling this task, Bagehot believed 
that the central bank should be guided by four main principles: (1) lend freely 
and to the public, (2) at a penalty rate, (3) to any actors with good collateral (4) 
who are illiquid but solvent. These principles, described in more detail below, 
constitute Bagehot’s invaluable contribution to lender of last resort (LoLR) 
theory (Oganesyan 2013). 
Thus, the traditional LoLR function has been modified as a result of the recent 
crisis, and the main features of the modern LoLR have been found to include 
provision of liquidity and collateral, lowering interest rates and expansionary 
monetary policy, loosening collateral standards, supporting critical institutions, 
opening special liquidity facilities that target specific markets or groups of 
agents, and becoming the market maker of last resort (MMLR) and buyer of last 
resort(BLR) (Nier 2009). 
Carlson et al. (2015) argue that LOLR lending and liquidity regulations are 
complementary tools. Liquidity shortfalls can arise for two very different reasons 
based on liquidity and solvency concerns. For example, sound institutions can 
face runs or some deterioration in the liquidity of markets they depend on for 
funding.  In addition, solvency concerns can cause creditors to pull away from 
troubled institutions. Using examples from the recent crisis, they argue that 
central bank lending is the best response in the former situation, while orderly 
resolution (by the institution as it gets through the problem on its own or via a 
controlled failure) is the best response in the second situation. They further 
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contend that liquidity regulations are needed in both situations as such 
regulations help ensure that the authorities will have time to assess the nature 
of the shortfall and arrange the appropriate response.  Liquidity regulations also 
provide an incentive for banks to internalise the externalities associated with 
any liquidity risks(Carlson et al. 2015).  
The next important component of government safety net is a deposit insurance 
scheme. Deposit insurance is generally considered an important part of the 
regulatory structure for the banking system. This structure should protect the 
‘‘safety and soundness’’ of the banking system while providing banks with the 
appropriate rules and incentives to allocate credit and liquidity efficiently 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015). 
 
3.5.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The theoretical literature provides both positive and normative strands 
(Engineer 2013).  A recent positive model of deposit insurance scheme is like 
the outcome of a non-co-operative policy game between nations (Engineer 
2013).  In this model, government can subsidise domestic banks through 
deposit insurance.  This model assumes that depositors and government are 
rational actors.  National governments choose the level of deposit insurance to 
maximise their citizen’s welfare, taking into account the endogenous behaviour 
of utility maximising depositors.  The model ignores moral hazard issues and 
further assumes that entities are linked through international deposit flows.  The 
inclusion of international competition for depositors generates a complex 
regulatory game, even though the model controls and excludes panic-based 
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bank runs which are contrary in standard normative models of insurance by 
Morrison and White (2011), where such subsidy are inefficient and are 
motivated by intergovernmental competition.  Using a normative model, with 
both moral hazard and adverse selection, they show that government provided 
deposit insurance can act as an efficient subsidised recapitalisation. 
The positive model therefore suggests that nations compete for deposits in 
order to protect their banking system from the destabilising impact of potential 
capital flight.  Policies are chosen to attract depositors who optimally respond to 
the expected return to deposits, which depends on deposit insurance levels, 
systemic risks and transaction costs (Engineer 2013). 
3.5.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
While deposit insurance is aimed at ensuring depositor confidence and to 
prevent bank runs, it comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging 
banks to take on excessive risk (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015).  Anginer et 
al.(2014)  studied  the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and 
system fragility during the global financial crisis and the period preceding it. 
Using a sample of 4109 publicly traded banks in 96 countries they show that 
generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the 
years leading up to the crisis. They stress the importance of the underlying 
regulatory and institutional framework and lend support to the view that 
fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring 
systemic stability. 
 
In line with this observation, Fonseca and Gonzàlez (2010) demonstrate using 
data for 1337 banks in 70 countries that capital buffers are higher in countries 
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with better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance by 
strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce 
risk-taking incentives.  
  
Other studies by (Angkinand and Wihlborg 2010; Forssbaeck 2011; Beltratti and 
Stulz 2012; Demirguc-Kunt et al.2015) point to the fact that the effect of deposit 
insurance on stability depends on scope, supervisory quality and government 
support. 
 
However, the literature does not agree on insured deposit rates and runoffs in 
response to idiosyncratic institutional stress measures. While a few papers 
document some level of both increased rates and decreased quantities at 
struggling institutions, others fail to find such a result. The mixed results hold for 
both empirical studies and for case studies.  
 
  A recent study by Acharya and Mora (2012) also show using examples of US, 
German, Irish and British banks and their depositors, that banks were not as 
able to provide liquidity as would be implied by theory and evidence from other 
crises. Their findings show that when an aggregate shock risks the sovereign 
itself, the standard argument that banks function well as liquidity providers can 
fail due to the poor quality of deposit insurance.   Furthermore, Imai and 
Takarabe (2011) found similar evidence of uninsured deposit outflows in Japan 
in 2002 as the government removed a blanket guarantee in favour of a cap. 
Following the removal of the guarantee, weak banks’ uninsured time deposits 
fell and these banks were unable to compensate with increases in insured 
deposits, leading to a contraction in credit supply. Iyer and Puri (2012) find that 
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uninsured deposits run during stress events using data from India. Their finding 
is consistent with the other literature finding that these outflows are significantly 
greater for uninsured depositors.  
 
3.5.3 CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
Tables 3.4a and 3.4b present some empirical literature work on bank safety and 
bank stability. The literature on the impact of central banks of developing 
economies in sub-Saharan Africa not having the capacity to play the role 
required of a modern lender of last resort (LLR) is scarce.  The literature shows 
that countries have explicit and implicit deposit insurance schemes.  The 
adverse distributional effects of generous schemes underscored the strengths 
and weaknesses of different deposit insurance scheme features.   
 
The literature does not show the transmission process through which the 
stability of the banking sector has been secured as a result of a country 
introducing a deposit insurance scheme. The literature shows largely post event 
effect of the deposit insurance protection schemes in various countries (Iyer and 
Puri 2012).  The current coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis 
levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going 
forward(Demirguc-Kunt  et al. 2015). 
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3.6.0 BANKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING STABILITY 
Bank governance refers to the implicit and explicit contractual relationships 
influencing the incentives of bank managers.  In corporate governance literature 
it is usually assumed that managers in a good governance system maximise 
shareholders wealth while the incentives to serve the interest of other 
stakeholders are provided by market forces, law, and regulation (Angkinand and 
Wihlborg 2010).   
 
The evidence on governance mechanisms includes boards, ownership 
structures, and executive compensation (De Haan and Vlahu 2013). Academic 
theory has long suggested a strong link between governance and risk-taking 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
The various ownership structures lead to differences in how the purposes of an 
organisation are shaped and how strategies are developed as well as the role 
and composition of boards(Johnson et al.(2011).  Johnson et al.(2011) suggest 
that there are two broad governance structures: the shareholder model and the 
stakeholder model. 
 
The shareholder model is epitomised by the economies of the US and UK.  The 
shareholders have legitimate primacy in relation to the wealth generated by the 
corporations, rather than the rights of other stakeholders such as employees, 
union representatives and financiers. However, proponents argue that 
maximising shareholder value benefits other stakeholders too (Johnston et 
al.2011: 129-132). At least in principle, the trading of shares provides a 
regulatory mechanism for maximising shareholder value.  Dissatisfied 
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shareholders may sell their shares, the result being a drop in share price and 
the threat of takeover for underperforming firms.  So the shareholder interest in 
a company is assumed to be largely financial (Johnston et al. 2011: 129 -132). 
 
The stakeholder model of governance is founded on the principle that wealth is 
created, captured and distributed by a variety of stakeholders.  This may include 
shareholders but could include family holdings, and other investors.  As such 
management is responsive to multiple stakeholders. Germany, Italy and Japan 
are often cited as examples of the stakeholder model (Johnston et al. 2011).  
 
3.6.1 SHAREHOLDER VALUE (SHV) THEORY AND STAKEHOLDER VALUE 
(STV) MAXIMISATION THEORY AND BANKING STABILITY 
Ferri and Leogrande(2015)  classify banks depending on whether they follow a 
STV or a SHV maximisation model. Cooperative banks, savings banks, credit 
unions traditionally apply an STV maximisation model while commercial banks 
and non-banking financial intermediaries apply an SHV maximisation model as 
a strategy to maximise profits (Coco and Ferri 2010).  
Academic literature on bank asset –side focuses on loans and credit 
commitments. Bank loans are considered to be special because banks monitor 
borrowers (Gorton 2009).  Banks have private information about borrowers 
when they perform credit assessment of loans at the initiation of loan. This is 
signalled to the market in the decision to lend to the borrower.   
Pecking order theory indicates that bank loans typically precede borrowing in 
the bond market for firms, thus banks are the first to certify a company as a 
  
110 
 
worthy borrower.  The conclusion of academics is that bank loans will not be 
sold(Gorton 2009).  This is because if loans are sold, the bank would have no 
reason to produce the private loan information or to monitor the borrower over 
the life of the loan.  
 This is the basis of the traditional originate –to- hold (OTH) strategy which 
signals that a bank is predisposed to a relationship banking model. This means 
also that OTH is the most appropriate credit management model for STV banks. 
The tendency to a correspondence between OTH and STV descends from the 
fact that heterogeneous stakes are guaranteed: i.e. shareholders and borrowers 
at least (Ferri and Leogrande 2015). 
Shareholder theory focuses on shareholder value maximisation and adopts the 
originate-to- distribute (OTD) credit management model as against the originate 
–to-hold (OTH) credit management model (Ferri and Leogrande 2015). A major 
distinction between the two models hinges on the way they respectively 
influence the strategic management of the banks.  According to Parmar et 
al.(2010) the stakeholder theory augments resource –based theory to provide 
the practical motivation for firms to act responsibly with regard to stakeholders 
interest, thereby addressing both the problem of value creation and trade and 
the problem of ethics of capitalism.   
The STV-OTH banks have a long-run perspective, organise their resources to 
obtain long run goals, and at the same time can develop long-run relationships 
with non-shareholder constituencies.  This underscores the higher resilience of 
STV-OTH banks to the crisis leading to three key differences which clearly 
stand out (Ferri and Leogrande 2015).  
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First, SHV-OTD banks cannot develop an efficient management to obtain long 
term goals since, as said, the structure of risks and the mechanism of building 
adequate capital reserves are falsified by the credit management model (Ferri 
et al. 2014). 
Second, because the SHV-OTD focuses on the supply side, it creates 
incomplete contracts and markets. Banks that maximise SHV tend to use 
explicit credit contracts, evaluated on the basis of statistical analyses of risk, 
and often build collateralised contracts, via securitisation.  
Third, in terms of efficiency, generally STV-OTH banks have a higher net 
interest margin (NIM) and lower Credit Deposit ratio (Caprio et al. 2014) and 
respect capital ratios via a more conservative management system. STV-OTH 
banks may be more sustainable (Coco and Ferri 2010). STV-OTH banks take 
less risk even in a pure accounting sense by checking borrowers’ quality.  In 
terms of risk and its impact of stability, the change from OTH to OTD and that 
from STV to SHV raised risks for the banking sector, financial markets and 
macro-financial stability.  
3.6.2 AGENCY THEORY AND BANKING STABILITY 
Banking literature on agency theory and stability follows a stand of literature 
which examines the nature of ownership relationships which give rise agency 
issues and how they impact on compensation and board structures.  
 
Agency theory is the theory of the relationship between a principal e.g. a 
shareholder, and an agent of the principal e.g. a company’s manager.  An 
agency relationship may lead to some agency costs that are losses that arise 
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when an agent (e.g. a manager) does not act solely in the interest of the 
principal (Brealey et al. 2011:910). This will require that the principal takes 
measure to align its interest with the agents to achieve the expected results.  So 
many factors influence the behaviour of the agent such as the monitoring of 
their activities, control of their decisions through the board, sanction for non-
performance in place depending on both internal (from the shareholders) 
directly or indirectly through market discipline and regulation(Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013). 
 
3.6.3 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
Economists for a long time used to assume without question that players that 
make up modern corporations such as managers, employees, shareholders and 
bondholders acted for the common good but recent experience over the past 30 
years show that there are conflicts of interests (Brealey et al.2008:969).  In 
addition, the property rights theory and legal approach to finance affirm that 
shareholders are the rightful owners of modern listed firms (Marcelin and 
Mathur 2015) whereas agency theory posits that managers are agents of 
shareholders (principals) that run the firm on their behalf(Brealey et al. 2011).  
However, banking literature on governance and bank stability (Bai and Elyasiani  
2013; Dermine 2013) indicate that there are conflicts between shareholders and 
managers, where it is hypothesised that managers diverge shareholders 
interest and reduce and / or appropriate the shareholders’ wealth unless there is 
alignment of reward which allow managers to share the gains from the risky 
projects with the shareholders.  This is the well-known principal-agency problem 
within many firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
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One means of aligning incentives between the two is to remunerate bank 
managers in equity. That has become a widespread practice during recent 
years, particularly within the financial sector. To take a striking example, in 2006 
the typical bank CEO’s wealth rose by $1 million for every 1% increase in the 
value of their firm (Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011). 
 
Compensating managers in equity is not, however, without cost.  By aligning 
managerial incentives with shareholders, the risk-shifting problem is potentially 
exacerbated. This includes incentives to ‘‘gamble for resurrection’’ when firms 
are nearing insolvency. Evidence during the crisis is revealing here. In short, in 
solving one principal/agent problem (between managers/shareholders), equity-
based pay may have worsened another (between shareholders/debt-holders). 
 
The second incentive argues Haldane (2012b) is that, the limited liability gives 
rise to a principal- agent problem between shareholders and debt-holders. And 
they are why double or even treble liability persisted in banking long after 
unlimited liability had been abolished (Haldane 2012b).  The limited liability also 
leads to banker-depositor conflicts which have always caused excessive fragility 
in banking. Since banks’ assets are often opaque, concerns about the quality of 
the assets can lead to panics and runs. Such concerns are less likely, however, 
if banks have significant equity funding from owners or shareholders, which 
allows them to continue to pay their debts and invest even after losses. In the 
nineteenth century, when banks in the UK were unlimited-liability partnerships, 
they routinely funded 50 percent of their investments by equity, and their 
owners’ personal assets could be tapped to pay depositors (Haldane 2012b; 
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Admiti 2015). To reduce the likelihood of a costly run, a bank has an incentive 
to protect short-term depositors with a cushion of long-term securities such as 
equity or subordinated debt that can absorb losses as a going concern. The 
protection of short-term depositors is thus compatible with shareholder value 
maximisation (Dermine 2013). 
 
The agency problems of banks are exacerbated by the presence of government 
guarantees and deposit insurance, which distort bankers’ incentives and 
encourage risk-taking. In addition, the special role of banks and the negative 
externalities of their failure make banks’ agency problems costlier for the 
economy (De Haan and Vlahu 2013).   
 
A third incentives issue is moral hazard. In principle, if risk is shifted to debt-
holders they ought to seek compensation through higher yields. That, in turn, 
would impose a degree of discipline on shareholder/manager incentives to risk-
shift (Haldane 2012b).  
  
 However from the viewpoint of depositors, deposit insurers and regulators, for 
whom the stability of banks is the principal objective, providing bank managers 
with less equity- based compensation (EBC) is more desirable to prevent 
managers’ incentives to adopt risky projects (Bai and Elyasiani 2013). 
 
3.6.4 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The literature relating financial stability to the OTH model stressing that, banks 
can promote stability when they retain an STV-OTH model. In this case banks 
can stabilise the business cycle and also be instruments for economic growth, 
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while the structure of risks in the financial system can be controlled by 
regulatory reserves and this can help to stabilise the business cycle (Ferri et al. 
2014).  The empirical evidence supports the theory.  
 
Empirical evidence on governance structure in relation to stakeholders and the 
shareholder model has been provided by Beltratti and Stulz(2012); Caprio et 
al.(2014); D’Apice et al.(2014);Ferri et al.(2014); and Lemzeri(2014).  They   
point to the fact that SHV-OTH model banks are less susceptible to 
procyclicality and therefore are more stable. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) who 
examined 25 Asian banks from 2005 to 2009 show that banks with more 
shareholder-friendly governance performed worse during the crisis while 
Lemzeri (2014) who examined 15 co-operative banks and 49 joint-stock banks 
in Europe found that diversified cooperative banking groups that retained the 
main features of their original model (i.e., STV orientation) contributed most to 
financial stability throughout European national banking systems. Also, Ferri et 
al. (2014) who studied 4532 banks from 12 Euro area countries show that STV 
banks, especially cooperatives, were downgraded less than SHV banks by the 
credit rating agencies. In turn, on country level data, by augmenting Caprio et 
al. (2014) who studied 9,349 banks found that countries with larger cooperative 
bank shares in their national banking system less likely suffered the 2008 
crisis.  D’Apice et al. (2014) found that traditional banks were assigned better 
ratings through 2008-2009. 
 For instance, Ferri et al. (2013) found that STV banks, especially cooperative 
banks, showed no worse, and sometimes even better, performance than SHV 
banks before the recent financial crisis.  Köhler (2015) compared the business 
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models and found that co-operative banks which engage in relationship lending 
can enhance their stability by financing their loans using core deposits which 
are unlikely to be withdrawn prematurely because they are held for liquidity 
services. 
On agency theory, empirical studies by Bai and Elyasiani(2013)who examined 
132 BHCs involving 216 CEOs from 1992-2008 found that the association 
between bank stability and managerial compensation is bidirectional.  However, 
the empirical evidence on this, as part of the bank governance mix on financial 
stability is mixed.   Angkinand and Wihlborg(2010); DeYoung et al.(2013); and 
Cheng et al.(2015) examined  the  relationship between the impact of high-
powered remuneration and stakeholder control and found that high-powered 
remuneration aligns the incentives of shareholders and managers and leads to 
higher profitability , but may have unintended effects on banks.  DeYoung et 
al.(2013) found that CEO risk-taking incentives lead to riskier business policy 
decisions (regarding loans to business, non-interest based banking activities, 
and investment in mortgage-backed) at US commercial banks over the 1994 -
2006 period, especially in the second half of the period after deregulation.  In 
contrast, Fahlenbrach and Stulz(2011)  found some evidence that US banks 
with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of 
shareholders in 2006 had a worse share price performance during the 
subsequent crisis.  The literature confirms that high-powered remuneration led 
banks to take more risk and then suffer losses during the recent crisis. 
Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi(2015) and Berger et al.(2012) examined how 
ownership structure impacts on performance and default probabilities of banks 
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respectively.  Both findings support the view that ownership structure does 
matter in explaining cross-variation in bank performance and default 
probabilities respectively. Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015) studied 750 
commercial banks based in 17 western counties between 2002 and 2010 and 
found that shareholders with excess control rights positively impacted on 
profitability and risks.  Berger et al.(2012) examined 249 default and 4,021 no 
default US commercial banks between 2007 and 2010 and found that where the 
shareholding of a bank has fewer outsider director and chief officer 
shareholding and more of other corporate insiders shareholding notably lower –
level managers, such as vice presidents or departmental heads, are more likely 
to default, indicating the importance the ownership structure plays in explaining 
the default likelihood.  They argue that lower-level managers with large shares 
may take on more risk because of the moral hazard problem.  Outside directors 
and chief officers are vilified in the event of default, so that the moral hazard 
problem may not apply as much to them.  This finding supports the current 
regulation on compensation (Fullenkamp 2013). 
3.6.5 CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON GOVERNANCE MODEL AND 
BANK STABILITY 
Tables 3.5a – 3.5c present some empirical literature work on bank governance 
and bank stability. The literature does not analyse the impact of Basel III on the 
governance models notably that of STV banks.  The study is also skewed 
towards big banks, notably the BHCs that pursue a SHV model of governance.  
It is possible that the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and systemic risk is induced and is different in more normal financial conditions. 
  
118 
 
Given that corporate governance structure changes slowly, a longer sample 
period would also allow for the analysis of whether changes in governance 
mechanisms affect systemic risks. Again the literature is silent on how the 
various roles of board members affect bank stability.  Furthermore, the literature 
is largely limited to bank performance with few examining how and through 
which channel specific governance structures and observable board 
characteristics influence bank stability and the systemic risk of financial 
institutions, particularly in sub–Saharan Africa. 
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3.7.0 BANK ACCOUNTING, MONITORING AND BANKING STABILITY 
Banking supervision, regulatory reporting requirements and key supervisory 
ratios such as the CAMELS variables, Basel III risk adjusted capital, liquidity 
and leverage ratios are to a great extent based on accounting data and 
measures.  These measures range from simple book measures based on bank-
level bottom –line accounting numbers, such as leverage ratio, to sophisticated 
market or book measures based on a portfolio-level model, such as value at risk 
(Acharya and Ryan 2015).  Therefore, the effectiveness of banking supervision 
is influenced by the choice of accounting framework on the part of the banks 
supervised (Schwartz et al. 2014).   
 
Banks take on risks that are opaque and difficult to verify (Bushman 2014).  
Financial statements not only record the financial situation of a reporting entity, 
they also influence its management and investor decisions. Consequently, 
financial statements and accounting rules influence the level of bank risk taking 
indicated by the level of lending and loan loss provisioning behaviour, which 
may in turn have an effect on financial or banking system stability (Schwartz et 
al. 2014). The role of managerial discretion over accounting decisions influence 
bank stability through two accounting channels: accounting numbers as 
numerical quantities and bank transparency (Bushman 2014). 
 
 Bank transparency is defined as the availability to outside stakeholders of 
relevant, reliable information about the periodic performance, financial position, 
business model, governance, value, and risks of banks (Bushman 2014).  
Bushman (2014) again stresses that financial accounting is a powerful point of 
  
123 
 
entry for empirical investigation into the economic consequences of bank 
transparency.  Ratnovski (2013) had earlier defined transparency as a set of ex-
ante choices that determine the presence of credible communication channels, 
with the key cost of transparency being lower benefits of control.  This definition 
distinguishes transparency from disclosure which is an ex-post action and 
therefore regulation of disclosure is not sufficient to achieve transparency when 
banks can manipulate or obfuscate information especially in the period of 
liquidity crisis, since a distressed firm has high incentives to manipulate 
information.  On the contrary, Huang and Ratnovski(2011) also provide 
evidence that although transparency renders banks unable to conceal negative 
but not the possibly of incorrect news about solvency.  Therefore, the emphasis 
on verifiable outcomes produces a rich set of variables that support a wide 
range of enforceable contractual arrangements and that form the basis for 
outsiders to monitor and discipline the actions and statements of insiders (Basel 
Committee 2015).  Again the variable outcomes are central to the efficacy of 
market discipline and non-market mechanisms in limiting the debt and risk 
overhang problems (Acharya and Ryan 2015:4). 
 
An area of transparency relates to impairment.  A well-functioning impairment 
model is of paramount importance for an amortised cost measurement to be 
reliable and credible (Hoogervorst 2012).  Transparency is therefore a 
necessary precondition of stability (Hoogervorst 2012). 
 
 
 
  
124 
 
3.7.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The theoretical literature on accounting and bank stability follows from the bank 
capital crunch theory which expresses the need to mitigate pro-cyclical features 
of capital regulations partly caused by capital regulation accounting rules and 
standards.  These capital regulation accounting rules and standards are 
therefore important elements in enhancing the stability of the financial 
system(Schwartz et al. 2014).   Bank capital crunch theory recognises the pro-
cyclical provisioning hypothesis and fair valuation method in accounting as 
drivers.   Pro-cyclicality is the exaggeration of cyclical tendencies in aggregate 
economic activity (Beatty and Liao 2011).  
  
Capital crunch theory predicts that capital adequacy regulation combined with 
market imperfections leads to pro-cyclical bank lending.    Specifically, banks 
reduce lending more to avoid potential future violations of regulatory capital 
minimums during recessions relative to expansions (Beatty and Liao 2011). 
Since banks have to hold capital against the risks inherent in their operations, 
they may then be forced to reduce lending or sell assets. In economic booms 
these effects reverse such that banks may further expand lending or buy assets 
(Beatty and Liao 2014). 
  
Regulators and policymakers argue that current loan loss provisioning rules 
under International Accounting Standard 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement (IAS 39), reinforce the pro-cyclical capital effect through its 
fair value measurement and impairment rules.  At the bank level, it provides 
room for delayed recognition of losses, which also can lead to higher cost of 
equity financing, availability of credit funding and terms demanded by creditors 
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to supply such funds (Ratnovski 2013; Archarya and Ryan 2015).  Delayed 
recognition of expected loss is associated with higher stock market illiquidity 
and a higher correlation between bank-level illiquidity and aggregate bank 
sector illiquidity and market returns during recessions (Beatty and Liao 2011; 
Bushman and Williams 2014). 
 
A forward looking loan provisioning under IFRS 9: Financial Instruments 
(Schwartz et al. 2014) is supported by regulators given these macro-economic 
concerns with the current incurred-loss provisioning method (Beatty and Liao 
2011).  It is a mixed measurement model (Hoogervorst 2012). In IFRS 9, 
financial instruments that have basic loan features and are managed on a 
contractual yield basis are measured at amortised cost. In contrast to the 
incurred loss model, the so-called “expected loss model” under IFRS 9 – 
Financial Instruments, implements a forward-looking methodology. Under this 
model, impairments can be made in a timelier manner, potentially dampening 
pro-cyclicality. Pro-cyclicality in bank lending may arise from the immediate and 
excessive recognition of losses in economic downturns, leading to a reduction 
in the capital base of banks (Beatty and Liao 2014). Credit losses that are 
expected to occur are reflected over the life span of credits, providing useful 
information for investors.  
  
 
 According to IFRS 13, fair value is the price that would be received to sell an 
asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants at the measurement date.  Using fair values to value banks assets 
and liabilities have the benefits of reflecting current market conditions and 
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providing timely information (Schwartz et al. 2014).  Fair value accounting was 
intended to increase transparency and thus reinforce disciplining effects 
imposed by the markets. The excessive use of fair value measurement can 
theoretically, affect the stability of banks because it can introduce unintended 
volatility and procyclicality, thus requiring some enhancements (Scalata et al. 
2008).   
 
 In contrast, Acharya and Ryan (2015) recently provide four a-prior strong 
reasons that exist to suggest that fair value accounting has had relatively minor 
effects on capital and thus stability to date. The four reasons are as follows: (i) 
banks primary types of financial instruments (loans and deposits) are measured 
at amortised cost and not fair value; (ii) the definition of fair value does not 
mention fire sale, thereby reducing the effect of market liquidity on fair value 
estimates; (iii) regulatory filters exclude unrealised gains and losses particularly 
on available for sale (AFS) debt securities that bank’s only commonly hold and 
generally recognised them at fair value; and (iv) gains and losses on low –credit 
risk debt instruments have counter-cyclical effects on regulatory capital (Xie 
2015). 
 
Among others, Scalata et al. (2008) have concluded that despite the problems 
encountered with fair value accounting, it is still the most appropriate way of 
valuing financial instruments. 
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3.7.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Some positive evidence from empirical studies (Jarolim and Öppinger 2012; 
Beatty and Liao 2011, 2014) find that the accounting rules did indeed have a 
significant effect on banks’ income statements and may thus have exacerbated 
the impact of the crisis. Jarolim and Öppinger (2012) empirically analysed the 
reaction of the European banking sector to the aforementioned amendments to 
the rules on reclassification of financial assets from October 2008 by focusing 
on 52 of the 80 banks included in the STOXX® Europe TMI Banks index. They 
show that this reclassification option was used quite extensively by some banks 
and, on average, it avoided recognition of accounting losses of almost €900 
million per bank. The study reveals that banks could have run into substantial 
problems if the rules had not been amended at the peak of the crisis.  
 
Beatty and Liao (2011) consistent with the capital crunch hypothesis, find a 
higher association between lending and risk-based capital ratios during 
recessions. They also find a stronger capital crunch effect for banks with assets 
greater than $500million. Consistent with the pro-cyclical provisioning 
hypothesis they further observe a greater reduction in lending during recessions 
by banks that delay expected loss recognition more compared with banks that 
delay less.  Additionally, they find that the smaller delay banks demonstrate less 
association between capital and lending. These results hold for both the loan 
loss specific market measures and management quality partitions. Furthermore, 
they find that smaller delay banks increase their pre- provision equity more 
during expansions and that greater delay banks’ pre-provision equity is reduced 
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more during recessions. Finally, they found no evidence of a capital crunch 
during the pre-regulatory period. 
 
Contrary to the above, Georgescu and Laux (2013) find that three prominent 
German banking failures involved banks that were regulated using data based 
on historical costs. They in addition, argue that policy-makers should reject the 
notion that historical cost accounting would be more suitable for promoting 
financial stability in the future. 
 
Some recent research by Bushman and Williams (2012) and El Sood (2012) 
also failed to find clear empirical evidence that fair value accounting caused or 
significantly worsened the crisis. Bushman and Williams (2012) examined 
banks across 27 countries and found that discretionary forward-looking 
provisioning can also be used to smooth or disguise earnings. This could 
weaken market discipline, as transparency and comparability of financial 
statements may then be reduced.   
 
El Sood (2012) using a sample of 878 US bank holding companies over the 
period 2001–2009, and a multivariate regression model, find strong evidence of 
income smoothing behaviour. Comparing the pre-crisis boom of 2002–2006 
with the crisis period of 2007–2009, he finds that banks use loan loss provisions 
more extensively during the crisis period to smooth income upward.  
 
Other empirical research findings provide mixed results (Fillat and Montorial-
Garriga 2010; Chan-Lau 2012; Fernández de Lis and García- Herrero 2013). 
Fernández de Lis and García- Herrero (2013) found that the Spanish 
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provisioning model reduced pro-cyclicality but did not eliminate it.  Meanwhile, 
Fillat and Montorial-Garriga (2010) analyse the effects that the Spanish 
provisioning model would have had on 13 US banks that accessed the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) Funds during the crisis. In this hypothetical 
situation, about half of the US banks that received government support would 
not have required it. However, the provisions would not have been enough to 
cover all losses incurred, suggesting that the Spanish model is a good way of 
covering losses in “average” downturn periods, but would not suffice for a 
financial crisis that is as severe as the most recent one. 
 
Chan-Lau (2012) in a simulation exercise applied to the Chilean banking sector, 
also found that while dynamic provisioning increases the resilience of banks it 
may not dampen pro-cyclicality. Therefore, dynamic provisioning might not be 
effective for dampening pro-cyclical effects in all jurisdictions and policy makers 
should not rely solely on this approach to solve the problems encountered 
during a crisis. Instead, Chan-Lau (2012) recommends that additional counter-
cyclical measures, such as the regulatory buffers proposed by the Basel III 
regime, should be considered. 
  
Therefore, rules to limit the excessive use of fair value measurement are 
promoted by both the academic literature and regulatory and financial sector 
policy makers to prevent artificial increases in the volatility of profit and loss 
accounts that may exacerbate pro-cyclicality and undermine the resilience of 
the financial system (Schwartz et al. 2014). 
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3.7.3 CRITIQUE OF LITERATURE ON ACCOUNTING AND BANK 
  STABILITY 
Tables 3.6a and 3.6b show the summary of literature on accounting and bank 
stability.  Accounting rules can make a substantial difference to supervisory 
ratios, impeding the international comparability of key metrics required in the 
supervision process (Schwartz et al. 2014; Bushman and Landsman 2012).   
Lack of uniformity makes comparability of key accounting variables between 
bank financial results with varying accounting standards as against that using 
USA and IFRS GAPS an issue of concern for policy formulation (Schwartz et al. 
2014). 
 
Another drawback is that the pricing of non-marketable instruments or of assets 
with illiquid markets as in many developing countries is based on models and 
assumptions, leaving considerable discretion to banks vis-à-vis the 
measurement of their assets. This increases opaqueness and reduces the 
comparability of financial statements (Bushman 2012; Acharya and Ryan 2015). 
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3.8.0 SUMMARY OF PRIOR RESEARCH AND GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Regarding the study on the relationship between regulatory structures and bank 
–level stability, the literature shows that researchers(King 2013; Beatty and Liao 
2014; Cullibas and Gonzalez 2014; Hong et al. 2014;Dermine 2015; among 
several others) make use of: (i) different approaches, assumptions and 
methods; (ii) variables and measures of bank entry, exit, accounting, 
supervisory and prudential measures and bank stability; (iii) control and 
instrumental variables and their measures or proxies; (iv) block study 
categories( developed, developing countries; low income , middle and high 
income economies, OECD among others); (v) time horizon or periods for the 
sample data, and (vi) data types (cross-sectional or panel) among other things.  
The differences in the choices made might explain the mixed results and 
ambiguous conclusions in the existing empirical works. 
Hence, the important question for research is: why is the empirical evidence 
mixed or ambiguous? This question triggers the following discussion that would 
reveal the vital differences that this research would try its best to accommodate 
by following or extending some of the previous studies that would make it 
different from them. 
Firstly, many of the past studies try to analyse the effect of only one (King 2013) 
or certain country category (ECB 2014; Demirguc-Kunt and Detrigiache 2015).  
For instance, Lemzeri (2014) made their studies on stability of banks using Z-
score, ROE and Loans as proxies and the governance adopted using co-
operative and joint stock banks to ascertain the effect of SHV-OTD and STV-
OTH.  Likewise, some of the studies focusing on accounting rules governing 
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how a wide range of complex transactions are mapped into accounting 
numbers,  indicate that poor mapping between fundamental activities and 
accounting numbers can introduce significant noise into banks’ financial 
statements.  For example, Beatty and Liao (2014), show that on average only 
20% of assets are recognised at fair value in bank balance sheet in the USA as 
at December 31 of 2012.  This example is extremely helpful as it draws our 
attention to the need to assess the direct impact of a country’s characteristics 
on stability.  This research will therefore take into account the characteristics of 
the Ghanaian banking system and practices in the discussion of the research 
findings resulting from the univariate and regression analysis.   
The use of different measures of stability and the omission of some relevant 
variables might contribute to the difference in the results and ambiguity of 
conclusions.  Hence, considering this and following Chiaramonte et al.(2015) 
and Lepetit and Strobel (2015)  the empirical analysis would involve a 
comparison of the CAMELS and Z-scores at bank individual risk-taking levels  
in order to fill the gap of exclusion bias as mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.5.  
Again, because the Z-scores of the sample selected in the existing literature on 
average were not representative enough of Ghana’s bank stability figure, this 
research will make it more representative.  
Hence, unlike the previous studies, the composite CAMEL score and that of the 
Z-score will be estimated and compared to ascertain if they offer the same 
results or otherwise.  More importantly outcomes that offer a more downside 
risk will be studied further to ascertain empirically, if the drivers impact 
significantly or not on the banking stability. 
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Secondly, a literature search showed different studies that used the Z-score did 
not set an index or thresholds for the Z-score but only described it as an 
indicator for distance to default.  Again, several of the related studies which 
extend into systemic stability use market related figures as against accounting 
data which makes them inapplicable in this research as most of the banks are 
not on the stock market.  In this research, following that of Klomp and De 
Haan(2012), Chiaramonte et al. (2015) and Lepetit and Strobel(2015)  
accounting data which complies with the IFRS and Basel III, Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA)  requirements will be used to measure and establish the 
relationship between the systemic risk variables  and banking stability. 
Finally, the empirical analysis will also use several estimation procedures to 
investigate the relationship between the stability score and the bank-level and 
regulatory variables.  Hence, the procedures to be used are: (1) different types 
of robust regressions besides the OLS for primary analysis and (2) fixed effects 
and random effects regressions.  A diagnostic analysis will be undertaken to 
check the consistency of the results or evidence and to handle some 
characteristics of the sample data including issues of heteroskedasticity, 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation, which violate the OLS assumptions. Such 
violations will necessitate the use of other estimation methods when using panel 
data (Apergis 2015). 
To sum up, this research would fill the gap in the literature by accounting for 
some of the sources of differences in results or include variables that the 
existing literature on bank stability in Ghana had excluded.  These sources are: 
(1) use of composite instead of single component of CAMELS and Z-scores as 
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stability measures; (2) use of a lower threshold or level of assets which will 
accommodate the relevant banks in Ghana as indicated in chapter 2, section 
2.5; (3) include relevant variables such as interbank borrowing, risk governance 
and regulatory independence of banks in the estimation procedures as drivers 
of stability in the literature on Ghana in chapter 2, section 2.5; and (4)use of 
different estimation procedures for primary analysis and for sensitivity and 
consistency analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines and justifies the appropriate research paradigm and the 
associated elements guiding this study. It seeks to achieve three additional 
objectives.  First, is to develop the conceptual framework which shows the 
relationship between bank regulation and stability theories and bank-level risk 
taking activities.  Second, is to critically examine the literature to understand the 
causal relationship that had been established theoretically and empirically 
between the gaps identified in the literature review in chapters 2 and 3 which 
included foreign ownership and participation, bank size, interbank borrowing 
and debts, NPL, risk governance and regulatory independence and bank 
stability. Third, is to formulate the research hypotheses. 
  
4.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
A clear research philosophy is of central importance to the efficient conduct of 
any research project.  Among other things, it provides a basis for the 
methodological framework, the validity and legitimacy of the research.  The 
researcher’s philosophical view, therefore, informs and guides the whole 
research process.  A review of the literature on research methodology and 
philosophies show that there are several ways in which the various paradigms 
have been classified.  However, the various classifications can be seen as 
variations that lie in between two extreme points, the positivist view and the 
interpretivist view. 
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Collis and Hussey (2013) support the view that paradigm can be used at 
philosophical, social and technical levels.  While the philosophical level reflects 
the basic belief about the world, the social level reflects how the research 
should be conducted.  The technical level, however, specifies the methods and 
techniques that should be adopted when conducting research.  The positivist 
paradigm posits that the social world exists externally, and that its properties 
should be measured through objective methods (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015).  
The positivists paradigm approach is usually quantitative, and characterised as 
being objective, scientific and traditionalists (Collis and Hussey 2013).  In 
contrast, the interpretivist paradigm rests on the assumption that social reality is 
in the mind of the researcher. This paradigm is also characterised as being 
subjective because it is socially constructed and with each researcher having 
his or her own sense of reality, and there are multiple social realities (Collis and 
Hussey 2013). 
According to Easterby–Smith et al. (2015) the main strengths of the positivist 
paradigm are that they can provide a wide coverage of situations, fast and 
economical.  And because most data are aggregated from large samples, they 
may be of considerable relevance to policy.  They further argue that the 
positivist paradigm provides room for the researcher to focus on hard data 
rather than opinion, look for regularities in the data obtained; and allows for a 
proposition that can be generalised from a specific example to a wider 
population of organisations and situations.  On the contrary, researchers critical 
to positivism argue that rich insights into this complex world are lost if such 
complexity is reduced entirely to a series of law-like generalisation (Saunders et 
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al. 2016). Easterby–Smith et al. (2015) further discuss the limitations of 
positivisms as being inflexible and artificial and, in particular, not very helpful in 
generating theories. They further argue that much of the data gathered may not 
be relevant to real decisions even though it can still be used to support the 
covert goals of decision makers.   
Interpretivism, on the other hand, has the benefit of allowing the researcher to 
focus on exploring the complexity of social phenomena with the view of gaining 
interpretative understanding (Easterby- Smith et al. 2015).  According to 
Saunders et al. (2016) interpretivism is the heritage of the two intellectual 
traditions of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism. The use of qualitative 
methods is fairly complementary.  
 The main limitation is that beliefs determine what counts as facts. In between 
these two extremes are other alternative research paradigms, such as critical 
theory, feminism, hermeneutics, postmodernism and pragmatism theory which 
also represent relatively coherent ways of thinking which is promoted by 
influential proponents (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015). 
This study adopts a positivist paradigm since it seeks to investigate a 
phenomenon that can be said to be deterministic.  Because the regulatory 
actions and financial stability measures are determined by law and are exact to 
an individual bank, a deterministic approach can be used to estimate the 
expected relationships.  The data required for this research either already exist 
in various forms or can be computed from existing data.  This study also 
proposes a number of hypotheses based on existing theories and the literature 
and tests these hypotheses empirically using quantitative data gathered across 
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banks and across time.  Finally, the results obtained from the analysis of this 
data can be easily replicated. 
4.3 RESEARCH APPROACH  
The research approach is deductive. The main body is exploratory and 
therefore the focus is on getting insights and familiarity with the subject area for 
more rigorous analyses (Collis and Hussey 2013). The research adopts the five 
sequential stages through which deductive research will progress: deducing a 
hypothesis from theory; expressing the hypothesis in operational terms; testing 
the operational hypothesis; examining the specific outcome of the inquiry; and 
finally, if necessary, modifying the theory (Saunders et al. 2016). 
 
4.4 DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The conceptual framework (Figure 4.1) illustrates the link between regulation 
and the operationalisation and measurement of bank safety and soundness. 
Banking regulation is dynamic, and in this conceptual framework liberalisation is 
a dynamic process which responds to changing domestic, global economic and 
international regulatory changes.  
 
Liberalisation therefore affects the existing regulatory design and structure 
which the underlying theories require a systematic approach to its sequencing 
in the form of: product and market development; risk mitigation; associated 
infrastructure; and capital account management. Gallagher et al. (2014) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff(2009)  in the literature on capital account liberalisation and 
financial stability show that there appears to be an association between capital 
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account liberalisation and the incidence of financial crisis.  Therefore capital 
account management measures that are sequenced with other economic 
reforms and regulations in order to maintain economic growth, productive 
employment, social cohesion and financial stability become extremely important 
(IMF 2015b).   
 
The structural impact of liberalisation on banking system stability therefore 
follows from the entry of foreign banks; increased competition domestically; the 
inflow of foreign capital, their nature and sources; new products; and risk 
management practices and technology (Cubillas and Gonźalez 2014). Important 
regulatory measures to mitigate the risks inherent in the liberalisation process 
are the existence of financial monitoring and supervision and the need to keep 
pace with the financial reforms (Karacadag et al. 2003).  
 
Financial monitoring and supervision are the day-to-day and continuous 
process of monitoring financial institutions to avoid potential bank failures and 
systemic risks from any of the financial institutions being supervised or from any 
related external sources.  A bank’s compliance with regulatory standards and 
achievement of good financial performance are indications of its ability to 
survive in the given economic and political situation (Barth et al. 2013).  
 
The financial stability theory has within its foundation the supervisory standards.  
These standards consist of a set of core principles that can be grouped into four 
core components: (i) regulatory governance; (ii) regulatory practices; (iii) 
prudential framework, and (iv) financial integrity and safety net. The regulatory 
design and structure and supervisory standards are interrelated and they 
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influence each other.  They combine to determine the banking models, 
strategies and complexity of banking activities in a jurisdiction (Karacadag et al. 
2003).   
 
Again, these standards affect the size of banks, asset quality and liability 
structures of banks being supervised in a jurisdiction.  The conceptual 
framework therefore serves as the foundation of the research hypotheses. 
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Figure 4.1 
Conceptual Framework: Regulatory Structures, Bank–level Risk Management and Bank 
Stability 
CCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Hypothesis Development  
 
4.5 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Source: Author’s Illustration: Adapted from Karacadeg et al. (2003) Framework on 
sequencing of banking sector liberalisation and modified by Author. 
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4.5 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
This section examines the various hypotheses proposed and then tested in this 
research.  The link between the regulatory structure and bank system stability 
and other perspectives discussed in Chapter 3 (Literature Review) is used to 
develop the testable hypotheses for this study.  This takes into account the 
influences of globalisation of financial services on the regulatory framework and 
its design.  Six testable hypotheses are proposed based on the regulatory 
structure and financial stability theories. 
 
4.6 BANK SIZE AND BANK STABILITY 
It has been suggested in banking literature that size is important in explaining 
the stability of any bank. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) distinguish 
between a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size which is the size of the 
bank relative to the national economy.  In practice, a bank determines its 
absolute and systemic size jointly, if it remains established in the same country. 
They argue that while absolute size presents banks with a trade-off between 
risk and return, systemic size is an unmitigated bad, reducing return on assets 
without a reduction in risk. In other words, a bank’s assets size determines the 
bank’s potential impact on the banking system should they fail (BOE 2009).  
The share of a bank’s assets over total banking system assets is also used to 
measure its market power within the loan market of the country.  Claessens and 
Van Horen (2012) argue that differences between small and large banks are 
driven in part by different economies of scale and the fact that such banks 
operate in different niches, leading to differences in performance.    
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4.6.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
There are several theories supporting the view that large and complex banks 
contribute to systemic risk. According to one view, the unstable banking 
hypothesis, large banks tend to engage more in risky activities (e.g., trading) 
and be financed more with short-term debt, which makes them more vulnerable 
to generalised liquidity shocks and market failures such as liquidity shortages 
and fire sales (BOE, 2009; Giesie et al. 2013). 
 
According to another view, the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, regulators are 
reluctant to close or unwind large and complex banks, resulting in moral hazard 
behaviour that leads banks to take on excessive risks in the expectation of 
government bailouts (Farhi and Tirole 2012). 
 
According to a third view, the agency cost hypothesis, large and complex banks 
that engage in multiple activities (e.g., combining lending and trading) suffer 
from increased agency problems and poor corporate governance that can 
translate into systemic risk (Bolton et al. 2007; Laeven and Levine 2007). 
According to this view, banks have a natural tendency to take on excessive 
risks and to grow in size, while regulators, by focusing on micro-prudential 
regulation, did little to prevent the resulting build-up of systemic risk. As a result, 
large banks tend to share many of the risk factors that other theories have 
identified as being important drivers of systemic risk, such as high leverage, 
activity diversity, and interconnectedness.  
 
Bank size is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of survival, 
because it is well-known that larger banks have higher survival odds than 
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smaller banks. In contrast, the coefficient on bank size is expected to be 
negative for all size classes in the market share regressions, because the law of 
diminishing marginal returns suggests that it is more difficult for bigger banks 
(that already have larger market shares) to improve their market shares(Berger 
and Bouwman 2013). 
 
4.6.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
The recent financial crisis has generated tremendous interest in the study of 
risk-taking of financial institutions. Laeven et al. (2016) considered a sample of 
412 deposit taking institutions from 56 countries with assets in excess of over 
$10 billion from 2006-2008, while Bhagat et al.(2015) also analysed 702 unique 
financial institutions and measured risk using the Z-score. They both document 
a positive and significant relation between bank size and bank risk.  
 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) exploit variation in the cross-section of performance of 
164 large banks (defined as banks with total assets greater than $50 billion) 
across the world during the period of the financial turmoil (2007–2008). They 
document that smaller banks with concentrated ownership and more non-
interest income are associated with higher idiosyncratic risk.  Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) further document a negative relation between bank size and Z-score. 
However, their relation is statistically not significant – possibly due to the limited 
cross-sectional variation in their bank size measure since they only consider 
banks greater than $50 billion in assets. Berger and Bouwman (2013) consider 
a comprehensive sample of U.S. banks during 1984–2010 and document a 
positive relation between bank size and bank credit risk (defined as the bank’s 
Basel I risk-weighted assets divided by total assets). 
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However, the recent study by De Jonghe et al. (2015) provides mixed results, 
depending on the size of the bank in question by stating that scope expansion 
and innovation is less detrimental for systemic risk and even becomes 
beneficial for medium sizes and large banks. 
 
Tables 4.1(a) and (b) provide a summary of comparative studies on bank size 
and bank stability. Thus, the size of the bank can also have either a negative 
impact or a positive impact on bank stability.  The above arguments above 
supported by the summary empirical literature in Tables 4.1 (a, b) provide the 
basis for the first hypothesis: 
𝐻1:  The size of the bank is not related to bank stability in Ghana. 
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4.7 INTERBANK BORROWING AND BANK STABILITY  
Applying the theory of capital structure financing to banking shows that banks 
are highly levered but the type of debt or liability determines the quality of its 
balance sheet.  Where liabilities are natural core deposits argued Shin (2010), 
they reduce bank risks.   
 
However, where debts are external borrowing in the form of foreign 
denominated debts used to create local assets, the mismatch between currency 
assets and liabilities will increase the exposure of the bank as the local currency 
generally remains unstable and requires more of the local currency to settle the 
debt when they are due(Inoguchi 2013). There is also interbank risk which is the 
risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from lending in the interbank money 
market (Filipović and Trolle 2013), which creates a further network effect that 
leads to potential systemic risks (BOE 2009).   
 
4.7.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
Battiston et al. (2012)  using a model which deals with credit inter-linkages find 
that financial acceleration, i.e. the positive feedback of financial robustness on 
itself, is a sufficient condition for systemic risk from interbank borrowing 
defaults. It eventually more than offsets the stabilising role of risk sharing and 
amplifies the effects of a shock to a single agent of the network, leading to a 
full- fledged systemic crisis. The relationship between the probability of default, 
both individual as well as systemic, and connectivity is U-shaped. If connectivity 
is already high, a further increase may have the perverse effect of amplifying 
financial distress through the financial acceleration to increase systemic risk. 
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The trade-off between risk-sharing possibilities and contagion risk can be 
affected by the degree of diversification or interconnectedness. Nier et al. 
(2007) model the banking system as a network with different degrees of 
connectedness.  They show that for a given level of connectivity, an increase in 
interbank asset exposures facilitates the propagation of shocks and causes a 
higher number of defaults.  
 
Georg (2013) examined contagion risk in different types of networks. He finds 
that interbank loan volumes above an upper threshold decrease systemic 
stability. The threshold level depends on the level of inter-connectedness. 
Larger exposures are less likely to conflict with financial stability for higher 
levels of interconnectedness. Hence, larger international exposures can be 
assumed to make banking systems prone to crisis. For example, banking 
systems might not be able to withstand large and unexpected withdrawals or 
sudden losses in cross-border claims. How far this holds true might depend on 
the level of network diversification. 
  
4.7.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Batiz-Zuk et al. (2015) examined 40 Mexican banks between 2008- 2012 of the 
impact of interbank lending failures.  They found that a significant 18 per cent of 
the total assets to be compromised.  Allen et al. (2014) simulated the impact of 
market discipline through interbank deposit and interest on loans on the 
behaviour of 51 multinational banks from 20 developed countries and their 
subsidiaries from 2005 -2012. They conclude that subsidiaries that depend on 
interbank borrowing experience decline in credit growth during the crisis. 
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Along the same lines, Inoguchi (2013) studied the effect of borrowing of foreign 
currency and interbank borrowing in Korea, Thailand and Malaysia from 1993-
2006. They find a positive and a significant relationship between stability and 
interbank borrowing through market discipline effects. 
 
 Anginer and Dermirgüc-kunt (2014) took a different perspective about the 
interbank lending and borrowing and financial stability by measuring the co-
dependence default risk of 1,942 publicly traded banks in 65 counties globally.  
They find that high openness of the financial sector through financial 
liberalisation leads to higher banking sector co-dependence.  Again higher co-
dependence is positively associated with the financial crisis, particularly the 3-
year period leading to the financial crisis. 
 
Tonzer (2015) recently, examined the effects of international linkages in 
interbank markets on the stability of interconnected banking systems of the 
main 17 advanced countries for the period 1994-2012. He finds that countries 
that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable 
banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spill over effects.  
He finds that the effect of integration in international interbank markets on 
stability is ambiguous.  While larger cross-border exposures are likely to 
increase bank risks, higher diversification has a counterbalancing effect.  In 
other words, bilateral linkages can have a beneficial effect on stability. 
The theoretical and empirical literature are shown in Table 4.2 and lead to the 
second hypothesis that:  
𝐻2:  The level of external and interbank borrowing of the bank is not related to 
bank stability in Ghana. 
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4.8.0 NON –PERFORMING LOANS AND BANK STABILITY 
Non-performing loans are loans for which there is virtually no hope that the 
interest and principal would be repaid, or for which the repayment of interest 
and principal are doubtful.  Generally, non-performing loans are technically 
defined by regulation and by international reporting standards (BCBS 2016: 8).   
The BIS uses a standard five-tier loan classification system, where loans are 
classified as: Passed, Special Mention, Substandard, Doubtful, and Virtual Loss 
and Loss (unrecoverable).  By regulation, non-performing loans are loans 
classified as being substandard to loss based on the default period.  
 
4.8.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
Non –performing loans reduce the quality of bank assets, profitability and the 
stability of banks by depleting the equity of banks.  High level of non-performing 
loans reduces the bank’s net worth and could lead to the bank’s insolvency 
(Nkusu 2011). 
 
The relationship between NPL and bank stability can also be explained from 
bad management, skimping and moral hazard hypotheses.   Moral hazard may 
lead managers to increase the riskiness of their loan portfolio when their banks 
are thinly capitalised, while bad management manifests in the form of poor skills 
in credit scoring, appraisal of pledged collaterals and monitoring of borrowers 
(Berger and De Young 1997; Ghosh 2015). 
 
4.8.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Foos et al. (2010) examined the inter-temporal relation between abnormal loan 
and future loan losses in 16,000 individual banks from 16 major countries 
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including the US, Canada, Japan and 13 European countries during the period 
1997-2007.  The study revealed that abnormal loan growth is significantly and 
negatively related to bank solvency.  In 14 out of 16 countries, higher abnormal 
loan growth led to lower capital ratios, indicating a decreased bank solvency 
levels. This is because past loan growth leads to an increase in 
contemporaneous loan losses and to a decrease in relative interest income.  
  
Michalak and Uhde (2012)  examined the effect of credit risk securitisation or 
cash and synthetic securitisation transactions on the stability score of 60 stock-
listed bank holdings in the EU-13 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997-
2007.  They find a negative impact of securitisation on bank stability because of 
the existence of direct and indirect effect of the credit risk exposures within the 
first-loss position.  
 
A number of studies examined the feedback effects from the banking system to 
the real economy from a cross-country perspective.  Nkusu(2011) unlike De 
Bock and Demyanets(2012) who focused on emerging economies, studied 26 
advanced economies in the period of 1998–2009, found that a sharp increase in 
NPLs led to a decline in house prices, credit-to-GDP ratio, and GDP growth. 
The confluence of adverse responses in key indicators of macroeconomic 
performance—GDP growth and unemployment—leads to a downward spiral in 
which banking system distress and the deterioration in economic activity 
reinforce each other.  
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These theoretical and empirical findings are shown in Table 4.3 below and the 
current level of non-performing loans reported by Ghanaian banks provide the 
basis for the third hypothesis:  
𝐻3: The level of non-performing loans is higher for the bank with a lower level of 
bank stability in Ghana. 
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4.9.0 RISK GOVERNANCE AND BANK STABILITY 
Rahim et al. (2015) define risk governance as the ways directors are 
responsible to optimise and monitor risk in an organisation.  They argued that 
the main role of risk governance is to improve the potential for survival and 
growth of banks, prevent sudden shocks, and monitor internal and external 
activities across the world for high-profile collapses of major institutions.  
 
 According to Mongiardino and Plath (2010), risk governance requires: (1) a 
dedicated board level risk committee, of which (2) a majority should be 
independent, and (3) that the CRO should be part of the bank’s executive 
board. Based on a survey among 20 large banks, they find that only a small 
number of banks followed these guidelines in 2007.   
 
4.9.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
Under risk management irrelevance proposition, Stulz (2003) argues that for 
risk management to increase the value of a firm, it must be more expensive to 
take a risk within the firm than to pay the capital markets to take it. Stulz (2003) 
argued that with market imperfection, bank risk management will eliminate or 
reduce deadweight costs, bankruptcy costs, reduce taxes, promote optimal 
capital structure which balances the tax benefits of debt against the costs of 
financial distress and debt overhang. 
 
The current theoretical literature argues that from control perspectives (BCBS 
2012) risk governance is an integral part of corporate governance that focuses 
on enterprise risk management.  The board’s risk committee is at the apex and 
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through the risk and compliance departments provide the second lines of bank-
wide enterprise risk management defence (BCBS 2012; Dermine 2013).  
 
4.9.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
The contemporaneous study by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) investigate whether 
a strong and independent risk management is significantly related to bank risk 
taking and performance during the credit crisis in a sample of 74 large US bank 
holding companies for the period 1995-2010.  They construct a Risk 
Management Index (RMI) which is based on five variables related to the 
strength of a bank’s risk management, including a dummy variable whether the 
bank’s CRO is a member of the executive board and other proxy measures for 
the CRO’s power within the bank’s management board. Their findings indicate 
that banks with a high RMI value in 2006 had lower exposure to private-label 
mortgage-backed securities, were less active in trading off-balance sheet 
derivatives, had a smaller fraction of non-performing loans, had lower downside 
risk, and a higher Sharpe Ratio during the crisis years 2007/2008. 
 
Aebi et al. (2012) analyse the influence of bank-specific corporate governance, 
and in particular ‘‘risk governance’’ characteristics on the performance of banks 
during the financial crisis. Most importantly, their results show that banks, in 
which the CRO reports directly to the board of directors, perform significantly 
better in the financial crisis while banks in which the CRO reports to the CEO 
perform significantly worse than other banks in their sample. 
 
Again Battaglia and Gallo (2015) recently studied 15 Chinese and 21 Indian 
banks to ascertain the relationship between risk governance and performance 
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variables such as ROA and ROE which can proxy as stability variables. Using a 
pooled regression model, they find a positive relationship between the size of 
the risk committee and ROE and ROA suggests that over the period 2007–2011 
banks with larger risk committee perform better in terms of profitability.  
Regulatory enforcement of risk based management through micro-prudential 
regulation, Basel III requirements under the pillar II or supervisory review 
process point to the changing composition of boards of banks globally.   
 
Given the gap in the literature in Chapter 2, the theoretical and empirical 
evidence summarised in Table 4.4, justify the inclusion of risk governance as 
one of the independent variables and lead to the fourth hypothesis which 
stresses that risk governance as part of enterprise risk management impacts 
positively on bank stability as follows:  
𝐻4:  The level of regulatory risk governance practices of the bank is positively 
related to bank stability in Ghana. 
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4.10.0 REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE AND BANK STABILITY 
Regulatory independence is part of the current Basel core practices for effective 
banking supervision issued in 2012.  Regulatory independence involves the 
degree of the state and regulator’s participation in the shareholding of banks, 
and the appointment of board members (Doumpos et al. 2015).  According to 
Casu et al.(2015), policy makers in most emerging economies seem to consider 
state ownership of banks as a second best solution, in ‘normal’ times at least.   
This is because during a crisis they may well have to nationalise banks to save 
them.  Governments are increasingly subjecting the public banking sector to 
market discipline, by treating them in a manner similar to private banks in terms 
of supervision and other factors. 
 
4.10.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The theoretical literature is much less abundant with some notable exceptions. 
Andrianova et al. (2008) develop a locational model of banking that 
distinguishes between state-owned and private banks. They show that state –
owned banks can play an important role in the banking system but this depends 
on the institutional quality of a given country. More specifically, in the presence 
of opportunistic private banks and poor institutional quality, the nonexistence of 
state banks may lead to financial disintermediation.  
 
Andries and Billon (2010) build a theoretical model in which banks face a risk of 
failure in bad states of the economy, i.e. when productive firms suffer a low 
productivity state. They put forth that public banks have a more stable deposit 
base, because depositors perceive that their funds are better protected in times 
of crisis in the case of public banks. This mechanism helps government-owned 
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banks to insulate their slowdown of lending from downturns when the economy 
is hit by a financial shock. 
 
Brei and Schclarek (2015) argue from a theoretical perspective that the lending 
behaviour of private and public banks in response to adverse economic shocks 
and develop a theoretical framework that models the interactions of depositors, 
firms, and private and public banks. The results indicate that lending during 
normal times is similar across private and public banks. During a financial crisis, 
however, lending activities by private banks decrease to a larger extent than 
that of public banks. These results indicate that public banks play a counter-
cyclical role in their banking systems, while private banks play a more pro-
cyclical role. 
 
4.10.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Regarding the behaviour of government banks the evidence from non- crisis 
periods is quite negative (Cull and Martinez Peria 2013).  Along similar lines, 
Iannotta et al. (2013) who studied 210 banks from 16 European countries with 
minimum assets of €10 Billion from 2000-2009 find that government-owned 
banks (GOBs) have lower default risk but higher operating risk than private 
banks, indicating the presence of governmental protection that induces higher 
risk taking.  Again GOBs’ operating risk and governmental protection tend to 
increase in election years. These results are consistent with the idea that GOBs 
pursue political goals. 
  
In contrast, the literature examining the lending of state banks during business 
cycles is quite sparse with mixed results (Cull and Martinez Peria 2013; Brei 
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and Schclarek 2013).  Cull and Martinez Peria (2013) examine the impact of 
bank ownership on credit growth in a sample of Latin American and Eastern 
European developing countries before and after the global financial crisis, 
finding mixed results. They show that state banks in Latin America acted in a 
countercyclical fashion during the crisis, whereas those in Eastern Europe did 
not, hence emphasizing regional differences. Again Bertay et al. (2015) who 
examined 1633 banks from 111 countries from 1999-2010 concluded that state 
banks appear to lend countercyclically in GDP terms independently of the 
occurrences of the financial crisis.   
Using an international sample of banks from 50 countries over the 1994–2009 
period, Brei and Schclarek (2013) provide robust evidence that government-
owned banks do play countercyclical role by increasing lending in response to 
financial crises relative to normal times, while private banks decrease lending 
relative to their normal lending pattern.  They show that the average private 
bank lends at a higher growth rate than the average government-owned bank in 
normal times (11% per annum compared to 8%). However, once the crisis hits, 
government-owned banks lend at a higher rate (9% per annum vis-à-vis 7% for 
private banks).   
 
From the review of literature summarised in Table 4.5; we therefore, test if bank 
stability is related to state and or the central bank ownership of the bank.  It is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
𝐻5: The state or the central bank ownership of the bank is not related to bank 
stability in Ghana.  
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4.11.0 FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND STABILITY 
The influx of banks into a country’s economy may impact positively or 
negatively on its stability depending on many factors such as the maturity of the 
financial sector, level of banking services technology, the capital base of the 
local banks, skills and complexity of transactions undertaken.  Likewise the 
licensing regime also determines the degree to which foreign players can have 
control over domestic banking assets (Mulyaningsih et al. 2015). 
 
4.11.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
The relationship between foreign ownership and stability follows from the 
distinction between global advantage and home field advantage hypotheses 
(Berger et al.2000). In spite of the strategic role played by such domestic banks 
in the local economy, Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001) argue that for a small 
economy, it may make sense not to have any domestically owned banks at all, 
as they may not be able to diversify their risks sufficiently.   
 
 Čihák and Schaeck (2014) focus on bank efficiency as a possible conduit 
through which competition influences bank soundness. The global advantage 
hypothesis states that foreign banks might benefit from competitive advantages 
relative to their domestically-owned peers. Foreign-owned banks use more 
advanced technologies due to stiff home market competition. Foreign banks 
might also be more competitive when compared to domestic banks due to an 
active market for corporate control in the home country, and because they have 
access to an educated labour force that is able to adopt new technologies. The 
home field advantage hypothesis predicts that foreign banks are at a 
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disadvantage when compared to domestic banks. Foreign-controlled banks are 
assumed to perform less well than domestically-controlled banks due to higher 
costs of providing the same financial services or due to lower revenues. 
 
However, Detragiache et al. (2008) demonstrate a theoretical model, showing 
that foreign banks are better than domestic banks at monitoring “hard” 
information, such as accounting information or collateral values, but not at 
monitoring “soft” information, such as the borrower’s entrepreneurial ability or 
trustworthiness.   Foreign bank entry may hurt bank customers and worsen their 
welfare suggesting that learning is especially important for foreign banks 
(Claessens and Van Horen 2012).   
 
Huizinga and Laeven (2007) also suggest that foreign banks might only provide 
limited products or primarily serve firms from their home country, which might 
lead to more volatile earnings. In addition, international tax differences might 
encourage profit shifting from local subsidiaries or branches.   Findings from 
theoretical and empirical studies on the effect of foreign ownership on domestic 
bank performances are mixed, given their complexity. 
 
4.11.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Many studies using cross-country data empirically compare the performance of 
foreign banks with domestic banks and find that foreign banks operating in 
developing countries are more efficient and competitive than domestic banks 
(Yeyati and Micco  2007; Angkinand and Wihlborg 2010; Claessens and Van 
Horen 2012; Lee and Hsieh 2014).   
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Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) indicate that foreign ownership is associated 
with greater risk-taking, i.e. less stability as measured by the Z-index (a proxy 
for distance to default) in favour of the home field advantage hypothesis. 
 
Lee and Hsieh(2014) applied the GMM techniques on dynamic panels using 
bank-level data for Asian countries to investigate the impact of foreign 
ownership on financial stability, as well as whether the relation between foreign 
ownership and stability changes under different conditions of bank reforms in 
the host country.  First, the existence of the home field advantage hypothesis is 
supported; nevertheless, when considering the effects of bank reforms, the 
global advantage hypothesis holds. Second, an inverse U-shaped relation 
between foreign ownership and stability is supported.  Similarly, in a sample of 
Latin American banks, Yeyati and Micco (2007) findings were mixed. 
 
Moyo et al.(2014) in a sample of 662 sub –Saharan African banks which 
included Ghanaian banks, found that the entry of foreign banks have 
significantly and  positively  impacted on bank stability. 
 
 And, the existence of both foreign and local banks raises the question as to 
whether local and foreign banks have similar levels of stability.  As shown by 
Claessens and Van Horen (2012), the profitability of foreign banks is importantly 
affected by home, host and institutional factors. They find, for example, that 
foreign banks perform better when from a high income country and when 
regulations in the host country are relatively weak. Also, foreign banks from 
home countries with the same language and similar regulation as the host 
country tend to perform better.  
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Most of the new banks are from Nigeria, South Africa and the UK where Ghana 
shares a similar colonial, language, financial system integration policies and use 
the common law as the basis of their legal framework. As a consequence, to 
date, the question for whether banks with greater foreign ownership improve the 
performance (or risk) of financial intermediaries is still unresolved.  Thus, the 
impact of foreign participation on bank stability can either be positive or 
negative.  
 
The inferences made from the summarised literature in Tables 4.6 (a, b) and 
the stability arguments are therefore tested in relation to the changing 
ownership of banking assets by origin in Ghana with the following hypothesis:  
𝐻6: The level of foreign participation or ownership of the bank is not related to 
bank stability in Ghana. 
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4.11.0 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter discussed the research philosophy and the development of the 
hypotheses for the study.  The research paradigm provides the direction to be 
taken in the research methodology. Table 4.7 presents the summary of the 
hypotheses developed. In the next chapter, the methodology to test the 
hypotheses developed for the study will be presented. 
Table 4.7: Summary of Hypotheses 
Variables Hypothesis Expected sign of the 
relationship 
H1: Bank size The size of the bank is not related to bank 
stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) or Negative 
(-) 
H2: Interbank 
Borrowing  
The level of external and interbank borrowing of 
the bank is not related to bank stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) or Negative 
(-) 
 
H3: Non-
Performing 
Loans 
The level of non-performing loans is higher for the 
bank with a lower level of bank stability in Ghana. 
Negative (-) 
 
H4: Risk 
Governance 
 The level of regulatory risk governance 
practices of the bank is positively related to bank 
stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) 
 
H5: Regulatory 
Independence 
The state or the central bank ownership of the 
bank is not related to bank stability in Ghana.  
Positive (+) or 
Negative(-) 
 
H6: Foreign 
participation or 
Ownership 
The level of foreign participation or ownership of 
the bank is not related to banking stability in 
Ghana. 
Positive (+) or 
Negative(-) 
Source: Constructed from the Hypotheses Formulated 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
 5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the research methodology of this study.  It describes the 
problem space and ways that other researchers have studied the problems of 
banking stability, regulatory and bank-level risk taking activities.  The design of 
the methodology is based on prior research into the relationships as discussed 
in Chapter 4.  The method is intended to provide a robust repeatable method by 
which the research questions can be answered. This chapter, therefore, 
describes the method of data collection, the variables used to test the 
hypotheses and the statistical techniques employed. 
 
5.2.0 SAMPLE AND PERIOD SELECTION 
The period of study is five years from 2009 to 2013 and covers the period that 
banks in Ghana were required to recapitalise by the regulator and the period 
after that.  The focus of the study is on the activities of licensed banks, so the 
sample does not include microfinance companies, investment companies, and 
other non-bank financial institutions.   There are currently 27 licensed banks in 
Ghana accounting for almost 75% of the financial assets of the country.  Two of 
these 27 banks, namely Energy Bank and Royal Bank, were dropped from the 
study because they did not have the necessary five years financial data 
required for the computation of the Z-scores.  Five other banks are also 
excluded for insufficient data or lack of information.  
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The final sample consists of 20 banks, accounting for 74%of the existing bank 
population.  In terms of assets, the 20 banks hold about 96% of the banking 
assets (commercial banks) in Ghana.  Appendix 5.1 provides the summary of 
the sampling procedure and sample size. According to Pallant (2007), different 
authors tend to give different guidelines concerning the number of observations 
required for multiple regression tests.  Stevens (1996) cited in Pallant (2007) 
recommends that for social science research, about 15 data points per predictor 
are needed for regression models. Tabacknick and Fidell (2007) suggest a rule 
of thumb for determining the minimum sample size, N, for a regression analysis 
as, 50 plus 8 times the number of independent variables in the regression 
model (M). Thus: 
N = 50 + 8M 
The minimum sample size ensures that the number of observations in the 
statistical analysis is large enough to achieve sufficient statistical power and 
reduce estimation error.  Going by Tabacknick and Fidell (2007), this implies 
our model, with six independent variables, will need 98 cases.  The sample of 
20 banks over the five-year period results in a balanced panel of 100 bank-year 
observations.    
 
5.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
The following section discusses the method of data collection and type of data 
that were collected to conduct the study. The data for the study are compiled 
from different sources.  Bank-specific data, including their annual reports, are 
obtained from the Investor Relations Departments of the various banks.  The 
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reports are further verified for consistency from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of Ghana, where the bank in question is listed on the 
exchange. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2013, 2014) Banking Survey reports in 
2013 and 2014 capture data on the average return on equity and average return 
on assets of banks in the country from 2009 to 2013 and are used to verify the 
reliability of the data obtained from other sources.  Further reliability checks are 
done by recalculating the ratios from the original annual reports.  In analysing 
the data, the details are further cross-checked or validated from the Bank of 
Ghana’s recent Financial Stability Reports.   
5.3.1 ASSUMPTIONS  
With over 70% of Ghanaian banks not on the stock market to determine their 
market values, and the requirement to comply with current International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 13 on Fair Value, banks generally 
determine the fair value of their assets and liabilities as at the date stated on 
their financial statements.   
Also, the on-site inspections and verifications by the supervisory authorities 
would ensure that the bank’s financial position is accurately reported.  
Furthermore, the financial reports of the sample banks are based on the same 
International Financial Reporting Standards and monitored by the same 
regulatory authority. The accounting data and the data items from the regulatory 
reports will be based on a common approach and, therefore, comparable 
across the banks. Thus, in the absence of the market values, the balance sheet 
figures will be as close as we can get. 
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  5.3.2 DATA COLLECTED 
The following data and information have been collected.  The five years annual 
reports of all the twenty banks published or submitted to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  Other data items were collected from the total banking 
activity figures submitted by the banks to the Bank of Ghana, the International 
Monetary Fund Country reports, the Bank of Ghana Financial Stability Reports 
and the Statistical Service of Ghana. For each bank and for each year over the 
period 2009 to 2013, the following accounting data and regulatory data items 
were collected:  
(i) Total banking assets, liabilities and income sources;  
(ii) Interbank liabilities and borrowings;  
(iii) The Return on Average Assets (ROAA);  
(iv) The Return on Average Equity (ROAE);  
(v) Individual bank’s assets within the total system-wide banking assets; 
(vi) Actual Non-Performing Assets of each bank;  
(vii) Structure and existence of Risk Governance in each bank; and  
(viii) Bank of Ghana and direct Government of Ghana shareholdings, 
shareholdings of quasi-state institutions, notably Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), Social Insurance Company (SIC) and 
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (Cocobod) in each bank. 
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As all the data outlined above are publicly available, either from the banks 
themselves or other official sources, it is believed that the use and analysis of 
the data do not raise any ethical concerns, such as the confidentiality and 
anonymity of subjects, potential harm to participants, conflict of interest on the 
part of the researcher, and other general issues of access to data. 
 
5.4.0 DATA PREPARATION AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
The first preparatory analysis technique is preparation of logarithms (logs) for 
some of the data. Mathematical logs are used in econometrics analysis for 
several reasons. First, because of their size reduction properties, they reduce 
the scale of raw data, which will make it easier to compare small institutions to 
larger institutions. This is particularly important because the sizes of the banks 
in this study vary widely; if you consider that some of the banks included are 
large-scale multinational institutions and others are domestic or regional banks 
in developing countries, the scale problem becomes clear. In effect, logs 
perform the same function that the ratios calculated for some of the variables 
discussed below do, by making it possible to compare institutions of different 
sizes. 
The natural log function (ln) can be applied to dependent or independent 
variables (Gujirati and Porter 2009).  The dependent variable, the Z-score and 
the independent variable bank size are prepared to have logs.  
The second is the use of dummy variables.  In regression analysis, the 
dependent variable is also influenced not only by ratio scale variables like non-
performing loans and interbank borrowing but also variables that are essentially 
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qualitative or nominal scale in nature such as origin of banks which can be 
foreign or local.  Such variables usually indicate the presence or absence of a 
‘quality’ or an attribute (Gujirati and Porter 2009).  One way to quantify such 
attribute is by constructing artificial variables that take on values of 1 or 0, 1 
indicating the presence of that attribute and 0 indicating the absence of that 
attribute.  In this research origin and regulatory independence are treated as 
dummy variables (Gujirati and Porter 2009). 
The third is the use of ordinal scales.  It is used to measure a higher level of 
utility (Gujirati and Porter 2009).  Therefore in this research, a scale of 1- 4 is 
used to measure the level of risk governance maturity. Using a scale of 1- 4; 4 
will represent the highest and 1 the least.  
 
5.5.0 MEASURES OF BANKING STABILITY 
This section discusses the two measures of banking stability, the CAMELS and 
the Z-score used in this study as discussed in chapter 1. It discusses how the 
composite CAMELS and the Z-score index are measured and their 
interpretation in this study.  
5.5.1 CAMELS RATING SYSTEM 
The CAMELS rating is a composite measure used to evaluate the financial 
stability of financial institutions on six dimensions – Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings quality, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risks.  
The six components of the CAMELS and the composite measure are calculated 
in this study as described below.  
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5.5.1.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
The CAR is defined as CAR= (Tier I Capital + Tier II Capital) / Total Risk-
Weighted Assets.  Where Tier 1 or core capital include the stated capital, share 
premium, income surplus, and non-controlling interest after deductions for 
goodwill and specified assets such as intangibles and certain classes of 
investments. Tier 2 capital (supplementary capital) consists of revaluation 
reserves, qualifying subordinated loan capital debt not exceeding 50% of Tier 1 
capital, collective impairment allowances and unrealised gains arising in the fair 
valuation of equity instruments held as available for sale. Qualifying Tier 2 
capital is limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. 
The risk-weighted assets are measured by following the Bank of Ghana 
business rules for deposit-taking institutions in Ghana (BOG 2000).  The rules 
ensure that the computation of the risk-weighted assets takes into 
consideration, a hierarchy of five risk categories.  The definitions of the five risk 
categories and their respective risk-weights are given in Appendix 5.2.  The 
total of the risk-weighted assets (TRA) is then calculated by multiplying the 
value of assets in each risk category by its risk-weight and then adding the five 
risk-weighted assets together. 
5.5.1.2 Asset Quality Ratio 
The asset quality assessment is based on evaluating credit risks associated 
with the bank’s portfolio of loans and investments. The asset quality ratio is 
measured as gross non-performing loans, as per the Bank of Ghana Prudential 
Norms (specifically impaired loans), divided by the total credit portfolio or loans.  
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The total credit portfolio comprises of overdraft and term loans to individuals, 
other private enterprise, joint private and state enterprises and staff. The lower 
the ratio, the higher the asset quality and the reliability of the bank’s credit 
portfolios (BOG 2000). 
5.5.1.3 Management Quality Ratio 
Management forms the mechanism that makes decisions to ensure the bank 
minimises risks and exercises control in its operations. The quality of 
management takes into account leadership, governance and compliance 
issues. These characteristics can be measured qualitatively and therefore its 
composite measurement which has some quantitative attributes should be used 
with some caution. 
Because these are subjective attributes, the efficiency of the bank has been 
used as a proxy for management quality in the literature (Bassett et al. 2015).  
Management quality is therefore measured in this study as the ratio of non-
interest operating expenses to operating income (Bassett et al. 2015; Casu et 
al.  2015).  Non-interest operating expenses include employee-related 
expenses, occupancy charges or rent, depreciation and amortisation, directors’ 
emoluments, fees for professional advice and services, publicity and marketing 
expenses.  Operating income is the sum of net interest income, fee and 
commission income, trading income and other operating income such as profit 
on disposal of property and equipment.  A lower ratio, indicates higher 
operational efficiency and vice versa.  
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5.5.1.4 Earnings Ratios 
The earnings ratios reflect the bank’s ability to absorb losses, expand its 
financing, as well as, its ability to pay dividends to its shareholders, and help to 
develop an adequate amount of internal capital through profit retentions 
(Christopoulos et al. 2011).  They also reflect the financial risks assumed by the 
equity shareholders because of the prior claims of depositors and bondholders. 
The bank’s earning ability has been measured using the following three 
profitability ratios. 
5.5.4.1.1 ROA = [Net Profits/ Total Assets] x 100 
Pagratis et al. (2014: 11) and Casu et al.(2015: 717) defined return on assets 
(ROA) as the ratio of net profit after tax to total assets in book values.  Net 
profits are measured as profit before tax less income tax and the Ghana 
government’s fiscal stabilisation levy.  The higher the ratio, the more profitable 
the bank is. 
5.5.4.1.2 ROE = [Net Profits/ Own Capital] x 100 
Pagratis et al. (2014:11) and Casu et al. (2015: 717) define return on equity 
(ROE) as the ratio of the net profit after tax to bank equity in book values.  Net 
profit is measured as profit before tax less income tax and the fiscal stabilisation 
levy in Ghana. Own capital comprise of stated capital, income surplus, 
revaluation reserve, statutory reserve fund and regulatory credit risk reserve. 
The ratio shows a bank’s ability to generate income from its capital. 
 
  
182 
 
5.5.4.1.3 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
Following Claessens et al. (2016), the net interest margin is measured as net 
interest income divided by the average operating assets times 100 per cent.  
The net interest income is calculated as interest receipts from placement and 
short-term funds, treasury bills and government securities and loans and 
advances less interest paid to demand depositors, time depositors, and 
providers of borrowed funds and savings. The operating assets are the interest- 
or fee-earning assets of the bank and the total figure is calculated as the sum of 
cash and liquid assets, loans and advances, and any asset that directly 
generates interest or fees.  The higher the ratio, the better the bank would be at 
accommodating any potential losses from loan defaults and other settlement 
risks.   
5.5.1.5 Liquidity Ratios 
Liquidity ratios are used to assess the ability of the bank to meet obligations as 
they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses.  They also assess a 
bank’s ability to meet cash flow obligations, which are uncertain as they are 
affected by external events and other agents’ behaviour (BOG 2014). In this 
study, the liquidity of a bank is measured using the following ratios. 
5.5.1.5.1 Loans to Total Deposits (L1) = Total Loans / Total Deposits 
The total loan to total deposits ratio shows the total loans granted as a 
proportion of the bank’s customer deposits (IMF 2013b).  The total deposits 
include current accounts balances, cash collateral, savings account, and time 
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deposit balances.  The lower the ratio, the higher the bank’s level of liquidity 
and safer.   
5.5.1.5.2 Circulating Assets to Total Assets (L2) = Circulating Assets/ Total 
Assets. 
The other liquidity measure used in this study is the ratio of circulating assets to 
total assets. Circulating assets include cash in hand, claims against other 
banking institutions and its trading, investment and derivatives 
portfolios(Christopoulos  2011).  A higher ratio means the bank has a better 
liquidity status and, therefore, likely to be stable. 
5.5.1.6 Sensitivity to Market Risks 
A bank’s sensitivity to market risks describes the extent to which potential 
changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity and commodity prices 
affect the bank’s profits and the value of its assets (Saunders and Cornett  
2008:171). However, the most important risks for most banks in Ghana are 
interest rate risks and risks from their foreign exchange operations. In this 
study, a bank’s sensitivity to market risks is measured as the ratio of total 
securities to total assets (Christopoulous 2011). Total securities include trading 
assets, investment securities available for sale and government securities. The 
lower the ratio, the better for the bank since a higher value of this ratio would 
indicate a greater exposure to market risks.   
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5.5.1.7.0 Individual rating of CAMELS variables 
Regulatory authorities generally set limits to determine the performance of 
banks and also how banks comply with their stability guidelines.  In some 
cases, minimum levels are set for evaluation of banks. For example, the 
minimum CAR set by Basel II is 8% but regulators can adjust upwards the 
minimum threshold to reflect their financial and economic environment.  In 
Ghana, the minimum CAR is set at 10 % and NPL is also set at 1%. With the 
various ratios calculated, each bank is rated on a scale of 1 (strong) to 5 
(weak), in each of the six components as shown in Table 5.1. The rating criteria 
are based on the institutional practices of the regulatory authorities in Ghana. 
There is broad agreement in the empirical literature that the CAMEL indicators 
are useful in assessing the financial vulnerability of banks. Supervisors often 
use (combinations of) these indicators to come up with an assessment of a 
bank’s soundness. However, there is no clear agreement in the literature on 
how exactly to combine the various components into a composite CAMELS 
indicator (Klomp and De Haan 2012). Using the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) scale, composite and component ratings are 
assigned based on a 1 to 5 numerical scale.   A “1” indicates the highest rating, 
strong in performance and risk management practices, and least degree of 
supervisory concern.  A “5” indicates the lowest rating, weakest performance, 
inadequate risk management practices, and thus, the highest degree of 
supervisory concern. The composite rating bears a close relationship to the 
component ratings assigned.  
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Table 5.1: CAMELS Rating of Individual Variables  
 Rating 1 Rating 2 Rating 3 Rating 4 Rating 5 
Capital 
Adequacy  
 
≥ 15%  
 
12%- 14.99%  
 
8% - 11.99% 
 
7% - 7.99% 
 
≤ 6.99% 
Asset Quality 
Ratio 
 
≤1.5% 
 
≤2.5 – 1.51% 
 
≤ 3.5 – 2.51% 
 
≤5.5% - 3.51% 
 
≥5.51% 
 
Management  
 
≤ 70% 
 
≤75% - 71% 
 
≤80% -76%  
 
≤85%  - 81%  
 
≥85%  
Earnings – 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
 
≥1%  
 
0.9% - 0.8%  
 
0.7% – 0.35%  
 
0.34 %– 0.25% 
 
≤0.24% 
Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
 
≥ 20%  
 
15%- 19.99% 
 
12% -14.99% 
 
10 % - 11.99% 
 
≤9.99% 
 
Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
 
≥ 10% 
 
9.99% - 8% 
 
7.99 -6% 
 
5.99%-4 
 
≤ 3.99% 
Liquidity Ratio 
(L1)  
 
≤80% 
 
≤85%- 81% 
 
≤ 90% -86% 
 
≤95% - 91% 
 
≥96% 
Liquidity Ratio 
(L2) 
 
≥ 50% 
 
45% - 49.99% 
 
37% - 44.99% 
 
31%  – 36.99% 
 
≤ 30.99% 
Sensitivity 
Ratio 
 
≤25%  
 
32% -26%  
 
39% - 33%  
 
45% - 40%  
 
≥ 46% 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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5.5.1.7.1 Composite Rating  
As a standard practice, The Bank of Ghana currently attaches equal weight to 
each of the six components, making the composite rating an arithmetic average 
of the individual component ratings.  
In this study, however, the composite rating is based on a composite score that 
is calculated as a weighted score of the components ratings.  Weights are 
assigned to the individual CAMELS components as follows: Capital Adequacy 
Ratio, 3.5; Asset Quality, 1.5; Management,1;  Earnings,3;  Liquidity,2; and  
Sensitivity to Market Risk, 2.   Thus, rather than equally weighting, the CAMELS 
are reconfigured to reflect the current shift in regulation towards capital and 
broad liquidity needs. A bank’s liquidity is functionally affected by the existence 
of liquid assets (L), quality of earnings (E) and quality of marketable assets(S).  
The differential weights given here follow the approach of Christopoulos et al. 
(2011). The use of differential weights also reflects the findings of Agoraki et al. 
(2011) that capital adequacy requirements and asset quality are more 
informative as indicators of banking risk compared to measures of profitability, 
efficiency, and management quality.  
The respective weight of each component is then distributed proportionately 
across the five possible ratings for the given component. To illustrate, the CAR 
with a weight of 3.5 is spread across the five possible ratings as follows:  
 For a CAR rating of 1, the weighted score is 3.5 (that is 100% of the 
assigned weight for the component);  
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 For a CAR rating of 2, the weighted score is 2.8 (that is 80% of the assigned 
weight for the component);  
 For a CAR rating of 3, the weighted score is 2.1 (that is 60% of the assigned 
weight for the component); 
 For a CAR rating of 4, the weighted score is 1.4 (that is 40% of the assigned 
weight for the component); and   
 For a CAR rating of 5, the weighted score is 0.7 (that is 20% of the assigned 
weight for the component). 
This process is used to calculate the weighted scores for the other components, 
using their respective weights given above.  The sum of the weighted scores 
yields the overall composite score for the bank. The maximum composite score 
is 13 and the least is 2.6.  In this case, the higher the composite score, the 
better the bank.  Panel A of Table 5.2 shows the conversion factor table for the 
weighted scores of the component ratings.  The final classification of banks 
using the composite CAMELS score is summarized in Panel B of Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2: Bank Classification using the CAMELS Weighted Scores  
Panel A: CAMELS Weighted Component Scores  
CAMELS  Rating 1 Rating 2 Rating 3 Rating 4 Rating 5 
Capital Adequacy Ratio  3.5 2.8 2.1 1.4 0.7 
Asset Quality  1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 
Earnings ROA 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
ROE 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
NIM 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Management  1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Liquidity  Loan/ Deposit 
ratio (L1) 
1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Circulating 
Assets to Total 
Assets(L2) 
1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Sensitivity to Market(S)  2 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 
Total   13 10.4 7.8 5.2 2.6 
Panel B: Bank Classification based on Weighted Composite Score 
Composite Rating Overall CAMELS  Composite Score 
1 or Strong  13-10.5     
2 or Satisfactory  10.4 -7.9    
3 or Fair   7.8 -5.3   
4 or Marginal     5.2 -2.7  
5 or Unsatisfactory      ≤2.6 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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A composite rating of 1 indicates banks that are sound in every respect.  A 
composite rating of 2 indicates banks that are fundamentally sound but may 
have modest weaknesses correctable in the normal course of business.  A 
composite rating of 3 means that a bank has a combination of financial, 
operational or compliance weaknesses ranging from moderately severe to 
unsatisfactory. A composite rating of 4 means that a bank has an immediate 
volume of serious financial weaknesses or a combination of other conditions 
and factors that are unsatisfactory to supervisors.  Finally, a composite rating of 
5 means that the bank has an extremely high immediate or near-term 
probability of failure (Bassett et al. 2015). 
 
5.5.2.0 THE Z-SCORE 
The second measure of bank stability used in this study is the Z-score. 
Following Lepetit and Strobel (2015), the Z-score is measured as  [(ROAA + 
E/A)]/ σ(ROAA) where ROAA is the bank’s return on average assets, E/A 
denotes the bank’s average equity to average asset ratio and σ(ROAA) is the 
standard deviation of return on average assets computed for a five-year rolling 
window. The average assets and the average equity are computed as the 
average of the opening figures and their end of year figures, recognising the 
dynamic nature of each variable as a flow and not static over the period. Using 
a rolling time window for σ(ROAA) allows for time-variation in the standard 
deviation of the return on assets, and this avoids the Z-score being exclusively 
driven by changes in ROAA and E/A (Barry et al. 2011). Thus, the Z-score 
increases with higher profitability and capitalisation levels but declines with 
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unstable earnings reflected by a higher standard deviation of return on assets 
(Casu et al. 2015). The Z-score can also be characterised as a combined 
measure of portfolio risk, and leverage risk. As a robustness check, the Z-score 
measure is decomposed into its two additive components, namely:  Portfolio 
Risk =  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴
  and Leverage Risk =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴
  where CAR is the total equity to total 
assets ratio (Schooner and Taylor 2010). 
The Z-score has been used as a measure of bank stability in the literature 
because it indicates the distance to default, specifically the number of standard 
deviations a bank is away from the default barriers, or the point at which losses 
eliminate equity (Roy 1952). Thus, the larger the Z-score, the longer the 
distance from the default barriers and hence, the more stable bank is (Barry et 
al. 2011).  
  
5.5.2.1 The Z-score Scale 
Similar to the CAMELS composite ratings, the Z-score is used to rate the banks 
on a scale of 1 to 5, according to the degree of stability. The overall rating is 
based on the total Z-score and the leverage ratio, which is the average total 
equity to average total assets. The five rating categories and their respective 
threshold scores are given in Table 5.3. The rating scale is developed from the 
rules and regulations of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for 
depository institutions (FDIC 2013). 
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 Table 5.3: Z-Score rating index for Ghanaian Banks 
Z- Score Ratings  Total Z-Score  Leverage Ratio or  Multiplier  
 1 or Highly Stable ≥ 10 ≤5 or up to 20 times or less 
2 or Stable   ≥8< 10 ≤4 or 20.01 times  to  25 times 
3 or Fairly Stable ≥6 < 8 <4  but ≥ 3 or 25.01 times  up to 33 
times 
4 or Unstable ≥4<6 ≤ 3 but ≥ 2or above 33 times 
5 or Significantly Unstable  <4 ≤2 or above 50 times 
Source: Author’s Estimation and FDIC Regulatory Capital Rules Register 
(2013). 
The leverage multiplier measures the number of times the bank’s total assets 
held can be financed by its equity. The lower the leverage multiplier the more 
stable the bank is.  The rating criteria presented in Table 5.3 above could be 
considered as an enhanced framework for assessing bank stability. It 
emphasises the need for the existence of appropriate levels of capital to support 
the bank’s investment activities. Thus, besides the Z-score, banks in each 
category must first satisfy a minimum leverage ratio. Hence, for a bank to be 
classified as highly stable (rating 1), the bank must have a leverage multiplier of 
20 or less and a total Z-score of 10 or more. A stable bank (rating 2) must have 
a leverage multiplier not exceeding 25 and a total Z-score of at least 8.  A fairly 
stable bank (rating 3) would have a leverage multiplier not exceeding 33 and a 
total Z-score of at least 6. An unstable bank (rating 4) would have a leverage 
multiplier not exceeding 50 and a total Z-score of at least 4.  A significantly 
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unstable bank (rating 5) would have a leverage multiplier exceeding 50 and a 
total Z-score of less than 4. Note that, in the case of the Z-score calculation, the 
asset base is not risk-weighted; hence the thresholds for the leverage ratios 
here are lower than those used for the CAMELS ratings in Table 5.1. 
 
5.6.0 MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES: BANK-LEVEL 
VARIABLES  
This section explains how the relevant bank-specific and other control variables 
that drive bank stability are measured.  The bank characteristics include bank 
size, the mix of financing and lending activity.  
5.6.1 Bank Size 
The potential candidates for measuring firm size include accounting-based 
measures such as total assets and total revenue, and market based measures 
such as market capitalisation (Bhagat et al. 2015). 
Following the existing literature, including Dermirguc-Kunt and Huzinga (2011) 
the research first focuses primarily on total assets on absolute basis.  Second, 
and following Bhagat et al.(2015), bank size is measured as the natural log of 
the bank’s book value of total assets.   
5.6.2 External and Interbank borrowing   
Following BOG (2014), a bank’s portfolio of external and interbank debt is 
measured as the ratio of the external and interbank debt to total liabilities.  The 
bank’s domestic interbank liabilities and external borrowing, includes all 
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domestic, and the cedi-value of all foreign borrowing. The translation of the 
foreign borrowings into cedis captures the full effects of currency changes on 
the bank’s debt portfolio, including any potential systemic effects. 
5.6.3 Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) 
Non-performing loans, in this study, is measured as the ratio of overdue loans 
to gross loans (Beck et al. 2013). The NPL is estimated from banks’ total loans 
that are classified between substandard, doubtful and loss, in line with Bank of 
Ghana’s classifications. These are usually loans outstanding for more than 90 
days after the due period. Using the Bank of Ghana classifications provides a 
uniform framework for the assessment of non-performing assets across the 
banks and reduces any measurement errors arising out of some banks 
recycling their loans, and therefore underestimating the level of their non-
performing loans. 
 
5.7.0 MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES: REGULATORY DESIGN
  VARIABLES  
As discussed in Chapter 4, this study also examines the impact of the 
regulatory environment (both internal and external), on bank stability. The 
variables considered here are risk governance maturity, regulatory 
independence of the bank and also the origin of the parent bank. The 
construction of these variables is described below. 
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5.7.1 Risk Governance Maturity 
The risk governance maturity follows the framework defined by Mongiardino 
and Plath (2010) and the risk governance index provided by Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2011). Four out of their five variables reflect the Ghanaian situation and also in 
line with a bank’s risk governance practices and compliance with the Bank of 
Ghana’s risk governance framework, and the BIS best practices. Information 
from the bank’s annual report, validated by information disclosed at AGMs and 
facts behind the figures at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
where the bank is listed on the Stock Market is checked against the Bank of 
Ghana and BIS guidelines. These guidelines include less political influence on 
board membership, the existence of risk committee, measurement and 
disclosure of value at risk (VaR), and the degree of allocation efficiency based 
on BOG defined business segments.  Full compliance is assigned a score of 4.  
This implies that a score of 3; 2; and 1 means a bank has satisfied three; two; 
and one of the defined risk governance requirements respectively. 
5.7.2 Regulatory Independence 
Following Brei and Schclarek(2013), we construct a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the bank is a private bank(or no significant state or quasi –state 
influence) and 0 if Bank of Ghana, government or other quasi-state institutions, 
such as SSNIT, State Insurance Company (SIC) and Ghana Cocoa Marketing 
Board (Cocobod) have a significant shareholding in the bank. Appendix 5.3 
shows ownership changes and control of quasi-state institutions in determining 
regulatory independence. 
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5.7.3 Origin of banks  
The origin of banks is to identify the country, from which the parent bank is 
licensed.  The banks are classified as local or foreign depending on the 
jurisdiction in which the current parent bank with controlling interest was 
licensed (Mulyaningsih et al. 2015). Where there have been some acquisitions 
of local and state-owned banks over the period, compliance with IFRS 
3(Revised) Business Combinations is ascertained to validate the change in 
ownership. Following Claessens and Van Horen(2012) we construct a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for foreign banks and 0 for local banks. 
 
5.8.0 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA  
This section discusses the statistical methods used in analysing the data 
collected and to test the various hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The 
analysis of the data is in two stages. The first stage, the univariate analysis, 
involves the use of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and test of means 
to explore trends in the bank stability measures and their relationships with 
bank characteristics. The next is the multivariate analysis which involves the 
use of panel data methodology to test the various relationships.   
5.8.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The descriptive statistics provide a broad overview of the data, and the 
distributional properties of the various variables. These include the mean, 
median, standard deviation, range of scores, skewness and kurtosis.  The 
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Shapiro- Wilk test for normality is also used to test if the various variables are 
normally distributed.  
The correlation analysis involves pair-wise correlations of the various variables 
using both the parametric Pearson correlation and the non-parametric 
Spearman rank correlation.  Since the commonly-used Pearson correlation 
measure can be affected by nonlinearities in the data, the Spearman rank 
correlation is used to check the robustness of the Pearson correlation measure. 
If there are no significant nonlinearities in the data, the results from these two 
measures would be consistent with each other.  
An independent t-test is used to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between two sets of means for two different groups of subjects.  In 
this study, the independent sample t-test is used to test if there are significant 
differences in the stability characteristics across different bank groups (e.g. 
foreign versus local banks).   
5.8.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
As noted earlier, this study examines repeated measures of bank stability and 
their determinants for a cross-section of banks over the period 2009 to 2013.  
This thesis employs a panel data analytical framework to investigate the 
relationship between banking stability and regulatory and bank–level risk taking 
variables.  The panel data analytical framework adopted in this thesis is 
consistent with prior bank stability and regulatory structure studies by Uhde and 
Heimeshoff(2009), Pathan (2009) and Doumpos et al.(2015) amongst others.  
In this case, the method of analysis is that of multiple regressions and the 
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method of estimation may be pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random 
effects or fixed effects models as described later in this section.   As the data 
has cross-section and time dimensions, panel data regression analysis is 
commonly used in the literature to analyse data sets consisting of repeated 
measures on cross-sectional units such as individuals, firms, or countries, at 
different points in time.   
Initially, the panel data regression model in its general form was estimated as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  … … … . . +𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡  … … … … … . (Equation 1) 
Where:       
- 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is dependent variable 
- 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents explanatory variable 
- 𝑖 = 1 … … … , 𝑁 firms 
- 𝑡 = 1 … … … , 𝑇 time periods 
- 𝛽0  represents the constant term 
- 𝛽1 is the coefficient of the explanatory variables 
- 𝑈𝑖𝑡  represents the error term 
The error term can further be decomposed into two components in the form of a 
firm-specific error 𝑣𝑖 and an idiosyncratic error𝜀𝑖𝑡.  Thus: 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ……………………………………...................... (Equation 2) 
The idiosyncratic error term in panel data changes over time and across firms.  
However, depending on the behaviour of the error term 𝑈𝑖𝑡 and whether the 
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explanatory variable is serially correlated with the components of the error term 
𝑣𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 would determine the empirical model specification. 
Fundamentally, there are three standard panel data regression models that 
arise from the general model described in equation (1) above with specific 
assumptions in relation to the explanatory variables, the properties of the error 
term, and the association between the explanatory variables and the error term.  
In addition, further assumptions need to be made regarding the variability of the 
regression coefficient across firms.  In this respect, and as has been indicated 
earlier, a panel data regression model in this thesis may be estimated by pooled 
OLS, random effects or fixed effects models and are discussed below. 
5.8.2.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled OLS) 
Pooled OLS assumes constant coefficients, that is, referring to both intercepts 
and slopes.  In the event that there is neither a significant firm-specific effect nor 
significant temporal effects, it could be possible to pool all of the data and run a 
pooled OLS regression model.  Thus the typical assumptions of constant 
variance (homoskedasticity), exogeneity, observations on the independent 
variables are not stochastic but fixed repeated samples without measurement 
errors; and uncorrelated observations (multicollinearity) must continue to 
hold(Green 2008). 
In this thesis the Pooled OLS regression is estimated in the following general 
form:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ….Equation 3 
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Basically, the estimated Pooled OLS regression will be biased because of 
unobserved heterogeneity (𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are correlated). But the bias may be 
lower because the Pooled OLS regression relies on between firm comparisons 
as well as within variation compared to the cross-sectional OLS regression. 
5.8.2.2 Random Effects Model (RE) 
A random effects model assumes that the unobserved differences are not 
correlated with any of the explanatory variables.  That is, 𝑣𝑖 are treated as 
random constant terms (Green 2012) where the intercept is a random outcome 
variable.  The specific benefit of using the random effects model is that, the 
regressors allowed time-invariant variables to be included.  In this instance, the 
random error 𝑣𝑖 is heterogeneity specific to a cross sectional unit and in this 
case, banks.  This random error is assumed to be constant over time 
(Schmidheiny, 2014).  The equation of the random effects regression becomes: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    … … … … … … … … .. ..................Equation 4 
Where 𝑣𝑖 is between–firm error and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is within–firm error.  Thus, 𝑣𝑖 are 
assumed to be random variables and that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑣𝑖) = 0.   
But if 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑖𝑡,𝑣𝑖) ≠ 0 the random effects estimator will be biased (Schmidheiny 
2014).  In this thesis, the Hausman specification test is used to test on whether 
the random-effects estimator is biased or not. 
5.8.2.3 The Fixed Effects Model (FE) 
The fixed effects model assumes constant slopes but different intercepts for 
cross sectional (group) units, and in this case individual banks, thus, the 
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intercept is the cross section (group) specific that differs from bank to bank.  
Further, the error term(𝜀𝑖𝑡) is assumed to be correlated with the explanatory 
variables.  Even though there are no significant temporal effects when using 
fixed effects model, there are significant differences among firms.  Thus, the 
fixed effects model is employed whenever one is only interested in analysing 
the impact of variables that may vary over time.  In this respect, it may be used 
to explore the relationship between the explanatory variables (bank-level risk 
taking and regulatory variables) and banking stability within a bank.  This means 
that each bank has its own individual characteristics that may or may not affect 
the explanatory or the dependent variables.   
If these individual characteristics within a bank may impact or bias the 
explanatory variables or the dependent variables, then one needs to control for 
these individual firm characteristics. 
In this thesis, the fixed effects model is in the following general form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …Equation 5 
Where 𝑣𝑖 is the unobservable firm-specific effect which differs between banks 
and is time-invariant. 
McManus (2011) shows that the fixed effects model is not a panacea for all 
endogeneity bias such as time –varying unobserved effects, time –varying 
measurement error, simultaneity or feedback loops.  Again time – constant 
effects are removed in addition to the possibility of providing poor estimates 
where there is little variation.  FE is criticised as trading consistency for 
efficiency as it uses only within-unit change and ignores between–unit variation.  
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There is therefore the possibility of parameter estimates being imprecise 
leading to large standard errors. 
5.9.0 THE BENEFITS OF USING PANEL DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES  
Hsiao (2007) discusses the typical benefits and challenges of using the panel 
data framework. The benefits include a greater number of data points, which 
increases the degrees of freedom, provides more variability in the sample data 
set, and leads to more reliable parameter estimates and accurate statistical 
inferences. The use of a panel data framework also offers the opportunity to 
control for unobserved individual specific effects in the data set. The empirical 
models used and their estimation processes are discussed below. 
 
5.10 THE CHOICE OF EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
For the purpose of empirical model specification for data analysis, the 
assumptions of panel regression need to be tested in order to determine the 
best fit empirical model specification for the unique data set used in this thesis. 
The Breusch and Pagan (1980) Langrange Multiplier is used in this thesis to 
choose between pooled OLS regression and the alternatives of random effects 
and fixed effects models.   
 
Pathan (2009) suggests that the test could be used to determine whether or not 
there is heterogeneity. If the pooled OLS estimator is found to be inconsistent 
and biased due to unobserved variables, then, the choice between random 
effects model or fixed effects model is decided by the Hausman specification 
test to help distinguish between the consistency and efficiency of the 
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estimators. Fundamentally, if this thesis employs pooled OLS regression and 
the unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the error term (𝑢𝑖𝑡)and the 
independent variables when the random effects regression is suitable, the OLS 
estimator will be consistent but not efficient. However, if there are no 
unobserved variables which are unlikely to hold in this thesis, then OLS will be 
efficient. Otherwise, the random effects regression will be more consistent and 
efficient.  
 
In the same vein, if a pooled OLS regression is employed when a fixed effects 
regression is suitable, the OLS estimator will be inconsistent while the fixed 
effects model will be consistent. Also, if a random effects regression is used 
when fixed effects regression is suitable, then the random effects model will be 
inconsistent. In this respect, one needs to be very careful in choosing a suitable 
estimator in this thesis.  
 
Following that, the Hausman specification test will be used to distinguish 
between random effects and fixed effects regressions for the empirical analysis 
in Chapter 7.  The Hausman test assumes that the individual and/or time effects 
are not correlated with the independent variables, in which case the random 
effects model would be suitable. This assumption is tested against the 
alternative of the presence of fixed effects in the data set. If there are fixed 
effects, then estimates from the random-effects model will be biased and 
inconsistent and, therefore, unsuitable. Hence, if the null of the Hausman test is 
rejected, then the fixed effects estimation would be used. It is however argued, 
that failure to reject the null hypothesis in the Hausman test does not 
necessarily mean the random effects assumption is true. 
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An alternative to the Hausman test is the Breusch-Pagan test proposed by 
Breusch and Pagan (1980). However, Moulton and Randolph (1989) show that 
the asymptotic properties of this test statistic can be poor, even in large 
samples. Given the relatively small sample size in this study and the fact that 
none of these specification tests is fully efficient, the asymptotic properties of 
these tests may not hold for this sample. Hence, the results from the 
specification tests should be interpreted with caution.  
 
5.11 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL  
The empirical model follows Uhde and Heimeshoff(2009) and Battaglia and 
Gallo(2015). The empirical specification of the basic model used in this study is 
as follows: 
 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0+ 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑡+ 𝑎2𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑅𝑖𝑡+𝑎5𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝑎6𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡  Equation 6 
Where:  
-   𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the natural log of the Z-score and the dependent variable (DV)    
where i = entity or bank and t = time period  
-  𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a bank size, expressed in natural log form 
-  𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is interbank liabilities to total liabilities ratio  
- 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is Non Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans ratio 
-  𝑅𝑖𝑡is the index rating variable for Risk Governance  
-   𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the indicator variable for Regulatory Independence 
-  𝑂𝑅𝑖 is an indicator variable for origin of the foreign bank 
-   𝑎𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 6 are the respective slope coefficients 
-   𝑤𝑖𝑡is the error term and  
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-  𝑎0 is the intercept.  
   
5.12 ROBUSTNESS TEST OF RESULTS 
The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation for linear and non-linear 
models was formalised by Hansen (1982).  Following Hayashi (2000) the linear 
regression model in equation 7 is expressed as  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿0 + 𝜀𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, … … . . , 𝑛                                                            𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 7 
where 𝑧𝑡 is an L × 1 vector of explanatory variables, 𝛿0 is a vector of unknown 
coefficients and 𝜀𝑡is a random error term. 𝑦𝑡  is the dependent variable.  
Equation 7 allows for the possibility that some or all of the elements of 𝑧𝑡may be 
correlated with the error term 𝜀𝑡 i.e., 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝑘 𝜀𝑡  ] ≠ 0  for some k, the number of 
instrumental variables. If 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝑘 𝜀𝑡  ] ≠  0 then 𝑧𝑡𝑘 is an endogenous variable.  It is 
well known that if 𝑧𝑡 contains endogenous variables, then the least squares 
estimator of 𝛿0 in equation 7 is biased and inconsistent. 
In  Equation 7, it is assumed that there exists a K ×1 vector of instrumental 
variables 𝑥𝑡 which may contain some or all of the elements of 𝑧𝑡 .   We let 
𝑤𝑡represent the vector of unique and non-constant elements of {𝑦𝑡, 𝑧𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 }. It is 
assumed that {𝑤𝑡 } is a stationary and ergodic stochastic process. 
The instrumental variables 𝑥𝑡satisfy the set of K orthogonality conditions: 
𝐸[𝑔𝑡(𝑤𝑡, 𝛿0)] =𝐸[𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑥𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿0)] = 0                                  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 8 
 
where 𝑔𝑡(𝑤𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡) = 𝑥𝑡  𝜀𝑡𝑚 = 𝑥𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿0).  Expanding (Equation 8), gives the 
relation 
Σ𝑥𝑦 = Σ𝑥𝑧𝛿0 
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where Σ𝑥𝑦= 𝐸[𝑥𝑡𝑦𝑡  ]  𝑎𝑛𝑑  Σ𝑥𝑧 =𝐸[𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡
′ ].  For identification of 𝛿0, it is required that 
the K ×L matrix 𝐸[𝑥𝑡  𝑧𝑡
′] = Σ𝑥𝑧 be of full rank L. This rank condition ensures that 
𝛿0 is the unique solution to (Equation 8). Note, if K = L, then Σ𝑥𝑧Σxz is invertible 
and 𝛿0may be determined using Σ𝑥𝑧
−1Σ𝑥𝑦(Hayashi  2000). 
 
A necessary condition for the identification of 𝛿0 is the order condition 
K ≥ L      𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 9,  
which simply states that the number of instrumental variables must be greater 
than or equal to the number of explanatory variables in (Equation 7). If K = L 
then 𝛿0 is said to be (apparently) just identified; if K > L then 𝛿0is said to be 
(apparently) over-identified; if K < L then 𝛿0 is not identified. 
In other words, the rank condition rank (Σ𝑥𝑧) = 𝐿  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 10  , 
must also be satisfied for identification. 
In the regression model (Equation 7), the error terms are allowed to be 
conditionally heteroskedastic as well as serially correlated. For the case in 
which 𝜀𝑡is conditionally heteroskedastic, it is assumed that {𝑔𝑡} = {𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡 } is a 
stationary and ergodic martingale difference sequence (MDS) satisfying  
 E[𝑔𝑡𝑔𝑡
′] = E[𝑥𝑡𝑥𝑡
′𝜀𝑡
2] = S where S is a non-singular K × K matrix. The matrix S is 
the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the sample moments ?̅?= 𝑛−1Σ𝑡=1
𝑛  
𝑔𝑡(𝑤𝑡𝛿0) (Hayashi, 2000). 
This follows from the central limit theorem for ergodic stationary martingale 
difference sequences (Hayashi, 2000):  
√𝑛𝑔 =
1
√𝑛
  ∑ 𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡
𝑑
→  𝑁(0, 𝑆) 
𝑛
𝑡=1
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where avar(?̅?) = S denotes the variance-covariance matrix of the limiting 
distribution of √𝑛𝑔.   For the case in which 𝜀𝑡is serially correlated and possibly 
conditionally heteroskedastic as well, it is assumed that {𝑔𝑡} = {𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡 } is a 
stationary and ergodic stochastic process that satisfies  
√𝑛𝑔 =
1
√𝑛
  ∑ 𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡
𝑑
→  𝑁(0, 𝑆) 
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
𝑆 =   ∑ Γ𝐽 = Γ0 + ∑(Γ𝐽 + Γ𝐽
′)
∞
𝐽=1
 
𝑛
𝐽=−∞
 
 
 Where Γ𝑗=𝐸[𝑔𝑡 𝑔𝑡−𝑗
′ ] = 𝐸[𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡−𝑗
′ 𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡−𝑗].  In the above, avar(?̅?) = S is also 
referred to as the long-run variance of ?̅? (Hayashi 2000). 
To compute any of the efficient GMM estimators, a consistent estimate of 
𝑺 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̅?)is required.  The method used to estimate 𝑺 depends on the time 
series properties of the population moment conditions 𝑔𝑡.  If the population 
moment conditions 𝑔𝑡(𝜃0) are an ergodic-stationary but serially correlated 
process then  
𝑆 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑔) = Γ0 +  ∑ (Γ𝑗 + Γ
′
𝑗)
∞
𝑗=1   where Γ𝑗 = 𝐸[𝑔𝑡(𝜃0)𝑔𝑡−𝑗(𝜃0)
′].   
 
In case of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimate of S 
has the form: 
?̂?𝐻𝐴𝐶 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑤𝑗,𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑗=1
(Γ̂j(θ̂) + Γ̂′j(θ̂)) 
where 𝑤𝑗,𝑛 (𝑗 = 1, … … … . . , 𝑏𝑛) are kernel function weights, 𝑏𝑛 is a non-negative 
bandwidth parameter that may depend on the sample size, 
Γ̂𝑗(𝜃) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑔𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=𝑗+1 (𝜃)𝑔𝑡−𝑗(𝜃)
′
,   and 𝜃 ̂ is a consistent estimate of 𝜃0. A standard 
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of correcting the presence of potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the panel data is by using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987) .Therefore to make 
the results robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation the robust and HAC 
Bartlett-Newey West kernel options are specified when using the STATA 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).   
 The independent variables are instrumented and by using the wmatrix and 
variance-covariance (vce) options appropriate that allows either for errors that 
are independent and identically distributed; or are independent but not 
identically distributed that exhibit heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The 
wmatrix specifies the type of weight matrix to be used in conjunction with the 
two-step and iterated GMM estimators.  The validity of the instruments is tested 
using the Hansen’s J test statistic of overidentifying restrictions. In all cases, the 
test statistic accepts the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous 
(Roodman  2006). 
 5.13 OAXACA – BLINDER DECOMPOSITION TECHNIQUE 
The STATA software is used to undertake the decomposition of the differences 
in the stability scores between the foreign and the local banks.  This procedure 
known in the literature as the Blinder – Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973) divides the stability differentials between the local and foreign 
banks into a part that is ‘explained’ by group differences in performance or risk 
taking and productivity characteristics such as size, NPLs, debt and interbank 
borrowing, compliance with regulations and a residual part that cannot be 
accounted for by such differences in bank system stability. The unexplained 
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part is often used as a measure of discrimination for policy preference, but it 
also subsumes the effect of group differences in unobserved predictors.  In 
other words, the Blinder- Oaxaca will be used to assess how much of the gap in 
Z-scores between the foreign and local banks is due to characteristics 
(explained variable) and how much is due to policy or system changes 
(unexplained variable).  The reason is to find out how much of the mean 
outcome difference, is accounted for by group differences in the predictors.   
Empirically, Basset et al. (2015), who examined whether the standards used to 
assign commercial banks CAMELS have changed materially over time from 
1991 -2013 in the USA, used the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method to 
disaggregate bank conditions into ‘composition’ component and ‘risk’ 
component. 
Jann (2008) shows the methods and formulae as follows: given two groups 
local banks (A) and foreign banks (B), an outcome variable 𝑌 and a set of 
predictors, the difference in the mean outcome is defined as 
𝑅 = 𝐸(𝑌𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑌𝐵)  ;                                                                      𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 11 . 
Where: 
- 𝑅 is the difference in the mean outcome 
- (𝑌𝐴) is the expected value of local banks outcome variable 
- 𝐸(𝑌𝐵)  is the expected value of foreign banks outcome variable  
The expected value of each outcome variable is accounted for by group 
differences in the predictors.  
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Based on the linear model:  
𝑌𝑙 = 𝑋𝑙
′𝛽𝑙 +∈𝑙 ,   𝐸(∈𝑙) = 0, 𝑙 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}                                𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 12.  
Where: 
- 𝑌𝑙 is the dependent variable or log of Z-scores of local(A) and foreign(B) 
banks  in Ghana 
-  𝑋 is a vector containing the predictors(bank size, bank borrowing, NPL, 
risk governance, regulatory independence and ownership)  
- 𝛽  is a constant which contains the slope parameters and the intercept  
- ∈ is the error term 
- 𝑙   =1 .........., N banks 
 The mean outcome difference can be expressed as the difference in the linear 
prediction at the group-specific means of the regressors (Jann 2008:2).   
That is: 𝑅 = 𝐸𝑌𝐴 − 𝐸𝑌𝐵 = 𝐸(𝑋𝐴)
′  𝛽𝐴 − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)
′ 𝛽𝐵                     𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 13   
Since, 𝐸(𝑌𝑙) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑙
′𝛽𝑙 + 𝜖𝑙) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑙
′𝛽𝑙) + 𝐸(𝜖𝑙) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑙)
′ 𝛽𝑙    𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 14        
  with 𝐸(𝛽𝑙) = 𝛽𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸(𝜖𝑙) = 0 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
Jann (2008) contends that the identification of the contribution of group 
differences in predictors to the overall outcome difference in equation 13 can be 
rearranged as shown in Equation 15 below. 
𝑅 = [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]
′𝛽𝐵 + 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)
′(𝛽𝐴−𝛽𝐵) + [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]
′(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐵)  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 15  
The rearrangement results in a ‘three–fold’ decomposition or the outcome 
difference is divided into three parts:𝑅 = 𝐸 + 𝐶 + 𝐼 (Jann 2008:2). 
The first summand 𝐸 = [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]′𝛽𝐵  amounts to the part of the 
differential that is due to group differences in the predictors (the “endowment 
effect”).  The second component 𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)
′(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐵)measures the contribution 
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of differences in the coefficients (including differences in the intercept).  The 
third summand 𝐼 = [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]
′(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐵) is the interaction term accounting 
for the fact that differences in endowment and coefficients exist simultaneously 
between the two groups (Jann 2008:3). 
Jann (2008) further explains that the Equation 15 is formulated from the 
viewpoint of foreign banks (Group B).  This means that the group differences in 
the predictors are weighted by the coefficients of foreign banks to determine the 
endowment effect(𝐸) which measures the expected change in foreign banks’ 
mean outcome, if foreign banks had local banks’ predictor levels.  Similarly, the 
second component ( 𝐶), the differences in coefficients are weighted by foreign 
banks’ predictor levels, which measure the expected change in foreign banks’ 
mean outcome if foreign banks had local banks’ coefficients.   
Alternatively, Equation 16 is formulated from the viewpoint of local banks 
(Group A).  The endowment effect amounts to the expected change of local 
banks’ mean outcome, if local banks had foreign banks’ predictor levels. The 
coefficient effect quantifies the expected change in local banks’ mean outcome 
if they had foreign banks’ coefficient.  Following Jann (2008: 3), this reverse 
three-fold decomposition can also be expressed as: 
𝑅 = [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]
′𝛽𝐴 + 𝐸(𝑋𝐴)
′(𝛽𝐴−𝛽𝐵) − [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]
′(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐵)  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 16 
The first summand 𝐸 = [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]′𝛽𝐴  amounts to the part of the 
differential that is due to group differences in the predictors (the “endowment 
effect”).  The second component 𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑋𝐴)
′(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐵)measures the contribution 
of differences in the coefficients (including differences in the intercept).  The 
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third summand 𝐼 = [𝐸(𝑋𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)]
′(𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐵) is the interaction term accounting 
for the fact that differences in endowment and coefficients exist simultaneously 
between the two groups (Jann 2008:3). 
The main limitation to Blinder – Oaxaca has been the need to have only two 
groups to compare.  However, the comparison of foreign and local banks 
stability is the basis of this research and makes its application very relevant. 
 
5.14 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed data considerations and analysis procedures 
adopted in this thesis with particular emphasis on data collection procedures 
and the method of analysis in achieving the thesis objectives. First, it attempted 
to describe the data, sample and the development of the composite CAMELS 
and the Z-score where the sources of data were comprehensively explained. 
The scoring methods are then described and discussed. 
Second, the independent variables were discussed. The linear GMM model is 
suggested to test the robustness of the results.  The result from the statistical 
tests employed will be discussed in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
  
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter uses descriptive statistics to compare changes in stability trends 
from 2009 to 2013.  The chapter seeks to achieve three objectives. First, is to 
examine the differences in the measures of stability between the foreign and 
local banks. Second, is to ascertain if the CAMELS and the Z-score measures 
of bank stability report the same level and pattern of bank stability in Ghana as 
stated in chapter 1.  Third, is to identify the implications of the findings for 
banking sector management in Ghana.  
6.2 COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAMELS 
A summary of the descriptive statistics of CAMELS variables of the sampled 20 
banks is presented in Table 6.1. The table reports the mean, minimum and 
maximum values for these variables over the sample period.  All the values are 
reported in percentages. 
Table 6.1 becomes meaningful when it is integrated into the results reported in 
Table 6.2. Figures 6.1 to 6.9 show the distribution of the CAMELS variables 
across the 20 banks for the period 2009 – 2013.  For all the column charts 
shown, the first eleven banks on the horizontal axis are the foreign banks in 
Ghana.  The remaining nine banks are the local or Ghanaian-owned banks. In 
Chapter 2, the comparative analysis of the capital adequacy, asset quality of the 
entire Ghanaian banking sector and other sub-Saharan African countries were 
presented. 
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Table 6.1 
Summary Statistics on CAMELS Variables of 20 banks from 2009- 2013  
(Values reported are in percentages) 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR)  
20.7 10.0 74.3 
Asset Quality(AQ) 12.3 1.0 48.0 
Management (M) 59.1 27.3 116.0 
 
Earnings  
Return on  
Assets (ROA) 
 
2.5 -4.3 7.0 
Return on  
Equity(ROE) 
18.3 -21.1 51.2 
Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
9.2 3.4 17.3 
 
Liquidity  
Loan/ Deposit 
Ratio (L1) 
 
70.2 14.0 128.0 
Circulating 
Assets to Total 
Asset Ratio(L2) 
47.0 18.0 96.0 
Sensitivity to Market 
Risks(S) 
26.0 0.01 77.0 
 Source: Authors Calculations 
  The comparative analysis in this chapter takes into account two other 
countries because of the significant role the banks from Nigeria and South 
Africa are playing in Ghana.  South African banks currently control over 16.2% 
of Ghana’s banking assets.  This figure is more than 6% of Ghana’s GDP (IMF 
2014b) which implies that their failure would constitute a systemic financial 
crisis in Ghana (Casu et al. 2015).   
Table 6.2 below integrates the key results in Table 6.1 and provides a 
comparative analysis of the financial soundness or CAMELS variables of Ghana 
(using the author’s figures) compared with those from South Africa and Nigeria 
over the period from 2009 to 2013. 
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Table 6.2 
Comparative CAMELS Variables of 20 sample banks from 2009- 2013 and 
Country CAMEL variables of South African and Nigerian Banks   
(Values reported are in percentages) 
Country  Ghana South 
Africa  
Nigeria 
Variable Mean of 
20 
sampled 
banks 
Mean (all 
banks) 
Mean(all banks) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR)  
20.7 15.8 10.8 
Asset Quality(AQ) 12.3 4.82 11.16 
Management (M) 59.1 55.6 50.63 
 
Earnings  
Return on  
Assets (ROA) 
 
2.5 1.32 -0.66 
Return on  
Equity(ROE) 
18.3 18.66 -32.92 
Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) 
9.2 3.4 17.3 
 
Liquidity  
Loan/ Deposit 
Ratio (L1) 
 
70.2 50.2 59.07 
Circulating 
Assets to Total 
Asset Ratio(L2) 
47.0 16.6 21.1 
Sensitivity to Market 
Risks(S) 
26.0 Not 
Available 
Not Available 
Source: Author’s Calculations from IMF Country Report No. 14/340 on 
South Africa; IMF Country Report No. 14/103 on Nigeria; World 
Development Indicators (WDI), 2015; Moyo et al. 2014. 
 
The comparative results show that the sampled 20 Ghanaian banks on average 
have a higher percentage of NPLs (asset quality (AQ)) than their peers in 
Nigeria. Again Nigerian banks on average generate a higher NIM than the 
sampled Ghanaian banks. The reasons are that the Nigerian banking sector 
experienced banking crisis in 2009 and therefore sanitised its regulatory regime 
by increasing Nigerian banks’ capital base, strengthened deposit insurance 
monitoring, and shifted from universal to specialised licensing regime (Ikpefan 
2012). Again, the Nigerian banks show a lower ratio of non-interest operating 
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expense to operating income than the sampled Ghanaian banks.  The 
Ghanaian banks however have a higher capital adequacy levels, liquidity (LIQ 1 
and LIQ 2), ROA and ROE than their peers in Nigeria.  Overall, the Ghanaian 
banks appear to be more stable than the Nigerian banks with the average 
capital adequacy level almost double that of the Nigerian banks in percentage 
terms.  However, these conclusions should be used with caution because they 
are based on percentages and have practically ignored the relative absolute 
capital amounts, absolute size of banks, currency value to the dollar and 
relative stability of the economic environment. 
However, comparison with South African CAMEL show mixed results. The 
Ghanaian banks appear to be more liquid, earn a higher net interest margin 
(NIM) but show a lower asset quality level, a higher operating cost to operating 
income and  loan to deposit ratios.  In terms of stability, the results show that 
South African banking variables indicate a more stable banking sector than that 
of Ghana because they show a higher asset quality level. This can partly be 
attributed to South Africa’s ability to implement the key Base II disclosure 
requirements.  The regulatory regime is therefore very stringent on the degree 
of how banks disclose and write –off of their bad loans.  South African banks 
also have a lower operating cost to operating income than the sampled 
Ghanaian banks. The market sensitivity comparison is excluded for lack of data. 
The operating cost to income ratio reported for sampled Ghanaian banks is the 
highest among the three countries (see also Moyo 2014), may be attributed 
negatively to management inefficiency (Klomp and De Haan 2012).  It may also 
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be attributed positively to ‘profit mining’ (a positive form of tunnelling)  to create 
funds to be recycled for future nominal capital increases. 
6.3.0 GRANULAR ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE GHANAIAN BANKS’ CAMELS 
The granular analyses of the 20 sampled banks’ CAMELS are presented in this 
section to illustrate the results of their individual bank–level risk taking as 
compared with peers in the sample.   
6.3.1 CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO (CAR) 
 
The mean capital adequacy ratio across all banks over the sample period is 
20.7.  Thus, on average the banks have healthy capital adequacy ratios.  
However, using the average measures can mask the differences in the banks’ 
capital adequacy ratios.  
The minimum and maximum CAR values are 10 % and 74.3 % respectively for 
the sample banks.  Thus, while some banks have very high CARs, others have 
relatively lower CARs but all the banks satisfied the minimum capital adequacy 
ratio of 10% required by the regulatory authorities in Ghana.   
Figure 6.1 represents the distribution of the CARs for the sample banks over the 
study period reported. 
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Figure 6.1 
Sample Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio of 20 banks from 2009 -2013 in 
Ghana 
 
Source: Author’s illustration 
 Although none of the banks breaches the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 
10% over the period, differences in the capital adequacy ratios across banks 
are clear.  And, even for the same bank there are some wide variations from 
year to year. 
 
6.3.2 ASSET QUALITY (AQ) 
The quality of assets or non-performing loans stood at 12.3 % on average from 
2009 to 2013.  The minimum and maximum NPL values reported were 1% and 
48 % respectively for the sample banks. It shows the relative performance of 
both foreign and local banks in managing their loan default risks over the period 
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of study.  Figure 6.2 represents the distribution of the NPLs for the sample 
banks over the study period reported.  All the banks breached the regulatory 
allowable non-performing loans level of 1% over the period.   There are 
differences in the NPLs across banks and even for the same bank,  there are 
some wide variations from year to year depending on risks inherent in the 
segments the bank in question has concentrated its loan portfolios. 
The Bank of Ghana’s response has been the introduction of loan-write off 
disclosure notice with the primary aim of minimising the risk of recycling of 
loans.  Second has been the establishment of loan trusts for the state–owned 
banks to ensure the recovery of some of the loans and possible sale of the bank 
to private investors.  These measures have failed largely because the allocation 
of loans in state-owned banks are still directed at meeting  political ends, while 
the privately–owned banks are equally affected by the weak macroeconomic 
environment which is largely driven by government expenditure.  
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Figure 6.2 
Individual Asset Quality (NPL ratios) from 2009 to 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
Again the measures do not have penalties that lead to changes in organisations 
that put managers job at risk as suggested by Shehzad and De Haan(2015).  
This trend is likely to worsen given the decline in international oil prices as an 
emerging source of foreign exchange and a tool for sovereign guarantee of 
loans.  Compared to peers in sub-Sahara Africa as shown in Chapter 2, asset 
deterioration is relatively high.   
The effectiveness of these measures had been undermined by the continued 
political influence on the management of these institutions, weak management 
capacity to prevent continued tunnelling of resources. 
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6.3.3 MANAGEMENT 
The mean cost-income ratio across all banks over the sample period is 59.1.  
Moyo et al. (2014) show that the average cost –income ratio across 18 
countries including Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa from 2008 to 2011 was 58.33. 
Thus, on average the banks in Ghana have relatively higher cost to income 
ratios. The high cost to income ratio in Ghana is explained by the lack of scale 
economies due to the small system and average bank size (IMF, 2011) and 
currently partly due to tunnelling.  The minimum and maximum cost-income 
values are 27.3% and 116% respectively for the sample banks.  Figure 6.3 
represents the distribution of the cost –income ratios for the sample banks over 
the study period reported.  All the banks show high cost-income ratios which 
indicate high operating costs and rigidities in their cost structure.  The high cost-
income ratios have the potential to also reduce the banks’ flexibility to respond 
to a changing macro-environment.  High staff costs and cost of extending 
branch network reduce their ability to reduce administrative expenses.  Except 
for UT Bank, all the banks have taken steps to reduce their cost to income 
ratios after 2011.   
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Figure 6.3 
Management (cost-income) ratio of 20 banks from 2009 to 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
6.3.4 EARNINGS  
6.3.4.1 Return on assets (ROA) 
The mean value for return on assets (ROA) was 2.5 %.  The minimum and 
maximum ROA values reported were – 4.3 % and 7 % respectively for the 
sample banks in the period of study.  The data shows that the reported ROA of 
banks depends on the profitability of banks in that particular year.  The year 
2009 shows that four banks had negative ROA because they declared huge 
losses and post-2009 period shows significant improvement in the performance 
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of banks.  Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of banks’ generated returns on their 
assets in the period of study.   
Figure 6.4 
Return on Assets of 20 banks from 2009 to 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
6.3.4.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
The mean value for return on equity was 18.3%.  The minimum and maximum 
ROE values reported were -21.1% and 52 % respectively for the sample banks 
in the period of study.  The data reported negative ROEs in 2009 when four of 
the sampled banks reported losses in that financial year. Variation in ROEs, 
therefore, follows the profit trends and the level of new equity injections into 
banks.  Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of banks’ returns on shareholders’ 
funds by sample banks in the study period.  The pattern of distribution shows 
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that return to shareholders by individual banks has consistently improved after 
2009. This is explained by the fact that while nominal profit after tax declared by 
the banks were increasing year after year, the level of retentions and new 
capital or equity injections were not increasing in tandem due to multiple and in 
some cases extra dividend policies being pursued by all the banks.  The effect 
of such dividend policy arrangements accounted for high ROEs of banks in 
2012 and 2013.  
Figure 6.5 
Return on Equity of 20 banks from 2009 – 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
6.3.4.3 Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
The mean value for Net Interest Margin (NIM) was 9.2 %.  The minimum and 
maximum NIM statistics reported were 3.4% and 17.3 % respectively for the 
sample banks in the period of study.    The data shows differences in the 
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interest margins reported by sample banks. Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of 
individual banks’ returns over their cost of lending by sample banks in the study 
period. 
 The margins reported by the banks are generally positive.  However, there are 
variations in individual bank’s NIM, which shows the differences that exist 
among banks in their bank-deposit and bank-credit markets. The cross-
sectional data shows some mixed results that, except for 2009 and 2013, local 
banks on average achieved a higher net interest margin than their foreign 
competitors in the period of study.   
The results also show that banks have responded to changing market 
conditions and have priced their loans to reflect the underlying risks effectively. 
In other words, the banks have chosen their segments carefully, and business 
and pricing strategies do reflect the level of risks in these segments. 
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Figure 6.6 
Net Interest Income of 20 banks for 2009 to 2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
6.3.5 LIQUIDITY  
6.3.5.1 Liquidity: Loan to Deposit ratio (LI) 
The mean value for the loan to deposit ratio was 70.2 %. The minimum and 
maximum LI values reported were 14 % and 128 % respectively for the sample 
banks in the period of study.  Figure 6.7 shows an individual bank’s funding of 
loans from deposits mobilised over the study period from 2009 to 2013.   
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Fig. 6.7 
Loan deposit ratio of 20 banks from 2009 to 2013 
 
Source : Author’s Presentation 
 
 
The data on individual banks shows variations in the loan to deposit ratios of 
sampled banks. 
Except for FABL and Zenith Bank, in pre-2011 period that exceeded 100 per 
cent of their loan to deposit ratios, the remaining foreign banks have funded 
their loan assets from their customers’ deposits.  Even though the deposit base 
presented does not distinguish between core and wholesale deposits, foreign 
banks in Ghana have maintained good loan financing measure after 2011 which 
promotes stability of their banks. 
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Many of the local banks exhibited similarly, high loan to deposit ratios in the pre-
2011 period, notably, GCB, UT, ADB, Unibank and NIB.  The post-2011 period 
shows that pockets of instability and weak liquidity still remain with banks like 
CAL Bank, HFC Bank and UT Bank.  These banks have very high loan to 
deposit ratios, and typically above 100 %.  Such banks are usually using foreign 
loans and interbank borrowings to fund their loan assets. This exposes the 
banks to changes in exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables than 
the other banks. Because they hold loans which are not tradable in the 
Ghanaian market, that makes them less liquid and vulnerable to the 
depreciation of the local currency (cedi). 
6.3.5.2 Liquidity (LII): Circulating Assets to Total Assets Ratio 
The mean value for the circulating assets to total assets ratios of sample banks 
was 47 %.  The minimum and maximum circulating to total assets ratio value 
reported were 18 % and 98 % respectively for the sample banks in the period of 
study.  Figure 6.8 shows an individual bank’s funding of loans from deposits 
mobilised over the study period from 2009 to 2013.   
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Figure 6.8 
Circulating Assets to Total Asset Ratio (L2) of 20 banks from 2009 -2013 
 
Source : Author’s Presentation 
 
The pattern of distribution for individual banks shows that foreign banks held a 
relatively higher proportion of their circulating assets to total assets than the 
local banks.  This means that they are able to manage their liquidity positions 
actively and at minimum costs.  Circulating assets tend to have low risks and, 
therefore, yield low returns.  Again circulating assets practically have ready 
marketability.  Supervisors are assured that the banks with high holding of 
circulating assets in the assets mix, will be able to raise funds rapidly by selling 
their liquid assets should the need for quick liquidity arise.  In terms of stability, 
banks with high circulating assets to total assets are more solvent than banks 
that have a low proportion of their assets as circulating asset (Giese et al. 
2013). 
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6.3.6 SENSITIVITY TO MARKET RISKS (SMR) 
The mean value for sensitivity to market risks was 47%. The minimum SMR of 
0.01% was reported in the period of study.  The maximum SMR of 77% was 
also recorded over the period of study.  A minimum of 0.01% and a maximum of 
77 % were reported.  Figure 6.9 shows the distribution of individual bank’s total 
assets held in the form of marketable investments over the study period from 
2009 to 2013.  
Figure 6.9 
Sensitivity to Market Risk of 20 banks from 2009 to 2013 
 
Source : Author’s Presentation 
Although there are variations in individual bank’s holding of marketable 
instruments to total assets over the period of study, the impact of holding these 
instruments and their impact on banking stability needs to be exercised with 
caution.  The foreign banks hold more of these marketable instruments than the 
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local banks and, therefore, are expected to be more exposed to changes in 
market rates, which also affect the interest incomes than the local banks.  This 
expected outcome does not hold in Ghana in the period of study because the 
holding of these assets by the foreign banks is in response to changing 
economic environment caused by increasing public sector borrowing 
requirements.  Because the government has resorted to borrowing from the 
domestic market, government bonds and treasury bill rates have been rising 
and have become more attractive than direct lending to the high-risk dominant 
SME loan market.  A further attraction is that holding of these government 
bonds and treasury bills, does not attract provisioning, supports high capital 
adequacy levels and relatively high yields. 
 
6.4.0 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS: THE CAMELS 
This section presents the relationship between the CAMELS variables.   The 
differences in the values reported for the local and the foreign banks are also 
tested to ascertain the statistical significance of the differences and also to 
assess how these differences have changed over the period of study. 
6.4.1 CORRELATION  
The strength of the relationship between the CAMELS variable provides an 
insight into how bank-level risk taking activities affect each other.  Table 6.3 
shows the correlation that exists amongst the average CAMELS score and 
variables. 
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Table 6.3 
Pearson Product Correlation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 AvCAM CAR AQ ROA ROE NIM MGT LIQ I LIQ II SMR 
AvCam 1.000          
CAR 0.3184 1.0000         
AQ 0.0043 -0.4042 1.0000        
ROA 0.3384 -0.1325 0.0964 1.0000       
ROE 0.5887 -0.0202 0.2300 0.4088 1.0000      
NIM 0.2786 -0.0000 0.1648 0.3599 0.6990 1.000     
MGT 0.4157 0.1925 0.1400 -0.0765 0.3611 0.1961 1.000    
LIQ 1 0.1851 -0.2538 0.1847 0.3474 0.1007 0.2108 0.1791 1.000   
LIQ 2 0.4486 0.3365 -0.2448 0.1337 0.2072 0.0941 0.5370 0.2562 1  
SMR 0.3266 -0.1721 0.0000 -0.1710 -0.1042 -0.2934 -0.2485 -0.3277 -0.4344 1.000 
 Software Used : STATA 12.0 
 
Column 1 of Table 6.3 shows the Pearson product-moment correlation matrix 
and suggests that the average stability measure (AvCAM) relates positively with 
variables notably CAR, ROA, ROE, LIQ 1, LIQ 2, NIM and SRM. It is less 
affected by the AQ. Column 2 shows that LIQ 2 and MGT are positively related 
to the capital adequacy (CAR) positions of banks.  Improvements in these 
variables are likely to improve the capital adequacy position of banks.  
 Likewise, LIQ 1, ROE, ROA, AQ and SRM relate negatively with CAR and 
therefore improvements in their quality will enhance the capital adequacy ratios 
of banks.  Column 3 of Table 6.3 shows that asset quality relates positively with 
all the variables except for LQ2 indicating the trade-off between liquidity and 
non-performing loans.  Increases in non-performing assets reduce liquidity.  
Likewise, the NPLs levels affect capital, return on investments, return on equity 
and the liquidity position of banks.  Column 4 shows that when the management 
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of a bank is able to control the cost of operations, it will also improve the other 
indicators.  In other words, it suggests that cost control has a direct impact on 
ROA through the direct relationship between bank operating costs and 
operating profits. Column 10 of Table 6.3 suggests that banks sensitivity to 
market risks is negatively correlated with the rest of the variables except asset 
quality. Overall, the highest correlation is found to exist between NIM and ROE 
at 69% in column 5.  
Table 6.4 
Spearman Rank Correlation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 AvCAM CAR AQ ROA ROE NIM MGT LIQ I LIQ II SMR 
AvCam 1.0000          
CAR 0.3112 1.0000         
AQ 0.0000 -0.4042 1.0000        
ROA 0.3391 -0.1325 0.0964 1.0000       
ROE 0.4654 -0.0104 0.2024 0.3316 1.0000      
NIM 0.3484 0.0645 0.1760 0.5125 0.6055 1.000     
MGT 0.4202 0.1925 0.1400 -0.0765 0.3765 0.3025 1.000    
LIQ 1 0.2455 -0.2867 0.2086 0.4556 0.2523 0.4454 0.2483 1.000   
LIQ 2 0.4220 0.3311 -0.2492 0.1361 0.2242 0.2064 0.5273 0.2344 1.000  
SMR 0.2345 -0.1211 -0.0934 -0.1968 -0.1606 -0.3593 -0.2859 -0.4259 -0.4806 1.000 
 Software Used : STATA 12.0 
 
Column 1 of Table 6.4 shows the Spearman rank correlation matrix, which does 
not assume linearity and suggests that the average stability measure (AvCAM) 
relates positively with variables notably CAR, ROA, ROE, LIQ 1, LIQ 2, NIM and 
SRM. It is less affected by the AQ.  Column 2 shows that, LIQ 2, MGT and NIM 
are positively related to the capital adequacy positions of banks. In the 
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Spearman rank correlation, NIM is positively related to CAR which suggests 
that improvement in interest margins through lower cost of funds will improve 
profits and reserves, which will positively impact on the CAR. Again, Column 10 
of Table 6.4 and the supporting row for SMR, suggest that banks sensitivity to 
market risks is negatively correlated with the rest of the variables. Overall, the 
highest correlation is found to exist between NIM and ROE at 60% in Column 5. 
Although, the Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between SMR 
and AQ is positive, the non-parametric Spearman correlation is negative.  The 
reverse is the case for NIM and CA.  
Overall, the Pearson correlation coefficients and the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients suggest similar patterns or direction, and strength of the 
relationships among the CAMELS variables except that the relationships tend to 
be relatively stronger under the Pearson product-moment correlation matrix. 
The rule of thumb for checking problem of multicollinearity is when the 
correlation is greater than 0.7 (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996).  Again, a sample 
correlation of more than 0.8 is evidence of severe collinearity (Gujirati and 
Porter 2009).The results suggest that multicollinearity might not be a problem 
because the correlations are less than 0.8 (Gujirati and Porter 2009). 
 
6.4.2 SAMPLE T-TEST OF CAMELS VARIABLES  
An obvious question that arises from the charts above is whether or not the 
differences observed across the foreign banks and the local banks are 
statistically significant.  The t-test for differences in means is used to test for any 
significant differences in the various ratios between the group of foreign banks 
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and the local banks.  The t-procedures, hinge critically on the assumption of 
normality and the law of large numbers, in addition to having independent 
samples.  The result is presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
T-tests of Differences in Means of the CAMELS Variables: 2009-2013 
T-tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CAMELS 
Variable  
Foreign Local  Difference  t-value  p-value  
CAR 25.19 15.26 9.93 2.9111 0.0093 
NPL 11.96 12.92 -0.96 0.2487 0.8064 
MGT 54.08 65.44 -11.36 2.9588 0.0084 
ROA 3.11 1.92 1.19 2.4474 0.0249 
ROE 19.27 15.27 4.00 1.0123 0.3248 
NIM 9.32 9.09 0.23 0.2575 0.7997 
LIQ1  60.58 82.13 -21.55 3.8349 0.0012 
LIQ 2 52.18 40.68 11.50 2.2039 0.0408 
Mkt. Sen. 32.54 17.95 14.59 2.8851 0.0099 
Overall 
Score 
10.6 9.9 0.70 2.3792 0.0286 
Software Used: STATA 12 
 
The independent samples t-test is used to examine the differences in CAMELS 
variables for both foreign and local banks from 2009 to 2013 using the average 
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of the variables. Column 3 of Table 6.5 shows the differences in the means of 
average CAMELS variables of foreign and local banks. Of statistical 
significance are the p-values reported for the differences in the means of the 
capital adequacy levels, the efficiency of operations measured by the cost 
income ratio or management(MGT), loans to deposit ratio or liquidity 1 (LQ 1) 
and sensitivity to market risks(SMR).  They are statistically significant at the 1%, 
5% and10% levels. 
 The LIQ(1) figures show that the local banks channel a greater proportion(82%) 
of their deposits into loans as compared to the average loan deposit ratio of 
their foreign peers(60%).  Loans are not easily saleable in Ghana and that 
partly explains why the local banks appear to hold less liquid assets or 
circulating assets than the foreign banks (LIQ 2).  The differences in means of 
their LQ(2) and return on assets(ROA) are statistically significant  at the 5% and 
10% levels. However, the local banks performed better than the foreign banks 
as they are less exposed to market risk (SMR) theoretically.   
The parametric t-test shows that the foreign banks are more liquid, more 
efficient in terms of lower cost to income ratios and have a higher risk capital 
level on average. And using the average composite CAMELS measure, the 
foreign banks show a higher level of stability than the local banks and it is 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels. The t-test shows that the differences in 
non-performing loans (NPL), net interest margin (NIM) and return on equity 
(ROE) are not statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
The non-significance of the difference in mean is plausible. This can be 
explained by the pursuit of competitive pricing of personal, business and 
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institutional loans and the concentration of assets in government securities, 
which provide relatively similar margins on activities. Given the size of the 
Ghanaian banks and the existing regulation of bank lending, banks tend to 
share many of the high value and emerging business opportunities, like cocoa, 
oil and energy related financing, with other players through loan syndication.  
This changing market situation is also a contributory factor to the non-
significance of their levels of non-performing loans, net interest margin and 
return on equity differences. 
 
6.5.0 THE Z–SCORE MEASURE 
This section presents the Z-score measure as a proxy for bank stability in 
Ghana from 2009 to 2013. Table 6.5 shows the list of sample banks in Ghana 
and their Z-scores over the period.  The first eleven on the list are foreign banks 
and the rest, i.e. from number 12 on the list are local banks. 
6.6.0 COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF Z-SCORE 
Table 6.6 illustrates the Z-score and its decomposed components of leverage 
and portfolio risks of sample banks in Ghana.  The distinction is important as it 
shows that where leverage risk is low for a bank, the portfolio risk is available to 
improve the level of stability measure or the Z-score. 
Figure 6.10 and Table 6.6 below show that after 2011, both the average Z-
scores of the banking industry and some individual bank’s Z-scores have 
declined.   
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The stability levels achieved by the sampled Ghanaian banks become more 
meaningful when they are compared with their peers in South Africa and Nigeria 
using their average stability scores as shown in Figure 6.11.   
Table 6.6 
Summary Z –Scores of 20 Sample Banks from 2009-2013 
 
N0.  Bank 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 Average  Leverage 
Risk  
Portfolio 
Risk  
1 GT                      
12.01  
        
14.22  
             
21.05  
         
20.51  
         
11.15  15.79 13.18 2.60 
2 UBA                        
9.54  
      
11.23  
             
17.05  
         
15.61  
           
6.45  11.98 9.46 2.52 
3 SCB                      
10.10  
          
9.21  
             
12.65  
         
11.13  
           
6.38  9.89 6.90 2.99 
4 Barclays                      
11.48  
        
11.39  
             
16.14  
         
12.18  
           
4.00  11.04 8.77 2.27 
5 Access                      
11.96  
        
15.47  
             
33.47  
         
42.18  
         
35.20  27.66 25.06 2.59 
6 Ecobank                        
7.70  
        
8.70  
             
13.71  
         
13.22  
           
7.25  10.12 7.66 2.46 
7 Stanbic                        
7.71  
        
9.15  
             
13.58  
         
10.11  
           
4.80  9.07 7.50 1.57 
8 Firstbank                      
13.17  
        
11.94  
             
28.78  
         
22.66  
         
10.04  17.42 16.39 0.93 
9 FABL                      
10.74  
        
14.60  
             
11.75  
           
5.70  
           
2.41  9.04 8.18 0.86 
10 SG                        
8.46  
        
9.71  
             
16.15  
         
14.43  
           
8.95  11.54 9.76 1.78 
11 Zenith                        
8.28  
        
8.66  
             
14.17  
         
10.54  
           
6.26  9.58 7.76 1.82 
12 GCB                        
8.55  
        
6.87  
               
6.85  
           
7.31  
           
9.71  7.86 6.07 1.79 
13 UT                        
5.33  
        
6.70  
               
9.51  
           
8.48  
           
6.25  7.25 5.95 1.31 
14 Fidelity                        
5.37  
        
4.83  
               
5.38  
           
5.35  
           
3.33  4.85 4.01 0.84 
15 ADB                        
9.33  
        
8.22  
             
14.00  
         
10.27  
           
7.88  9.94 8.23 1.71 
16 Unibank                        
6.04  
        
5.97  
               
9.21  
           
7.72  
           
5.28  6.85 5.77 1.07 
17 HFC                      
10.81  
        
11.55  
             
16.43  
         
13.35  
           
4.74  11.37 9.76 1.61 
18 Prudential                         
6.45  
        
6.34  
               
8.81  
           
6.72  
           
3.16  6.30 5.43 0.87 
19 NIB                        
7.72  
        
6.07  
               
8.18  
           
7.24  
           
2.17  6.28 5.94 0.33 
20 CAL                      
11.18  
          
9.96  
             
12.01  
         
11.27  
           
5.95  10.07 8.10 1.97 
 Average 9.10 9.54 14.44 12.80 7.50 10.69 9.01 1.68 
 Source: Computed by Author 
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Figure 6.10 
Z-score of 20 Sample banks 2009 to 2013 
 
      Source: Author’s Presentation 
Comparatively, the Nigerian banking sector stability figures are very low ranging 
from -9.6 in 2009 to 2.78 in 2013.  Although Ghana and South Africa had their 
banking stability levels reduced in 2013 from their 2012 levels, the stability 
scores of the Nigerian banking sector contrasts sharply with stability scores 
reported for the Ghanaian and South African banks.   
Comparative analysis of the stability score of the 20 Ghanaian banks with that 
of South African and Nigerian banks in their home countries show that the 
South African banks have consistently achieved a higher stability score on 
average than the sampled Ghanaian banks over the period of study.  All things 
being equal, with a higher stability score on average and also from a high rigour 
regulatory regime, the South African banks therefore pose less threat to the 
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stability of Ghana’s banking system, but the regulator still needs to ensure that 
their activities are effectively monitored.   
Figure 6.11: Comparative average Z-Scores of Ghanaian and Foreign 
Banks Home Country Banking Stability Levels 
 
Source: World Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis(2016). 
 
Overall, the picture from Figure 6.11 reinforces the IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) micro 
and macro-prudential arguments that consolidated balance sheet of regulated 
banks, sanitised licensing regime, and enforcement of cross-border regulation 
are very crucial for monitoring of banks.  Furthermore, these findings suggest 
and support the view that a proactive and an intrusive approach to regulation 
(FDIC 2013) should continuously be applied in jurisdictions that open up their 
banking sector like Ghana (Enoch et al. 2015). 
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6.7.0 GRANULAR ANALYSIS OF Z-SCORES OF SAMPLE 20 GHANAIAN 
 BANKS 
Table 6.7 shows that the year 2009 had the least solvency level of 2.41 while 
2010 produced the highest Z–score of 42.18.  Bank stability scores in the year 
2013 show the least of the maximum Z-scores. Again the year 2013 produces 
the least difference between the minimum Z-score of 5.33 and the maximum Z 
–score of 13.17. Overall the stability score improved from 7.57 in 2009 to 14.44 
in 2011 and has since been declining.  It declined by 33.93% from 14.44 in 
2011 to 9.54 in 2012 and declined further by 4.7% from the 2012 level to 9.09 in 
2013 as also shown in Figure 6.11.   
Table 6.7 
Summary Descriptive Statistics of Z- scores 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2013 20 9.097 2.314 5.33 13.17 
2012 20 9.540 3.034 4.83 15.47 
2011 20 14.44 11.178 5.38 33.47 
2010 20 12.80 8.231 5.35 42.18 
2009 20   7.57 7.037 2.41 35.20 
      
Z-score 
Average 
20 10.69 5.506 4.66 26.96 
Leverage 
Risk 
20 9.01 5.264 4.01 25.06 
Portfolio 
Risk 
20 1.68 0.732 0.33 2.99 
Software Used: STATA 12 
 
This trend can partly be explained by the fact that volatility of earnings on 
average assets declined from 2.38 in 2009 to 1.26 in 2011 and reversed by 
increasing from the 2011 level by 61% to 2.03 and subsequently to 2.23 in 2013 
below the 2009 level of volatility. The volatility of ROAA trend is presented in 
Figure 6.12 below. 
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Further analysis shows that out of the 20 banks sampled, 13 or 65 % had an 
average stability score below the average Z-score of 10.69 from 2009- 2013.  
Among the 13 banks identified as having below the average stability threshold 
figure, eight were state-owned and private local banks.  Only one local bank 
had stability score above the average.  Five of the foreign and regional banks 
had their stability score below average. Six had their scores above the overall 
average. 
 
Figure 6.12 
Volatility in ROAA and Bank stability trend 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
The stability score is further decomposed into portfolio and leverage risks to 
identify the main drivers of banking stability (Khöler 2015). In addition, 55% of 
the sampled banks totalling 11 have portfolio risks that are fairly above the 
average of 1.693.  However out of this total of 11banks, 8 are foreign banks and 
the 3 are local banks.  With the remaining sample, 3 out of the 9 are foreign 
banks and the rest being local banks had their portfolio risks scores falling 
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below the average portfolio risks score.  Tables 6.6 and 6.7 also show that the 
stability scores of banks are largely from their leverage risks figures. This 
reflects the low diversity of products and services on the Ghanaian market. 
 
6.8.0 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS: THE Z-SCORE  
This section examines the correlation between the Z-score and the individual 
variables that affect the bank stability values which include bank size, interbank 
borrowing and debts, non-performing loans, regulatory governance, risk 
governance, origin and its own decomposed elements of portfolio and leverage 
risks. From the OLS diagnostic tests shown in Appendix 5.4, the data is found 
to be normal and therefore the Pearson product-moment correlation matrix is 
used to ascertain if there is a possibility of multicollinearity. 
6.8.1 CORRELATION: Z-SCORE AND REGULATION AND BANK-LEVEL
  VARIABLES 
The Table 6.8 below shows the correlation that exists amongst model variables. 
Table 6.8 Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Z-score Size Interborr NPL RiskGov RegInd Origin Levrisk Portrisk 
Z-score 1.0000         
Size -0.1718 1.0000        
Interborr -0.0418 -0.0478 1.0000       
NPL -0.0531 -0.0093 0.0299 1.0000      
Riskgov 0.1782 0.3776 0.1169 -0.1193 1.0000     
RegInd 0.1754 -0.0261 -0.1232 -0.1429 0.2113 1.0000    
Origin  0.4689 0.0564 0.0561 -0.0179 0.3054 0.6804 1.0000   
Levrisk 0.9517 -0.2991 -0.0627 0.0561 0.0754 0.1327 0.4343 1.0000  
Portrisk 0.2023 0.4131 0.0817 -0.2401 0.3510 
 
0.1341 0.1648 -0.0003 1.0000 
Software Used: STATA 12 
 
The simple correlation matrix in Table 6.8 shows six measures of regulation and 
bank –level risk activities and the Z-score. The correlations in column 1 of Table 
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6.8 suggest that the Z-score is negatively correlated with size, interbank 
borrowing and non-performing loans.  The column 6 of Table 6.8 for example, 
shows a positive correlation of 0.68 between origin and regulatory 
independence. The correlations reported in column 1 range between -0.17 to 
0.46 indicating that various measures captured relate differently with the Z-
score.  Leverage risk has a correlation of 0.95 indicating that the stability score 
depends largely on the size of the leverage risks of banks. This will pose no 
multicollinearity problem because leverage risk is not used as a regressor in this 
research.  Correlations reported in columns 2 to 7 of Table 6.8 also range 
between -0.29 to 0.68.  The findings suggest that the bank-level variables also 
correlate differently with the regulatory variables. 
 
The results suggest that multicollinearity might not be a problem because the 
correlations are less than 0.8 (Gujirati and Porter 2009).  Again, Table 6.8 only 
showed the association between the Z-score and the bank-level and regulatory 
variables which might be suggestive.  Unless causality is established as will be 
discussed in chapter 7, such results are rarely compelling (Wooldridge 2013).   
 
6.8.2 SAMPLE T-TESTS OF THE Z-SCORES  
Again an obvious question that arises from Tables 6.6 and 6.7 above is whether 
or not the differences shown are statistically significant.  The independent 
samples t-test is used to examine the differences in Z-score variables for both 
foreign and local banks from 2009 to 2013 using the average of the variables. 
 
The results in columns 1 through 3 of Table 6.9 suggest that foreign banks are 
more stable than local banks.  Except for the year 2009, column 5 of Table 6.9, 
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which reports the p-values, suggests that the stability gaps which exist between 
the foreign and local banks from 2010 to 2013 are statistically significant.  
Table 6.9 
T-tests of Differences in Means of the Z-Scores of 20 banks 
from 2009 -2013 
T-test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year  Foreign Local  Difference  t-value p-value 
2009 9.35 5.38 3.97 1.287 0.2143 
2010 16.32 8.63 7.69 2.238 0.0381 
2011 18.05 10.04 8.01 3.107 0.0061 
2012 11.29 7.39 3.90 3.703 0.0016 
2013 10.10 7.86 2.24 2.411 0.0268 
2009-
2013 
13.49 7.86 5.63 2.609 0.0178 
Software Used: STATA 12 
 
In 2010, the reported difference was statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
levels.  In 2011 and 2012 the differences are statistically significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10%.  In 2013, the difference in stability was statistically significant at 
the 5% and 10% levels. The overall average difference in stability from 2009 to 
2013 was statistically significant at the 5% and10% levels.  Column 4 of Table 
6.9 is supported by Figure 6.13 below, which shows that trend in stability 
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differences is an inverse U-shaped, with the stability gap increasing between 
the two groups from 2009 to 2011 and falls between 2012 and 2013. 
 
Figure 6.13 
Z-score by origin of 20 banks from 2009-2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
Figure 6.13 also presents the average comparative stability levels using the Z-
score of foreign and local banks. The results show that stability levels are higher 
in foreign banks than local banks but both experienced decline in their 
measured stability levels in 2012 and 2013.  However, the average differences 
between stability score have been reducing since 2011. The narrowing gap 
between foreign and local banks stability can be explained from the 
capitalisation regulation and improved efficiency of local banks despite the 
increased volatility in their ROAAs as shown in Figure 6.12. 
 
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
20.00
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sc
o
re
 
Z-Score by origin 2009- 2013 
Foreign Banks
Local Banks
  
246 
 
6.9.0 COMPARATIVE MICRO ANALYSIS OF STABILITY RATING OF 
SAMPLE BANKS USING CAMELS AND Z-SCORE AS MEASURES IN 
GHANA 
This section discusses the issue of whether the two measures of stability 
provide similar or different quality of information on the level of banking sector 
stability.  Banks are therefore individually ranked from 2009 to 2013 using the 
two measures.  The findings are presented in Tables 6.10 through to 6.13.  
Again the findings provide the opportunity to analyse further the micro-
dimensions of the stability trends and their possible implications. 
6.9.1 COMPOSITE RATING OF SAMPLE BANKS USING CAMELS 
Individual CAMELS variables were combined to establish a composite score 
that determines the overall stability of each bank.  Table 6.10 reports the 
stability levels of sample bank using the composite CAMELS rating in the period 
of study. 
Table 6.10 
Summary CAMEL Composite Rating of 20 banks from 2009 -2013 
CAMELS rating of sample banks 
Rating  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 or Strong 7 8 8 11 12 
2 or 
Satisfactory 
11 12 11 9 8 
3 or Fair  2 0 1   
4 or Marginal       
5 or 
Unsatisfactory  
     
Total  20 20 20 20 20 
Source: Computed by Author 
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Table 6.10 shows that the average level of bank stability has improved since 
2009 where two banks were classified as ‘fair’. In 2010, all the banks in the 
sample were categorised as either ‘strong’ or ‘satisfactory’.  The situation 
reversed slightly in 2011with a bank being classified as ‘fair’, the number of 
sample banks classified as strong improved from 7 in 2009 to 8 in 2010 and 
2011. In 2012, following the completion of the recapitalisation regulation, the 
number of banks classified as strong increased from 8 to 11, approximately 
30% change. At the same time, the number of banks classified as satisfactory 
fell from 11 to 9, approximating a drop of 18%.  The improvement continued in 
2013, with the number of banks classified as strong increasing to 12 while those 
in the satisfactory category reduce by one or 11%. 
In short, there were more banks classified as satisfactory banks in 2009, than 
strong banks.  The situation reversed by the end of 2012.  In 2013, four 
additional banks migrated to become strong banks increasing the strong 
category by 50% over the 2011 figure.  
The CAMELS rating by origin using the annual CAMELS ratings from 2009 to 
2013 is presented in Table 6.11 below. The summary table shows that the 
foreign banks are relatively stronger than the local banks. Columns 1 through to 
3 of Table 6.11 suggest that the stability of the local banks improved marginally 
from two banks being classified as fairly stable to satisfactory after their 
recapitalisation in 2010.  
 Similarly, foreign banks classified as strong increased from 6 to 7 by 2011 
partly due to Barclays’ complete exit from the micro-financing business and full 
write-off of the losses in 2009.  In 2012 and 2013, the number of foreign banks 
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classified as strong increased to 8, as Access Bank strengthened its balance 
sheet through the acquisition of the Intercontinental Bank operations in Ghana, 
and restructuring its loan portfolio. 
Table 6.11 
CAMELS rating and classification of 20 sample banks 
CAMELS 
Classification  
Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Local  Foreign Local Foreign Local  Foreign Local  Foreign Local  Foreign 
1 or Strong 1 6 2 6 1 7 3 8 4 8 
2 or 
Satisfactory 
6 5 7 5 7 4 6 3 5 3 
3 or Fair  2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 or Marginal  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 or 
Unstable 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  9 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 
Source: Computed by Author 
 
Even though Stanbic Bank moved from being strong to satisfactory in 2013, its 
place was taken by the First Atlantic Bank (FABL), which has been restructured 
by its new foreign owners, with new capital injections in 2012.  
Similarly, in 2012 and 2013, the number of local banks classified as strong 
increase from 1 in 2011 to 3 in 2012.  In 2013 the number improved further to 4 
while those classified as satisfactory decreased from 7 in 2011 to 5 in 2013.  
The overall picture points to an improved, growing and relatively stable banking 
system according to the CAMELS rating as shown below in Figure 6.14 
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because the sample banks could be classified either as strong or satisfactorily 
strong. 
Figure 6.14 
CAMELS Rating of 20 Sample Banks 2009-2013 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
 
6.9.2 COMPOSITE RATING OF SAMPLE BANKS USING THE Z-SCORE 
Table 6.12 presents the summary stability trends of the sample banks using the 
Z-score.  Between 2009 and 2011, the number banks classified as highly stable 
based on the Z-score increased from 3 to 14, but declined from the 2011 level 
by more than half by 2013 as shown in columns 1 through to 3 of Table 6.12. 
Columns 2 through to 5 suggest that the number of banks in the stable category 
has more than tripled from 2 in 2009 to 7 in 2012 and reduced to 5 in 2013.  
Contrast to that, the number of banks classified as fairly stable reduced from 6 
in 2009 to 1 in 2011 and reversed by increasing to 4 in 2012 and 5 in 2013. 
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Table 6.12 
Summary Composite Z-score rating of 20 Ghanaian Banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 or Highly Stable 3 13 14 7 8 
2 or Stable  2 1 4 7 5 
3 or Fairly Stable  6 4 1 4 5 
4 or Significantly  Unstable 5 2 1 2 2 
5 or Absolutely Unstable  4     
Total  20 20 20 20 20 
Source: Computed by Author 
 
From Table 6.12, almost half of the banks sampled, would be classified as 
either significantly unstable (25%) or absolutely unstable (20%) in 2009.  By 
2013, no bank was classified as absolutely unstable but 2 local banks (10%) 
were classified as significantly unstable.  These findings are in contrast to the 
classifications based on the CAMELS presented in Table 6.10. The banks 
appear relatively stronger based on the CAMELS classifications. 
 
 Table 6.12 is further decomposed into local and foreign banks to examine the 
micro dynamics with respect to individual banks in each group.  The 
decomposed stability levels of sampled foreign and local banks are presented in 
Table 6.13 and Figure 6.15 below.  Table 6.13 reports the trends in the stability 
profile of foreign and local banks from 2009 to 2013 incorporating the effect of 
capital regulation introduced between 2009 and 2012. After meeting the capital 
regulation in 2011, all foreign banks were classified as class 1 or highly stable 
banks.  Five out of the number have fallen into either the stable or fairly stable 
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category by 2013.  On the other hand, local banks have maintained their level of 
classification in the highest category, slightly reduced their presence in the 
stable category by 2012.  However the number of local banks classified as 
either fairly stable or significantly unstable in 2011, have by 2013 more than 
doubled from 2 to 5.  No local bank is classified as absolutely unstable by 2013.  
A comparative analysis of 2009 and 2013 stability levels using the Z-score 
indicates that stability levels of the banks both local and foreign have improved.  
This is largely consistent with the findings of the CAMELS.  However the 
essence of ascertaining banks stability is brought fully to light if a comparison is 
done between 2009 and 2011; first being the compliance and transition period 
and subsequent comparison between 2011 and 2013.   
 
Z-score analysis removes the camouflage from the banks stability levels by 
showing that the stability of banks has been declining since 2012 through to 
2013 and that the relative proportion of the total assets of banks that can be 
funded using their capital has decreased significantly.  Furthermore, the rate of 
deterioration is occurring faster in the foreign banks than in the local banks.  
This is because while the local banks have their capital naturally hedged, 
because they were initially in the local currency, their foreign counterparts had 
their capital initially provided in US dollars. The depreciation of the local 
currency over time can lead to impairment of the dollar-denominated capital. 
 
Another reason is the quality of operational transparency and disclosures 
(Ratnovski 2014), and the degree of regulatory rigour from the parent 
jurisdiction, notably the UK, Indian and South African banks that enforce the 
IFRS requirements on dynamic provisioning and write-off policies partly explain 
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why foreign NPLs are equally high and express in the rapid deterioration of their 
stability levels. 
Table 6.13 
Decomposed Z-score classification of sample 20 banks 
Z-Score 
Classification 
of Banks 
Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Local  Foreign Local Foreign Local  Foreign Local  Foreign Local  Foreign 
1 or Highly 
Stable  
0 3 3 10 3 11 1 6 2 6 
2 or Stable  1 1 1  4 0 2 5 2 3 
3 or Fairly 
Stable 
2 4 4 0 1 0 4 0 3 2 
4 or 
Significantly 
Unstable  
3 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 
5 or Unstable 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  9 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 9 11 
Source: Computed by Author using Tables 5.3 and 6.6 
 
 
Figure 6.15 
Comparative Z-score classification 20 banks by Origin 
 
 
Source: Author’s Presentation 
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6.10.0 REGULATORY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS  
The fundamental conclusion deduced from Table 6.13 which used the Z-score 
index to assess the level of stability of banks in Ghana, is that 10% of the banks 
could be classified as weak in 2011. The number increased to 30% in 2012 and 
finally to 35% or 7 banks in 2013. This insight into the level of stability of banks 
in Ghana differs from the insight that could be drawn from Table 6.11 which 
classified their stability status using the composite CAMELS.  
These findings suggest three specific implications for banking regulation and 
banking policy in Ghana.  The first suggestion revolves around the need to 
investigate into the actual quality and structure of banking sector assets which 
demands improved accounting, transparency and disclosure of banking 
activities.  The second requires the regulator to take steps to minimise ‘profit 
mining’ tendencies.  The third challenges the regulator to create the needed 
structures to protect small savers in Ghana. These implications are critically 
reviewed below. 
6.10.1 IMPROVING ACCOUNTING, TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 
 OF BANKS LOAN ASSET QUALITY 
To promote accounting, transparency and disclosure of banks loan asset 
quality, banks should be required to show how they have valued the collateral 
backing any secured loan and the rigour of the cash flow analysis that supports 
such an exposure.  This is particularly necessary in developing countries like 
Ghana where unsecured loans and excesses have served to promote 
entrepreneurship and development of the SME segment.  On the other hand, 
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excesses have been one of the main sources of bad loans in Ghanaian banking 
practice (BOG 2014).  This will improve the quality and completeness of 
information available for regulatory monitoring, as well as the policy objective of 
ensuring banking sector stability and investor interest (Barth et al. 2013).  
Specifically, the provisioning for impairment needs to be dynamic and write–off 
policies need to be stringent to compel all players, notably the government to be 
more responsive to settling state agencies indebtedness to banks (BOG 2014).  
An additional benefit of having proper accounting and reporting system for 
impairment of loans of supervised banks is to improve their credit ratings by 
their correspondent banks. Indiscriminate rating of Ghanaian banks affect 
negatively the interest rates placed on their borrowings offshore which also 
contribute to the volatility in their return on assets if these increased costs 
cannot be passed through to customers in delivering their services.   
6.10.2 MINIMISE THE INCENTIVES TO PROFIT MINE BY BANKS 
Profit mining observed in Ghanaian banking sector, is a practical way of using 
the entrenchment view in corporate governance theory (Saghi- Zedek and 
Tarazi 2015), in a positive way and not in the negative way.  This does not 
involve insider expropriation (Boubakri and Ghouma 2010) but it is an aspect of 
tunnelling of initial capital by the investor in a jurisdiction where the currency 
value continue to fall against the convertible currencies which was initially used 
to secure the banking license with the aim of shelving the capital to be recycled 
to satisfy the nominal capital requirements in future and also ensure that 
average return on investments globally are protected in the group’s 
performance setting(Blankenburg and Khan  2012).   
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This is very successful where the banking regulator does not require and /or 
enforce the need for consolidated balance sheet reporting of the licensed 
conglomerate banks whether local or foreign.  The shelving of capital is carried 
through high management fees, IT infrastructure costs and support, training, 
intra-group lending and placements at managed rates. The banking license then 
becomes like an oil field or a mining concession where the investor has fully 
recovered his initial investments and continue to exploit the reserves for a 
continued and guaranteed positive return over the concession period (Duval et 
al. 2009). 
In the case of banking, it is carried out at the expense of depositors in Ghana. 
For example an investor in 2009 who acquired a banking license with the 
minimum capital requirement of GH¢60 million required $60 million then, now 
needs $32 million to satisfy the current minimum requirements of 
GH¢120million in 2015(BOG, 2014).  While globally, regulators are increasing 
the capital requirements in nominal and in real terms (Noonan and Binham 
2015), the Ghanaian regulator is rather reducing the dollar benchmarked 
minimum capital requirements.   
Secondly, pursuing nominal capital regulation over very short periods also 
poses serious disincentives to shareholders and potential investors in the 
banking sector.  The combined high business environmental risk and the 
growing regulatory challenges as discussed in chapter 2 are, in effect, 
encouraging both local and foreign banks to develop techniques of capital 
shelving as part of their capital management strategy to satisfy such frequent 
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nominal capital increases by the regulator, a feature that is quite frequent and 
unique to Ghana.  
One option is for the regulator to consider the dollarization of the minimum 
capital especially in an import-driven economy like Ghana to promote stability in 
the capital reported by banks but it comes with the risk that once the local 
currency strengthens against the dollar, it reduces the required capital and 
increases management discretion.  Alternatively, and preferably, the regulator 
should consider measures that will always encourage investors to commit their 
capital to the domestic economy by simply implementing the raw leverage ratio 
suggested by Basel III and adapting into its monitoring scale the Z-score rating 
used in this research which follows the FIDC(2013) developed scale.  
This approach will be in sync with the empirical literature (Grill et al. 2015) 
because banks will have to optimise their return on their capital, and their 
deposit insurance rating simultaneously by choosing their transactions carefully.   
This will potentially and to some extent minimise the inherent moral hazard 
partly induced by ‘profit mining’ which tend to reinforce themselves. 
6.10.3 PROTECTION OF SMALL SAVERS AND DEPOSITORS  
If owners of banks are incentivised to profit mine and shelve their capital, 
coupled with their limited liability status and there is absence of cross-border 
regulation and consolidated accounting by these foreign banks, it becomes 
imperative to design an effective mechanism to protect the depositors in Ghana.  
These issues are further explored and discussed in Chapters 7 of the study. 
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If the Z-score is signalling a deteriorating trend in the stability of banks in Ghana 
from Table 6.13, then, the next chapter will extend the discussion by examining 
the hypotheses concerning the relationship between the regulatory structures 
and bank–level risk management practices and bank stability over the research 
study period from 2009 to 2013. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MULTIVARIATE AND PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter first reports the dependence of the Z-score on the regulatory and 
bank-level risk variables in Ghana using the pooled OLS, the fixed effects and 
panel random effects regression models discussed in chapter 5.  The chapter 
seeks to achieve three main objectives.  First, it empirically tests the 
hypotheses in chapter 4 to ascertain if the identified regulatory and bank –level 
variables significantly affect the bank stability in Ghana or not as discussed in 
the empirical literature.  Secondly, it summarises the research findings in this 
chapter.  Third, it tries to present the implications and recommendations of the 
research findings. 
 
7.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PANEL DATA REGRESSION ANALYSIS    
This section presents the initial panel data regression results for the full sample 
banks.  In order to test the hypotheses, we used several estimation methods. 
First, we applied pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), assuming that a common 
error structure applies to all banks. Yet, treating banks as homogeneous entities 
is most likely too strong a restriction. Furthermore, there is the need to reduce 
the potential that pooled OLS outcomes will be biased or inaccurate if time-
invariant individual effects are observed.   Another option would have been to 
estimate the bank specific effects as fixed parameters.  
 
The purpose for including the fixed effects model in this analysis is that, it will 
remove any biased or unreliable pooled OLS estimator that can be attributed to 
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time-invariant individual effects from the error term and the autocorrelation of 
the error term (Verbeek 2008).  However, this would imply that many degrees of 
freedom would be lost since our panel contains many banks relative to years. 
We therefore in principle assume that all (unobservable) factors that influence 
individual bank behaviour, but that are not captured by our regressors, can be 
summarised by a random error term.  
 
Primarily, the random effects model will account for the potential that individual 
effects vary over time (Park 2011).  Also, we are not so much interested in the 
value of the unobserved bank-specific effect, but rather in making inferences 
with respect to population characteristics. Therefore, the random effects (RE) 
model is estimated.  We tested our final specification whether the pooled OLS, 
fixed effects (FE) or RE was to be preferred using both the Hausman 
specification test and the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test. The 
estimates pooled, fixed and random effects regression results based on the 
specific regulatory and bank-level risk management variables are reported in 
subsections 7.2.1 to 7.10 to test hypotheses one to six.   
 
Overall, six hypotheses are tested in this chapter as follows: 
𝐻1: The size of the bank is not related to bank stability in Ghana. 
𝐻2: The level of external and interbank borrowing of the bank is not related to
  bank stability in Ghana. 
𝐻3: The level of non-performing loans is higher for the bank with a lower level 
of bank stability in Ghana. 
𝐻4: The level of regulatory risk governance practices of the bank is positively 
 related to bank stability in Ghana. 
  
260 
 
𝐻5: The state or the central bank ownership of the bank is not related to bank
  stability in Ghana. 
𝐻6:  The level of foreign participation or origin of the bank is not related to 
bank stability in Ghana. 
 
7.3.0 TEST OF PANEL REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS 
Following Battaglia and Gallo (2015) the panel data analysis is used as the 
most efficient tool because of the way the research data is structured. The 
panel data structure allows us to take into account the unobservable and 
constant heterogeneity, that is, the specific features of each bank (management 
style and quality, market perception, business strategy, etc.).  
 
There are several different linear models for panel data. The fundamental 
distinction is that between fixed effects and random effects models. The primary 
estimation method is generalised least squares (GLS) random effects (RE) 
technique. This is because the random effects technique transforms data to get 
rid of autocorrelation in errors.  This technique is therefore robust to first-order 
autoregressive disturbances (if any) even within unbalanced-panels and cross-
sectional correlation and/or heteroskedasticity across panels (Battaglia and 
Gallo 2015).  
 
In the presence of unobserved bank fixed effects, panel fixed effects (FE) 
estimation is commonly suggested (Wooldridge 2002). However, such FE 
estimation is not suitable for our study for two main reasons. First, time-invariant 
variables cannot be estimated with FE regression, as it would be absorbed or 
wiped out in ‘within transformation’ or ‘time-demeaning’ process of the variables 
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in FE.  Thus, GLS RE is considered as an alternative to FE (Battaglia and Gallo 
2015). The choice of the GLS RE model is also based on the results from the 
OLS diagnostic tests, which is summarised from Appendices 5.4 and 5.5. Table 
7.1 below presents the summary of the diagnostic tests carried out in 
Appendices 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
Table 7.1: Summary results of OLS and Panel Data Diagnostics 
Diagnostics   Type of 
Test 
Test Statistic P-values  Implications 
Normality  Swilk e W 0.16089 Normally 
distributed   
Swilk r W 0.16089 
 
Homoskedasticity Breusch- 
Pagan 
(BP)/Cook-
weisberg  
𝜒2  
 
0.5911 
 
Homoskedastic 
0.29 
Multicollinearity Mean 
Variance 
Inflation 
Factor(VIF) 
VIF 1.47 No 
multicollinearity 
Autocorrelation Breusch- 
Godfrey 
Lag (1) 10.512 0.0012 Presence of 
autocorrelation Lag (6) 39.44 0.0000 
Model 
Specification 
Linktest  _hat 0.381 No specification 
error _hatsq 0.135 
Ovtest F 2.3 0.1157 No specification 
error 
Choice of Model Breusch-
Pagan 
7.3 0.0034 FE/ RE and not 
Pooled OLS 
Hausman 3.14 0.7915 GLS Random 
Effects 
Robust GMM 
Model 
Specification 
Hansen J 
Test 
Sig. 𝝌𝟐(1) J Test Model 2 
P-values  
 
The GMM 
Model is valid 
and is properly 
specified  
1% 6.635 1.0919 3 0.2960 
5% 5.025 1.1215 2 0.2896 
10% 2.706 2.4308 1 0.1187 
Source: STATA 12 
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Table 7.1 shows that there is the possibility of autocorrelation in the data.  This 
is followed by the results obtained from the Breusch–Pagan, Hausman and 
Hansen’s J tests shown in Appendix 5.5.  
 
7.4 PANEL RESULTS 
 
The results of the various estimation methods used are presented in Tables 7.2 
and 7.3. Table 7.2 reports the pooled OLS, fixed effects model and random 
effects model on the empirical model specified in section 5.11.  Table 7.3 
applies the GMM estimator to the model to test the robustness of the GLS 
random effects model results.  They show the full sample regressions in which 
we include all the regressors.  A positive co-efficient indicates an increase in 
bank stability and a negative one indicates a reduction in bank stability.  In 
general the results from the GLS random effects model and the GMM are very 
similar. 
  
Following Beck et al. (2013), as the dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of the Z-score, the point estimate can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity.  In all, 
bank size and all the regulatory risk variables, namely, risk governance, 
regulatory independence and origin appear to be statistically significant. Again 
following Beck et al. (2013), the absolute values of the coefficients of the 
significant variables are as follows: bank size coefficient varies between 0.082 
(FE) to 0.199 (GMM robust); risk governance coefficient varies between 0.072 
(pooled OLS) to 0.085 (GMM hac-bartlett); regulatory independence coefficient 
varies between 0.32 (GMM robust) to 0.394 (FE); and origin coefficient varies 
between 0.557 (FE) to 0.710 (pooled OLS).  
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A noteworthy first result from all the two tables is that we do not find much 
evidence of the significance of the other two bank-level risk variables, the 
interbank borrowing and NPL.  The absolute values of their coefficients are as 
follows: interbank borrowing coefficient varies between 0.0075 (pooled OLS) 
and GMM (robust) to 0.0087 (GMM hac-bartlett); and NPL coefficient varies 
between 0.0016 (FE) to 0.0044 (GMM hac- Bartlett and hac –bartlett Newey 
West).   
 
Two results are especially worth pointing out. First, we find a consistent and 
significant direct influence of size, risk governance, regulatory independence 
and origin.  The second is that the constant remains significant in all the 
estimation methods used. 
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Table 7.2: Determinants of Bank Stability: Model 1  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable  Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Estimation Technique  Pooled OLS Fixed  Effects (FE) GLS Random Effects(RE) 
Bank –level variables  
 Size -0.1877*** -0.0827 -0.1556** 
(0.002) (0.457) (0.030) 
Interbor -0.0086* -0.0075 -0.0076 
(0.073) (0.183) (0.116) 
Nplrat -0.0039 -0.0016 -0.0030 
(0.339) (0.804) (0.553) 
Regulatory variables 
Risgov 0.0725* 0.0822* 0.0845** 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.040) 
Reind  -0.3936*** -0.3949* -0.3741** 
(0.002) ( 0.074) (0.012) 
Origin  0.7100*** 0.5573 * 0.6686*** 
(0.000) (0.054) (0.000) 
Constant  5.9467*** 3.8100* 5.2463*** 
(0.000) (0.084) (0.000) 
R-squared within  0.1368 0.1290 
R-squared  0.3515   
Adjusted R-squared  0.3096   
Notes: The dependent variable is the Z-score which is the combination of risk adjusted average return on 
assets (ROAA/𝝈𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑨 ) and leverage risk (Assets/Equity)/𝝈𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑨 ).  Bank-level control variables are: Size(Bank 
Size) is the natural log of total assets of a bank; Interbor( Bank Interbank borrowing and debt) is the ratio of  
total interbank borrowing and debt to total liabilities of a bank in per cent;  Nplrat(Non-performing loans ) is 
total non-performing loans to Total Gross Loans of a bank in per cent.  The regulatory-level control variables 
are: Risgov(Risk Governance) which takes a scale of 1-4. 4 represents the highest and 1 the least score; Reind 
(Regulatory Independence) is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the bank is a private bank and 0 
otherwise; Origin (Bank Origin) which is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the bank is foreign and 0 if 
the bank is local; 𝑷 values are in parenthesis; * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** 
Significant at the 1% level. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.   
Software Used: STATA 12.0. 
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Table 7.3: Determinants of Bank Stability: Model 2 Robust Test 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable  Z-score  Z-score Z-score 
Estimation Technique  GMM 
(Robust) 
GMM 
(HAC-Bartlett ) 
GMM 
(HAC-Bartlett Newey West) 
Bank –level variables  
Size -0.1993*** -0.1946*** -0.1947*** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interborr -0.0075 -0.0087 -0.0086 
(0.122) (0.179) (0.178) 
Nplrat -0.0041 0.0044 0.0044 
(0.466) (0.479) (0.478) 
Regulatory variables 
Risgov 0.0802** 0.0851** 0.0848** 
(0.028) (0.012) (0.014) 
Reind  -0.3235*** -0.3411** -0.3394** 
(0.006) ( 0.026) (0.024) 
Origin  0.6120*** 0.6307*** 0.6296*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  6.1638*** 6.0840*** 6.0857*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen’s J 0.118 0.2896 0.2960 
Notes: The dependent variable is the Z-score which is the combination of risk adjusted average return on 
assets (ROAA/𝝈𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑨 ) and leverage risk (Assets/Equity)/𝝈𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑨 ).  Bank-level control variables are: Size(Bank 
Size) is the natural log of total assets of a bank; Interbor( Bank Interbank borrowing and debt) is the ratio of  
total interbank borrowing and debt to total liabilities of a bank in per cent;  Nplrat(Non-performing loans ) is the 
ratio of  total non-performing loans to Total Gross Loans times of a bank in per cent .  The regulatory-level 
control variables are: Risgov(Risk Governance) which takes a scale of 1-4. 4 represents the highest and 1 the 
least score; Reind (Regulatory Independence) which is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the bank is a 
private bank  and 0 otherwise; and Origin (Bank Origin) which is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the 
bank is foreign and 0 if the bank is local.  Instrumentals for equation include foreign ownership, local 
ownership, the constant, size, interbank borrowing, non-performing loans, risk governance and regulatory 
independence. HAC standard errors based on Bartlett kernel with 20 lags by Newey –West method; HAC 
standard errors based on Bartlett kernel with 98 lags.   𝑷 values are in parenthesis; * Significant at the 10% 
level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. Coefficients are on top of parenthesis.   
Software Used: STATA 12.0.  
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Regarding the estimation method, we employed two commonly used estimators 
that have been used before in the bank stability literature by Brei and Schclarek 
(2013): the fixed or random effects panel estimator and the GMM estimator. The 
choice to work with random-effects rather than with the fixed effects version is 
based on the Hausman test which rejects that the coefficients are significantly 
different.  
 
Given our static panel data specification, a further robust test is undertaken by 
using the linear GMM estimator based on the panel GMM estimator formalised 
by Hansen (1982).  The Hansen test, tests the null hypothesis that the model is 
valid and the J-statistic is asymptotically chi-squared with K – L degrees of 
freedom, where K is the number of moment conditions, and Lis the number of 
estimated parameters.  Again the J statistic is not significant even at 1% 
significance level, so we conclude that our model is valid and not mis-specified 
(Hayashi 2000). 
 
The Breusch–Pagan, tests the null hypothesis that the individual (or time) 
specific variance components are zero.  This was rejected to conclude that 
there is significant random effect in the panel data and that the random effects 
model is able to deal with heterogeneity better than the pooled OLS (Park 
2011). The LM follows the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.  
The Breusch –Pagan (BP) chi-square statistic for model (1) is 7.31 (p-value is 
0.0034) as shown in Table 7.1.  
 
The Hausman test is further used to examine if the individual effects are 
significantly correlated with any of the regressors (Park 2011). The Hausman 
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tests in this study for the model (1) follow the chi-square distribution of six 
degrees of freedom.  The Hausman test statistic for model (1) is 3.14 (and the 
p-value is 0.79).  These results suggest that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same.  In other words, the results show 
that the individual effects are, in most cases, not significantly correlated with the 
explanatory variables, so that random effects model can be used to model bank 
level specificities.  
 
7.5.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: BANK SIZE AND BANK STABILITY 
This section examines the effect of bank size on bank stability and its 
implications.  Based on the results from Table 7.4 below, bank size was found 
to have a statistically significant and a negative relationship with the Z-score at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels using the GMM and pooled OLS estimation 
methods. 
Table 7.4: Bank –level risk: Size results 
Bank –
level risk 
taking 
variable  
Dependent Variable : Z–Score 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed- 
Effects(FE)  
GLS 
Random -
Effects(RM) 
GMM 
(Robust ) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Bartlett) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Newey-
West) 
Size -0.1877*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0827 
(0.457) 
-0.1556** 
(0.030) 
-0.1993*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1946*** 
(0.003) 
-0.1947*** 
(0.003) 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.  The p-values are in the parenthesis. 
Source: STATA 12 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3 
 
The relationship is statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels using the 
GLS random effects model.  It is not statistically significant using the fixed 
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effects model but maintains a negative relationship. Thus the evidence supports 
a negative relationship between bank stability and the size of the bank in 
Ghana.  We therefore have sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis (H1), 
which states that, the size of the bank is not related to bank stability in Ghana. 
 
7.5.2 DISCUSSIONS  
The study finds that that increases in bank assets in Ghana reduced stability 
levels. The findings support the empirical studies by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2011) who found a negative relationship between size (absolute size) 
and Z-score using a sample of international banks from 1991 to 2009.  Their 
findings suggested that bank growth has not been in the interest of 
shareholders in smaller countries. Laeven et al. (2014) also found that larger 
banks are riskier and create more systemic risk, when they have lower capital 
and less stable funding.  This is particularly so with the large state-owned and 
small Ghanaian private banks that have a lower capital base relative to their 
assets as presented in Table 6.6 coupled with their high loans to deposit ratios 
also shown in Figure 6.7 by CAL, HFC, UT, ADB and NIB.  They tend to share 
many of the risk factors that the too-big–to- fail hypothesis (Farhi and Tirole 
2012) and unstable banking hypothesis (Gennaioli et al. 2013) have identified 
as being drivers of systematic risks, such as high leverage, activity diversity, 
and interconnectedness.   
 
As shown in Figure 4.1(the conceptual framework) in chapter 4, the negative 
relationship is in conflict with expectations that come with increased financial 
inclusion in a developing country like Ghana, because it is expected to promote 
  
269 
 
economic growth and development.  However, the structure and quality of the 
assets created theoretically and practically determine their relationship with 
bank stability.  
  
In the Ghanaian context, the increases in assets of banks are in bank 
infrastructure and loans.  Over the period of study competition has increased, 
making yield on new and expanding branches very low, even though overall 
profits have generally been increasing in nominal terms.   The second is the 
continued influence of government on state-owned banks to create long term 
assets through the financing of strategic imports such as petroleum for some 
state enterprises and special agricultural loans with negotiated rates with the 
central bank.  These transactions contribute significantly to overall reduction in 
the return on assets (ROA).  
 
 
7.5.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) argument means that state owned banks should be 
supported with fresh capital injections from the state budget.  Alternatively these 
state banks should be allowed to float part of their shares on Ghana Stock 
Exchange(GSE) as part of their capital expansion programmes whilst 
maintaining state control for strategic reasons.  The same should apply to the 
private banks (Casu et al. 2015). 
As suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013), the state-owned banks 
should be made to downsize given the huge size of public debt and also as a 
fiscally constrained country as discussed in chapter 2, in order for the state-
owned banks to be able to rely on the implicit financial safety net in future. 
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The second is the need to develop E-money payment platform which has a high 
adoption, conversion and penetration rate than the cards and cheque payment 
system because of their convenience, accessibility and security.  This will 
improve the economies expected from the rate of branch and infrastructure 
expansion to improve stability which is unique to the African region.  This also 
means that new regulation should be made on E-money payment which will 
bring the activities of telecommunication firms under Bank of Ghana’s control 
(Muthiora 2015).  
 
7.6.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: INTERBANK BORROWING AND 
 BANK STABILITY  
This section examines the effect of interbank borrowing and debt on bank 
stability and its implications.  Table 7.5 presents the results across the 
estimation methods and show a negative relationship between bank borrowing 
and bank stability.  
 
The relationship between borrowing and debt and bank stability is significant 
under pooled OLS model at the10% level. Except for the pooled OLS, there is 
no significant relationship using the other estimation methods at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
271 
 
 
Table 7.5: Bank –level risk: Interbank borrowing and Debt results 
Bank –
level risk 
taking 
variable  
Dependent Variable 
Z –Score 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects(FE)  
GLS 
Random 
Effects(RM) 
GMM 
(Robust ) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Bartlett) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Newey-
West) 
Interbank 
borrowing 
and debt 
-0.0086* 
(0.073) 
-0.0075 
(0.183) 
-0.0076 
(0.116) 
-0.0075 
(0.122) 
-0.0087 
(0.179) 
-0.0086 
(0.178) 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.  The p values are in the parenthesis. 
Source: STATA 12 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
Table 7.5 therefore shows that, there is no sufficient evidence to reject the 
hypothesis (H2) that the level of external and interbank borrowing of the bank is 
not related to bank stability in Ghana.  
  
This negative relationship supports the theory of capital structure and its 
application to banks by Inoguchi (2013). Empirically, the findings support the 
work of Anginer and Demirgüc-Kunt (2014) as discussed in Chapters 4 that 
interbank borrowing and debts in foreign currencies in volatile economies 
reduce banking stability. 
  
7.6.1 DISCUSSIONS   
Within the financial stability theory and supervisory standard mentioned in 
Figure 4.1, is a rapidly developing financial stability literature that borrows from 
the theory of networks which stresses the importance of borrowing on bank 
stability.  Increases in interbank borrowing indicate funding fragility.   The sign of 
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the coefficients (albeit not significant) is in line with recent empirical studies on 
the financial stability.  Gauthier et al. (2012) found that bank stability correlates 
negatively with interbank market activities in Canada.  Earlier findings by the 
Bank of England (2009), Arnold et al. (2012), and the World Bank (2014) 
suggested that interconnectedness, leverage and maturity transformation were 
the three main aspects of financial vulnerability.   
 
A bank’s borrowing might also include borrowing denominated in a foreign 
currency.   A negative relationship between bank borrowing and bank stability 
suggests that the cost of borrowing is outweighing benefits.  And, foreign 
exchange instabilities inherent in the foreign denominated borrowing can reduce 
earnings and have increased volatility in the banks’ earnings.   
 
Foreign banks, therefore, have a greater incentive to rely more on local 
interbank borrowing, which by convention in Ghana are guaranteed by holdings 
of government bills (BOG 2000).  However, increasing government bills 
holdings, and the competitive rates on them, provide the incentives to intensify 
the use of interbank borrowing further.  This situation potentially from empirical 
studies lead to long term stability risks of increased velocity of collateral, 
collateral mining (Singh 2011) and reverse maturity transformation (Singh and 
Stella 2012) , as symptoms of  banking sector instability. 
 
 7.6.2 IMPLICATIONS  
These findings have many implications.  Referring to Figure 4.1, the findings 
call for limits on foreign debt holdings of local banks and proper approach to the 
country’s capital account management by the central bank becomes very 
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crucial. Ocampo et al. (2008), argue that if a country does not increase reserves 
when the domestic firms increase short term foreign currency borrowing, it 
faces a greater risk of crisis.  This means that Ghana can self-insure itself 
against future capital account crisis if it increases its reserves as foreign 
denominated short term liabilities increase.  Having a well sequenced and 
Preventive Capital Account Regulations as a developing country are, therefore, 
needed to ensure stability of the banking system (IMF 2015b).  
 
7.7.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: NPL AND BANK STABILITY 
Hypothesis H3 is about the relationship between the level of non-performing 
loans of the banks and bank stability. The results in Table 7.6 show a negative 
relationship between bank stability and non-performing loans.  
Table 7.6: Bank –level risk: NPL results 
Bank –
level risk 
taking 
variable  
Dependent Variable  
Z –Score 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects(FE)  
GLS 
Random 
Effects(RM) 
GMM 
(Robust ) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Bartlett) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Newey-
West) 
Nplrat -0.0039 
(0.339) 
-0.0016 
(0.804) 
-0.0030 
(0.553) 
-0.0041 
(0.466) 
-0.0044 
(0.479) 
-0.0044 
(0.478) 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.  The p values are in the parenthesis. 
Nplrat is Non-performing Loans rate. 
Source: STATA 12 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
There is no sufficient evidence to accept the null hypothesis (𝐻3).  The results 
are weak as none of the coefficients in all the models estimated is statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The results show that non-performing 
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loans issue is a bank-wide and a serious regulatory challenge because they 
represent an ex post credit risk (Louzis et al. 2012) and a deteriorating balance 
sheet of banks(Ghosh 2015) and therefore require a more careful attention 
across board. 
 
7.7.1 DISCUSSIONS  
The negative non-performing loans coefficient is consistent with the expected 
view in banking literature that non-performing loans lead to diminution of bank 
asset values and increase the volatility of bank earnings, and hence reducing 
stability (Foos et al. 2010; Ghosh 2015).  The results show that banks identified 
as having high stability scores could potentially have had some high level of 
non-performing loans in Ghana. The results also support the findings in chapter 
6, section 6.4.2, where the differences between the NPL levels of foreign and 
local banks were found not to be significant.    
 
The risk is the possibility of overestimation of profits and therefore the Z-scores. 
The possible underestimation of NPLs is caused by the variations in the 
reporting of non-performing loans which practically still exist. The variations in 
the degree of reporting of NPLs represent the depth of operational and conduct 
risk failures in the entire asset portfolio risk management of Ghanaian banks as 
non-performing assets are potentially misclassified as current by the local banks 
to shore up their assets (IMF 2011). The IMF study in 2011 noted a variety of 
practices that result in an overstatement of capital, profitability, and liquidity in 
the banking sector and these practices persist. These include: (i) the 
misclassification of non-performing loans, particularly those linked to 
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government arrears; (ii) under-provisioning for NPLs; (iii) the treatment of 
restructured loans as current; (iv) accrual of interest on NPLs; and (v) the 
reporting of encumbered treasury securities among liquid assets.  Though 
improving to 12.0 per cent as at the end of 2013, misclassification and under-
provisioning for loans are still common occurrences among banks. Adjustments 
to 2012 figures by the IMF team for some of the obvious misclassifications, and 
lending to shareholders, showed that some of the small and medium sized 
banks may be undercapitalised (IMF 2013a).    
 
7.7.2 IMPLICATIONS  
As discussed in chapter 6, section 6.10.1 and following the lead from the 
literature, notably Zhang (2016), it can be argued that the capital injections into 
the banking system allowed the banks to write off non-performing loans and 
caused a significant fall of NPLs during the period 2012 and 2013. If this is the 
case, then the findings provide support for bad management, skimping and 
moral hazard hypotheses (Berger and DeYoung 1997).  Therefore two 
additional policy implications can be suggested.   
 
First, the government of Ghana should strengthen the loan trusts it has set up, 
to effectively help sanitise the loan books of the state-owned banks to 
complement the needed capital injections.  
 
Second, the Bank of Ghana should subject the market and interest rate risks 
associated with the loans to comprehensive regulatory requirements or to 
strong asset and liability management frameworks as they currently do not exist 
(IMF 2013a).  This is because the characteristics of the banks’ loan default 
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structure show that, Ghanaian banks are assuming counterparty credit risks 
beyond the perceived credit worthiness of their borrowers.  
 
7.8.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: RISK GOVERNANCE IN BANKS AND
  BANK STABILITY  
 
Hypothesis H4 assesses the relationship between the level of risk governance 
practices of the bank and bank stability.  The results presented in Table 7.7 
show that compliance with expected governance levels and other specific 
requirements, such as existence of Chief Risk Officer (CRO), use of value at 
risk (VaR) and other risk-related corporate governance mechanisms, positively 
affected banking system stability in the study period.  In other words, the results 
from Table 7.7 show that bank stability is positively and significantly affected by 
the risk governance practices of banks in Ghana. The two estimation models, 
the random effects and the GMM model, report that the relationship is 
statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels.      
Table 7.7: Bank Regulatory Risk: Risk Governance results 
Bank 
Regulatory  
variable  
Dependent Variable  
Z –Score 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed -
Effects(FE)  
GLS 
Random- 
Effects(RM) 
GMM 
(Robust ) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Bartlett) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Newey-
West) 
Risgov 0.0725* 
(0.094) 
0.0822* 
(0.094) 
0.0845** 
(0.040) 
0.0802** 
(0.028) 
-0.0851** 
(0.012) 
-0.0848** 
(0.014) 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.  The p values are in the parenthesis. 
Risgov is Regulatory governance. 
Source: STATA 12 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
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The pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation models also report a significant 
relationship at the 10% level.  None of the coefficients is statistically significant 
at the1% level. The results provide sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis 
that the level of risk governance practices of the bank is positively related to 
bank stability in Ghana.  
 
7.8.1 DISCUSSIONS 
A positive coefficient on risk governance implies that an increased recognition 
and implementation of a high degree of enterprise-wide risk management 
system by boards and bank-level managers will enhance bank stability.  This 
also implies that, unsound governance practices of banks would reduce bank 
stability.  The finding of a positive relationship between risk governance and 
banks stability is consistent with Aebi et al. (2012) who investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance, enterprise risk management (ERM) 
and bank performance.  They concluded that banks with Chief Risk Officers 
(CROs) reporting to the board had significantly less negative ROEs during the 
financial crisis.  Increases in ROEs have a positive impact on the Z-score 
through the CAR.   In Ghana, most of the international banks began to comply 
with risk governance rules after 2009.  The local banks followed suit in 2011, by 
complying fully with IFRS 7 which required disclosure of risk management 
policies and measures in published financial statements.  Given the importance 
of risk governance on bank stability, there is the need to deepen the risk 
management culture in Ghanaian banks.  
 
  
  
278 
 
 
7.8.2 IMPLICATIONS 
If the improvement in risk governance structures can lead to improvements in 
bank stability, then the regulatory authorities should promote the development 
of a risk management culture among the banks in keeping with BCP 7(the risk 
management process).   
 
Ghanaian banks have to adopt an enterprise-wide and integrated approach to 
risk management by increasing the size of their risk committees with persons 
with the abilities to balance business growth with bank risk management 
(Battaglia and Gallo 2015).  
 
Complementary and integral activities such as risk assessment, risk monitoring 
and risk mitigation require further investments in systems and staff 
development.  These investments would lead to the minimisation of compliance 
costs, optimisation of markets, credit and operational risk profiling and stability 
improvement. The regulator is also required to adopt risk-based supervisory 
approach in line with Basel II/III to reinforce the efforts of the banks. 
 
7.9.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE AND
  STABILITY 
 
Hypothesis H5 examines the relationship between the level of regulatory 
independence of banks and bank stability in Ghana.  Table 7.8 below shows a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between regulatory 
independence and bank stability at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, when the 
pooled OLS and GMM robust estimation models are used.  
  
279 
 
 
The GLS random effects and GMM (Bartlett and HAC) estimation methods 
show that the relationship is statistically significant at the 5% and10% levels. 
The fixed effects results show that the relationship is significant at the 10% 
level.    
 
Table 7.8: Bank Regulatory Risk: Regulatory Independence results 
Bank 
Regulatory  
variable  
Dependent Variable  
Z –Score 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects(FE)  
GLS 
Random 
Effects(RM) 
GMM 
(Robust ) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Bartlett) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Newey-
West) 
Reind -0.3936*** 
(0.002) 
-0.3949* 
(0.074) 
-0.3741** 
(0.012) 
-0.3235*** 
(0.006) 
-0.3411** 
(0.026) 
-0.3394** 
(0.024) 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.  The p values are in the parenthesis. 
Reind is Regulatory Independence. 
Source: STATA 12 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
The results suggest that there is sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis (𝐻5) 
that the state or the regulator ownership of the bank is not related to bank 
stability in Ghana. 
 
7.9.1 DISCUSSIONS  
The study shows that continued government and the regulator’s direct 
participation in commercial banking activities contribute to the reduction in bank 
stability in Ghana. Theoretically, the findings support or reflect Andrianova et al. 
(2008) locational model of banking, that distinguishes between private and 
public banks and find that the role played by state-owned banks depends on the 
institutional quality of a given country.  Empirically, the findings therefore 
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support findings of Cull and Martinez Peria (2013) and Iannotta et al. (2013) 
who argued that increased government and regulatory participation in bank 
governance lead to reduction in bank stability due to their persuasion of political 
goals.  Barth et al. (2008) findings suggest that policies that induce incentives 
for private sector corporate control of banks, among other things, work best to 
promote banking sector stability. 
   
7.9.2 IMPLICATIONS  
First, there is the need to refocus the importance of government holding and 
influence over state-owned banks.  Various schools have argued in support or 
against state ownership.  Theoretical models by protagonists including Andries 
and Bullion (2010) suggest that state capital and strong state financing 
machinery are needed due to the structural nature of the Ghanaian economy.  
However, the results from this study show that it is not just the injection of 
capital, but the quality of the management team appointed by the government to 
these banks equally matters. Board appointments should be based on 
competence and the regulatory fitness tests have to be revised and redefined 
with emphasis on risk-based management skills.  
 
 Again, the Bank of Ghana’s holdings in ADB and NIB need to be partly 
privatised or sold to a strategic partner with a focus on development banking 
only, or universal but development banking focused.  This will require a 
strategic investor with a huge capital and expertise in project financing, which is 
the key to unlock wealth and capital for sustainable growth in developing 
countries like Ghana (Finnerty 2013). 
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7.10 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: FOREIGN PARTICIPATION OR 
  OWNERSHIP AND STABILITY 
Table 7.9 reports the relationship between foreign ownership and banking 
stability in Ghana. The pooled OLS, the GLS random effects model and the 
GMM estimation method show that all the coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The fixed effects method of estimation however 
shows that the relationship is significant at the 10% level.  
 
Table 7.9: Bank Regulatory Risk: Foreign Participation/Ownership results 
Bank 
Regulatory  
variable  
Dependent Variable  
Z –Score 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
(FE)  
GLS 
Random 
Effects(RM) 
GMM 
(Robust ) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Bartlett) 
GMM 
(HAC 
Newey-
West) 
Origin 0.7100*** 
(0.000) 
0.5573* 
(0.054) 
0.6686*** 
(0.000) 
0.6120*** 
(0.000) 
0.6307*** 
(0.000) 
0.6296*** 
(0.000) 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels.  The p values are in the parenthesis. 
Origin is Foreign Ownership/ Origin. 
Source: STATA 12 and Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
Based on the results, we have sufficient evidence to reject hypothesis 𝐻6, that 
the level of foreign participation or ownership of the bank is not related to bank 
stability in Ghana and can conclude that the participation of foreign banks 
impacts positively to the stability of Ghana’s banking sector. 
 
7.10.1 DISCUSSIONS 
The results support the global advantage hypothesis which stresses that foreign 
banks have advantages over domestic banks.  The home field advantage 
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hypothesis has seen less success in Ghana due to limited capital and slow 
adoption of technologies which Ghanaian consumers prefer such as electronic 
payment products using the mobile phone technologies. The results of this 
study support the prior findings by Cleassens and Van Horen (2012) on the 
effect of foreign entry into banking sector and their positive impact on banking 
system stability. The preponderance of the foreign banks in the highly stable 
and stable category in Chapter 6 also confirms the findings of Vogel and 
Winkler (2011) report that foreign banks in emerging economies including sub-
Saharan Africa, contribute more than the local banks, albeit depending on the 
maturity of the banking sector.  
 
7.10.2 IMPLICATIONS  
The dominance of foreign banks in determining the stability of the banking 
sectors has many implications for banking sector regulatory design, notably in 
areas relating to banking safety, bank resolution, cross-border regulation and 
management of macro- prudential challenges.  These implications are 
explained below. 
 
Whilst the parent banks of the foreign banks provide insurance for their home 
depositors, the same does not apply to Ghanaian depositors. This observable 
weakness in the regulatory design and structure should be remedied. The 
design of any deposit insurance scheme in Ghana therefore, should reflect the 
level of financial depth else it will spur financial services growth only in the short 
term.  Bernet and Walter (2009) differentiate four separate types of deposit 
insurance schemes on the basis of their roles and powers. The four are the pay 
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box; cost reducer; resolution facilitator and supervisor models. Stability 
objective requires that any deposit insurance in Ghana should have a resolution 
status to correct the existing safety gap. It should also capture the dynamics of 
the industry with respect to foreign acquisition of licensed banks and the 
attendant cross-border deposit insurance issues.  Subject to the growth in the 
capital market, the deposit insurance scheme to be instituted could be 
transformed to a supervisory role.   
 
The next important issue relates to the financing of the scheme.  State warranty 
imposes additional budgetary burden.  The contribution of capital by insured 
institutions has the serious limitation of not having adequate contribution against 
a pending exposure.  Security based financing is inapplicable given the 
underdeveloped bond market in Ghana.  The preferred option for Ghana is to 
adopt a deposit insurance scheme that prepares the system proactively and is 
flexible to adjust to future claims or pay-outs.  This means that a combined ex-
ante and ex-post financing model would be the most appropriate but requires an 
effective setting of premiums (Casu et al. 2015). 
  
Fundamental to the scheme should be the adoption of risk-based premiums 
based on the level of non-performing loans, measured by the current regulatory 
standards or the Z-score which accommodates the requirements of IFRS 9.  
Premiums will also signal the market about the quality of individual bank-level 
risk management. The scheme has to ensure that the fund’s assets are 
invested on a risk-free basis and can be liquidated.  Pay-out decisions have to 
be framed to distinguish between eligible and covered deposits, which protect 
small depositors and SMEs which dominate the Ghanaian banking customer 
  
284 
 
base. Furthermore, the architecture of the deposit insurance scheme should not 
only enforce explicit warranty in the reform of reinsurance, but it should support 
cross-border harmonisation and co-operation.  Such reinsurance or explicit 
warranty should cover details of the role of the state, terms of the warranty, 
warranty-triggering events, restricted or unrestricted warranty, anticipatory credit 
or warranty payments, pay-out mechanisms and compensation (Bernet and 
Walter 2009). 
 
The influx of foreign banks also requires that the banking system is prepared to 
accommodate any possible failure should it occur. This suggests that an 
efficient Ghanaian special resolution system should be built on five pillars of: 
speed and transparency; law for co-operation (domestically and internationally); 
timely recognition of a looming illiquidity or insolvency; timely initiation of 
preventive measures to secure existing assets and liquidity; and timely 
shutdown or recapitalisation of insolvent financial institutions (Financial Stability 
Board 2011). 
 
Again, given the dominance of foreign banks, reciprocal arrangements will be 
beneficial to contain possible cross-border arbitrage coming from the use of 
cross–border sources of bank financing.  This necessitates the sharing of 
information across national supervisors through supervisory colleges (Enoch et 
al. 2015).  Specifically, the regulator should have the structures and systems to 
identify developments in, and migration of activity to the fringe of the regulated 
sector. Developing systemic, timely and accurate data on these fringes should 
also be a priority. Therefore, macro-prudential policies should be designed to be 
intrusive (IMF-FSB-BIS 2016).  
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A summary of all hypotheses and results of the models are presented in Table 
7.10 below. 
Table 7.10: SUMMARY OF ALL HYPOTHESES AND MODEL RESULTS 
Variables Hypothesis Expected sign 
of the 
relationship 
Empirical 
Results/effect 
on bank 
stability or 
soundness 
Conclusion 
H1: Bank size  The size of the bank is 
not related to bank 
stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) or 
Negative (-) 
Negative(-) and 
statistically 
significant  
Reject 
Hypothesis 
H2: Interbank 
Borrowing 
The level of external and 
interbank borrowing of 
the bank is not related to 
bank stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) or 
Negative (-) 
 
Negative(-) and 
not statistically 
significant 
Accept 
Hypothesis 
H3: Non-
Performing 
Loans 
The level of non-
performing loans is 
higher for the bank with a 
lower level of bank 
stability in Ghana. 
Negative (-) 
 
Negative(-) and 
not statistically 
significant  
Reject 
Hypothesis 
H4: Risk 
governance 
 The level of regulatory 
risk governance 
practices of the bank is 
positively related to bank 
stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) 
 
Positive(+) and 
statistically 
significant  
Accept  
Hypothesis 
H5: 
Regulatory 
Independence 
The state or the central 
bank ownership of the 
bank is not related to 
bank stability in Ghana.  
Positive (+) or 
Negative(-) 
 
Negative(-) and 
statistically 
significant  
Reject 
Hypothesis 
H6: Foreign 
participation 
or Ownership 
The level of foreign 
participation or 
ownership of the bank is 
not related to bank 
stability in Ghana. 
Positive (+) or 
Negative(-) 
Positive(+) and 
statistically 
significant 
Reject  
Hypothesis 
Source: Constructed from the Summary of Hypotheses Table 4.7 and Panel Results in 
  Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
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7.11.0 BLINDER-OAXACA DECOMPOSITION 
One of the main conclusions in Chapter 6 was that foreign banks in Ghana on 
average had a higher level of stability than the local banks. However, the 
differences in their factor endowments and how their interaction with each other 
given their stability levels cannot be discerned from the preferred GLS random-
effects model and the GMM results discussed in sections 7.1 to 7.10.  To 
answer these challenging issues, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is used, 
and the findings are discussed below.  
 
Oaxaca first estimates two group-specific regression models, and then performs 
the decomposition.  Tables 7.10 -7.12 report further the interaction effects of 
bank stability and their characteristics using the independent variables 
decomposed by their origin either as foreign or local.  
 
The decomposition output reports the mean predictions by local and foreign 
banks and their differences in Tables 7.11 and 7.12 below.  The decomposition 
results in Table 7.11 suggest that the mean of the log of Z-score (stability 
measure) is 2.43 for foreign banks and 1.99 for local banks, yielding a stability 
gap of 0.44.  In the second panel of the decomposition, the output, the stability 
gap is divided into three.   The first part reflects the mean increase of 0.10 in the 
stability of local banks if they had the same characteristics or predictor levels as 
the foreign banks. The increase of 0.10 indicates the endowment (brands, 
strategies, global presence) effect.  The second term quantifies the change in 
local bank stability score if local banks had foreign banks’ coefficients which will 
lead to a decrease of 0.0095 in the stability score which is very small in effect. 
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The third part is the interaction term that measures the simultaneous effect of 
differences in endowment and coefficients which is 0.35.  The overall effect is 
the measured stability gap of 0.44 between foreign and local banks.  Therefore 
foreign banks coefficient of 2.43 is largely explained by their endowments and 
coefficients. 
Table 7.11 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Z-score by origin (local) 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Number of observations =100 
1: local =0 
2: local = 1 
Z –score Coef. Std. Err. Z p>I z I [95% conf. Interval ] 
Differential   
Prediction _1 2.4347 0.0710 34.27 0.000 2.2954 2.5739 
Prediction_2 1.9902 0.0619 32.14 0.000 1.8688 2.1115 
Difference 0.4445 0.0942 4.72 0.000 0.2597 0.6292 
Decomposition  
Endowments 0.1030 0.1056 0.98 0.329 -0.1040 0.3101 
Coefficients -0.0095 0.2027 -0.05 0.963 -0.4069 0.3878 
Interaction 0.3509 0.2232 1.57 0.116 -0.0865 0.7884 
Software used: STATA 12.0 
 
The results in Table 7.12 show the relative contribution of the local and foreign 
banks to banking system stability by retransforming the logarithmic scales to the 
original scales.  The (geometric) means of Z-scores are 11.41 for foreign banks 
and 7.31 for local banks, which amounts to a difference of 56 %.  This means 
that, adjusting local bank endowment levels to the levels of the foreign banks 
would increase local banks stability by 56 %.  This supports the importance of 
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foreign banks in contributing to the current levels of banking sector stability in 
Ghana. 
 
Table 7.12 Exponentiated Results  
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Number of observations =100 
Oaxaca, eform 
1: local =0 
2: local = 1 
Z –score Exp(b) Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z p>I z I [95% conf. Interval ] 
Differential   
Prediction _1  11.4127  0.7822  35.92 0.000  9.9780  13.0536  
Prediction_2 7.3171 0.4306 33.82 0.000 6.5199   8.2118 
Difference 1.5597 0.1409    4.92 0.000 1.3066   1.8618 
Decomposition  
Explained  1.5678 0.3689 1.91 0.056 0.9882 2.4865 
Unexplained 0.9949 0.2477 -0.02 0.984 0.6106 1.6210 
Software used: STATA12.0 
 
Finally the decomposition of the Z-score into leverage and portfolio risk allowed 
for the analysis of the extent to which leverage risks interact with the 
independent variables in the study.   Table 7.13 below, shows a stability gap of 
0.41 between the foreign and local banks, which is close to the overall gap of 
0.44. The conclusion is that the gap in overall stability means is largely 
attributed to leverage risk differences, indicating the size of a bank’s capital is a 
key measure of its level of stability. 
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Table 7.13 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Leverage Risk by origin 
(local) 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Number of observations =100 
1: local =0 
2: local = 1 
Leverage Risk Coef. Std. Err. Z p>I z I [95% conf. Interval ] 
Differential   
Prediction _1 2.2430 0.0836 26.81 0.000 2.0790 2.4070 
Prediction_2 1.8231 0.0551 33.05 0.000 1.7199 1.9312 
Difference 0.4199 0.1002 4.19 0.000 0.2303 0.6164 
Decomposition  
Endowments 0.0905 0.0932 0.97 0.331 -0.0920 0.2732 
Coefficients -0. 1700 0.2180 -0.78 0.436 -0.5973 0.2573 
Interaction 0.4993 0.2356 2.21 0.034 0.0374 0.9613 
Software used: STATA 12.0 
 
7.12 CRITICAL REVIEW OF OAXACA DECOMPOSITION RESULTS 
Since our analysis is based on a limited number of years from 2009 to 2013, our 
results should be viewed as applying to the short run. If and when foreign banks 
and domestic banks converge as regards their structure and behaviour 
(endowments), the differences as observed by us would gradually disappear.  
Convergence may mean two possibilities.  Either the foreign banks reduce their 
endowment and coefficients effects while that of the local banks remain or 
increase or the local banks increase their endowment and coefficient effects 
faster to eliminate the difference.  It should be noted that if for example the 
endowments become equal, the differences will become zero, and the 
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interaction effect will also become zero.  The appropriate option given the 
results obtained from Tables 7.11 and 7.12 is that, the local banks will have to 
improve their endowments in order to enhance their stability levels. 
 
However, to the extent that the main difference between foreign banks and 
domestic banks is that the former are integrated in a multinational bank holding, 
whereas the latter are stand-alone entities, our results may actually be more 
long-lasting (De Hass and Van Lelyveld 2006).  Again the assumption has been 
that groups are homogenous and therefore ignores variations in individual 
bank’s approach to improve its endowment resources. 
 
If the endowment differences may be long-lasting, it is imperative for the 
managers of local and state-owned banks to refocus their attention on the 
primary characteristics of the foreign banks which make customers perceive 
them as strong brands, including introduction of efficient technologies in mobile 
money payment platforms, adaptation to current global risk management 
practices, staff development, branch services to counter cheque cloning among 
others.   
 
Again local banks should invest in their accounting and risk management 
systems, show to the financial market that their financial statements presented 
and disclosed are of the highest quality.  This will in the short to medium term 
support the stability of the banks by attracting cheap deposits and easy access 
to capital (Ratnovski 2013). 
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7.13 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF CAMELS RATING AND 
 Z-SCORES IN PREDICTING BANKING STABILITY IN GHANA AND
  THEIR LIMITATIONS  
It is important to note that the CAMELS is an early warning system (EWS) 
designed to draw regulators attention to certain key variables that show the risk 
profile and soundness of individual financial institutions in Ghana.  
Generally, the CAMELS results are not made public, except in an event of a 
bank’s failure (Casu et al. 2015).  It is seen largely as a micro-prudential tool. 
The additional limitation is that it becomes static (Casu et al. 2015) when there 
is room for management discretion on the timing of data and information 
generation especially where reports are not tied to managers’ jobs or do not put 
shareholders profits at risk (Shehzad and De Haan 2015).  Again some 
qualitative elements have to be introduced in the computation of the CAMELS 
ratings (Bassett et al. 2015).  
That is why in recent times the IMF and the Ghanaian regulator have been 
complementing the CAMELS framework with the use of stress testing as an 
additional supervisory tool (IMF 2013a,b).  The long term aim is to embed stress 
testing in bank risk management practices rather than it simply being a 
regulatory tool.  Primarily, stress testing is designed to complement the Basel 
capital ratios by adding more forward–looking perspective and by helping to 
ensure that banks will have enough capital to keep lending even under highly 
adverse circumstances (Casu et al.2015). 
Stress tests raise a number of issues including problems with data collection, 
the use of different methodologies and the need to reconcile internal expert 
judgement and external benchmarks as well as national and international 
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regulatory requirements in a developing country like Ghana where regulatory 
capacity is limited (Fuch et al. 2013).  From banks’ point of view, stress testing 
can be expensive and time consuming exercise.  Banks criticise both the 
methodologies and data used (Casu et al. 2015).  From the macro-prudential 
angle, the Financial Stress Index is currently non-existent in Ghana because 
market-based variables are a limitation (Vermeulen et al. 2015). 
The Z-score on the other hand reflects the extent to which a bank’s profit and 
capital levels can withstand the volatile profitability (Casu et al. 2015).  It suffers 
largely from its reliance on the availability of high quality accounting data that 
the banks provide for its estimation.  The quality of accounting data is also 
determined by the appropriateness of the current accounting standards (IFRSs 
and IASs) being used or adopted, the audit regime and the regularity of 
information generated.   
The possibility of developing a forward Z-score also reduces the critique by 
Casu et al.(2015) that the Z-score like all accounting measures has the 
limitation of being static and backward–looking at a point in time and the 
evidence that managers have exercised their timing discretion to minimise 
regulatory costs. 
In the area of banking stability, Casu et al.(2015:558) show that, the Z-score 
can be calculated for the whole banking system (macro-prudential) by simply 
calculating the Z-score for individual banks(micro-prudential) and then 
calculating the weighted average by bank size(usually assets).  These 
measures allow the Z-score to be used for micro-prudential and macro-
prudential purposes.  
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Following Lepetit and Strobel (2015), who assessed the forecasting 
performance of the Z-score by using the co-efficient of variation of the root 
mean squared error (CVRMSE) which evaluates the relative closeness of the 
predictions to the actual values in their work, similar tests were carried out in 
this study on the pooled OLS model, fixed effects model and the random effects 
model. As shown in Appendix 5.5, the pooled OLS had a CVRMSE of 18.99; 
fixed effects model had a CVRMSE of 16.86; and random effects model had a 
CVRMSE of 16.66.  It is observed that the co-efficient of variation of the RMSE 
of the random effects model is consistently the least among the three models 
when the Z-score is used as the dependent variable.   
Therefore the stability results predicted by the Z-score using the random effects 
on banking stability are close to their actual values. The p-values also tell us 
whether a variable has statistically significant predictive capacity in the 
presence of other variables, that is, whether it adds something to the equation.   
However caution should be exercised here because a variable that does not 
have a predictive power in the presence of other predictors may have predictive 
capability when some of these predictors are removed from the model. 
In sum because both stability measures are accounting based and given the 
critique offered above, such evidence suggest the need for further analyses of 
earnings management and accounting rules on bank riskiness(Chiaramonte et 
al. 2015)  if they are to be used effectively in Ghana.  The next chapter will 
focus on the research contribution and its conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONTRIBUTION, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
8.1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the thesis.  It seeks to achieve three 
main objectives. First it summarises the key research findings.  Second, the 
contribution to research, management practice and policy in banking will be 
identified.  In this regard some policy suggestions and their limitations if they are 
to be implemented in Ghana are further discussed.   Third, the research 
limitations and avenues for future research will also be identified.  
  
8.2.0 KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The results of this study show that the use of the CAMELS and the Z-score 
measures could lead to different outcomes in terms of bank stability in Ghana.    
This suggests that the traditional micro-prudential CAMELS framework should 
be complemented with the Z-score which inherently has both micro and macro-
prudential characteristics of signaling weaknesses in bank stability, and to 
enhance the management of bank stability in Ghana. 
The study also examined the impact of some bank-specific variables on bank 
stability.  The results show that while bank size, regulatory governance, 
regulatory independence and origin impact significantly on the stability score, 
there was no significant impact in terms of interbank borrowing and non-
performing loans.  Further analysis using the Blinder –Oaxaca decomposition 
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also suggests that foreign banks in Ghana exhibit relatively higher levels of 
stability compared to local banks.   
The policy implications of these findings suggest that the liberalisation of the 
banking sector should be accompanied by an effective micro- and macro-
prudential supervisory regime in order to manage the stability of the constituent 
banks and the banking sector as a whole. 
   
 8.3.0 CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE 
 
This research contributes to the literature in many ways.  It contributes to a 
strand of literature which compares the use of accounting-based measures as 
against market-based measures in assessing the stability and regulation of 
banks.  This thesis therefore complements the recent work by Chiaramonte et 
al. (2015) and Lepetit and Strobel (2015) although a different methodology has 
been adopted and the granularity of data is different in comparing the CAMELS 
and the Z-score. It contributes also to the strand of literature in banking which 
stresses on the role of accounting in banking stability. The research is based on 
the assumption that the accounting data used is reliable. Therefore the findings 
from the research contribute to the strand of literature which focuses on the 
usefulness of accounting data for analysing banking performance and their 
regulation starting with Schwartz et al.(2014), Bushman (2014) and  Acharya 
and Ryan(2015).   
 
 Again, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition has been widely used in the social 
science literature, to explain differences in outcomes for different groups, and its 
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application in the banking and finance literature is limited. This study therefore 
makes a methodological contribution to the strand of literature which uses the 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to provide insight into banking sector risk and 
regulation as recently carried out by Bassett et al.(2015) in the USA banking 
context.  Therefore this research is one of the pioneers to apply the Blinder-
Oaxaca methods to explain the stability gap between foreign banks and local 
banks in Ghana.  
 
This is one of the first major work that examines the stability of Ghanaian 
commercial banks over the period 2009 to 2013. It fills the gap in the extant 
literature by comparing the CAMELS and Z-score and provides insights into the 
varying levels of banking stability from pre-capitalisation period of 2009 to 2011 
and post capitalisation period from 2012 to 2013 in Ghana. It provides the first 
direct evidence of the relationship between bank–level and regulatory variables 
and banking stability measure, the Z-score in the context of pre and post 
capitalisation periods in Ghana. The study therefore contributes to knowledge 
by advancing incrementally the understanding of the level of stability of 
Ghanaian banks, and adds some revelatory information in the form of the 
effects of bank-level risk factors and regulatory variables on stability of 
Ghanaian banks.  
  
Again, the period of study makes this thesis contribute to post-crisis literature on 
banking stability in sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, the study is also timely 
given the recent reforms in the banking industry in Ghana and their potential 
impact on bank stability.  Although, there are a number of studies on banks in 
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Ghana, the other studies focus largely on competition and efficiency and do not 
cover the issues addressed in this study. 
  
It complements the strand of literature that examines the impact that foreign 
banks have on the banking sector stability of the host country especially in 
developing countries starting with Claessens and Van Horen (2012) , Lee and 
Hsieh (2014) and Moyo et al. (2014).  Again the Z-score indexation is an 
extension to the use of Z-score in the literature. Empirically, the use of the 
leverage ratio in this research to assess the stability of Ghanaian banks reflects 
the use of FDIC’s risk–adjusted leverage ratio indexation in the Ghanaian 
context. 
 
8.4.0 CONTRIBUTION TO MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
 
The main contribution of this research to bank management practice is that the 
fragility of banks might go unnoticed because the Bank of Ghana currently relies 
on the CAMELS as the regulatory tool. It is observed from this study that, banks 
that might be classified as sound using the CAMELS could be classified 
otherwise if the Z-score is used as the bank stability measure.  The regulator 
can, therefore, use the Z-score as a complementary measure for assessing the 
stability of Ghanaian banks as shown in current literature on bank stability 
(Casu et al. 2015). 
 
Therefore in the area of asset and liability management practice, this thesis 
provides further insight into what managers of banks should consider as an 
integral part of any high–level design of their portfolio planning, budgeting and 
provisioning strategies. The research draws managers of banks attention to the 
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fact that in their management practices, activities should be seen from their 
impact on the bank’s balance sheet first. The Z-score index suggests that 
management should always take into account, how the assets they create 
impact on the bank’s stability rating. This is because the assets will not be risk 
weighted, as it uses benchmarks set by the deposit insurers, it will be critical to 
depositors who monitor their banks. It therefore contributes to factors that a 
manager of a bank’s liability side of its balance sheet should consider to ensure 
the growth of the bank’s potential and market share.   
 
This research contributes to bank management practice by raising the issue of 
‘profit mining’ in the banking sector which may go unnoticed if regulators in 
Ghana and in many sub-Saharan Africa continue to pursue the current policy of 
frequent increases in banks nominal capital (nominal capital regulation) without 
considering their effects on investor attitudes and interest.  The thesis suggests 
as an implication that, it promotes moral hazard which potentially follows from 
the ‘profit mining’ incentive induced by such measures in practice.  This 
situation also reflects some of the regulatory dialectic (Casu et al. 2015) in the 
Ghanaian context that the research has brought to light. 
 
8.5.0 CONTRIBUTION TO REGULATORY POLICY 
 
The research makes contribution to policy from three angles: the micro- 
prudential, macro-prudential and regulatory architecture.   In the area of micro-
prudential policy the contributions are related to entry policy, safety and 
resolution.  For regulatory practice, the research suggests that the regulator 
should revisit the bank licensing regime to differentiate bank licences by activity 
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and capital requirements. Conscious efforts should then be made to attract 
strategic import and export development financing institutions.   
 
The research assesses its contribution to macro-prudential by taking the lead 
from the literature and by using the framework suggested by the IMF-FSB-
BIS(2016) on the definition, objectives and scope of macro-prudential policy. 
The research contributes to macro-prudential policy by having identified the too-
big-to –fail phenomena in the Ghanaian banking sector.  This is means the 
regulator should control such structural vulnerabilities within the Ghanaian 
banking sector that arise through the linkages and common exposures through 
the growing loan syndication structures.  The critical role of the state banks 
which renders them too-big-to-fail is defined by their share of banking liabilities 
which is over 20% (BOG 2015).  This means that they need to be recapitalised, 
through more equity injections, deleveraging by sticking to the standard loan –
deposit ratios and reduce their level of borrowing but deepen their deposit 
mobilisation efforts with the unbanked and the under-banked due to their 
physical spread.  The option to merge them will worsen the situation while 
asking them to reduce lending will also reduce their current procyclical role 
given the structure of the economy (Brei and Schclarek 2013).  The objective is 
to prevent unrestraint leverage, debt stocks and volatile funding. Again the 
interbank market should be regulated and its growth controlled by defining 
which assets can be taken to collateralise all transactions.  
 
The effectiveness of these measures requires that there are regulatory 
rearrangements within the current regulatory design or architecture. The aim is 
to ensure that the potential systemic risks posed by local and foreign banks are 
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controlled to achieve the expected level of bank stability.  The choice between 
the preferred twin-peak and an integrated regulatory structure would 
strategically reposition the Ghanaian regulator to potentially perform its 
expected role as the market maker of last resort (Nier 2009; Oganesyan 2014).  
 
 The adoption of an integrated approach to regulation may be saddled with the 
problems of regulatory information gathering gaps and legal powers due to the 
structure being less integrated and holistic in dealing with systemic risks 
(Daniels and Thornton 2013) which need to be minimised in Ghana. The twin-
peak approach on the other hand combines centralisation with regulation by 
objective, and splits the regulatory functions between two regulators: one that 
performs the safety and soundness supervision function and the other that 
focuses on the conduct-of-business regulation.   
 
8.6.0 LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES OF THE STUDY 
The major limitation of the study is the relatively small number of observations, 
which restricted the extent to which the analysis could be done.  Another 
challenge had been the availability and integrity of data as many post –balance 
sheet adjustments were detected in some cases two years after the publication 
of the financial statements.  Such challenges required a continuous review of 
accounting data presented and used in this research.   
 
The number of banks that could meet the minimum qualifying criteria defined as 
any licensed bank for 5 years with a fully audited financial statement also 
reduced the number of sample banks available for the research.  Because 
some participating banks are not on the Ghanaian stock market, the 
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compromise between the limitations of manual collection and the need to have 
adequate data for the panel data analysis made it extremely labour-intensive.  
This also affected the number of observations for the panel study and hence the 
degrees of freedom for any complex estimations.  
 
It would have been helpful to test directly the interaction effect between the 
bank variables and the regulatory indicator variables but this would increase the 
number of regressors, reducing the degrees of freedom of the model and the 
power of any inference tests. 
 
Again the study does not take into account the possible impact of other financial 
market institutions such as savings and loans, rural banks, finance houses, 
cooperatives and credit unions operating in Ghana. In addition, is the large 
informal and unbanked segment which interacts with the banking sector directly 
and indirectly through the payment platform controlled by the Bank of Ghana. 
This situation has put a severe limit on interpretation of the research findings, 
such as those relating to non-performing assets due to the paucity of 
interlocking information between the formal banking sector and the large 
informal sector.  
 
8.7.0 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Financial stability is an emerging field in banking regulation and therefore there 
are potential prospects for future research.   The research followed largely an 
exploratory path, but did retain a focus on central issues relating to the 
regulatory structures and bank –level risk taking and stability in Ghana.  There 
are issues that arose during the research that were outside the scope of the 
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research and could not be explored within it.  However, these issues open up 
some opportunities for future research. 
 
The first recommendation for research is based on some of the limitations 
above.  Future research can cover the entire banking sector that will include 
players in the Ghanaian financial services sector, notably the commercial 
banks, savings and loans and other deposit –taking firms.   Alternatively, future 
research can focus on the relative stability of stakeholder value (STV) driven 
firms, notably the credit unions against commercial banks that have shareholder 
value (SHV) orientation. This is very important for banking regulation and 
governance research as the Bank of Ghana is attempting to regulate the credit 
unions and the telecommunication firms through the mobile money which is 
based on trust law. 
 
The second recommendation relates to the research into the full impact of Basel 
II and III on the stability of banks in Ghana.  Another area for future research is 
how the future application of dynamic provisioning on loans will impact on the 
stability levels of banks in Ghana.  This is likely to affect the volatility of incomes 
and measurement of the stability scores. 
  
Furthermore, the data can be extended to include banks from other West 
African countries to undertake a regional banking stability research.  Again the 
Z-score, the CAMELS and other macroeconomic variables could be put 
together to create a financial stress index or a financial stability index to 
evaluate macro-prudential threats to banking stability in future research. 
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Finally, future research can look into the various regulatory rearrangements 
suggested in this research including the suggestion for the introduction of a 
deposit insurance scheme, the disciplinary role expected of the interbank 
market and assess their impact on stability of banks in Ghana. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 5.1: Sampling Procedure and Sample Size 
Procedure 
Number   
Process or Activity Outcomes 
1.  This table outlines the sample selection criteria and the number 
of banks considered in this study.  The data for sample bank, 
country and industry level activities are sourced from the Ghana 
Stock Exchange (GSE), Published Annual Reports of Banks for 
distribution at Annual General Meetings (AGMs), IMF Financial 
Stability Reports in 2011, 2013 and 2014, Bank of Ghana 
Financial Stability Reports 2013, 2014 and 2015, and the 
Department of Banking Supervision (BSD) of Bank of Ghana 
Reports. 
 
2. Initial Sample (list of licensed Class 1 Banks in Ghana) from 
Bank of Ghana sources 
27 
3. Exclude banks with insufficient data on financial position and 
performance and main regression. Therefore, Bank of Africa, 
Bank of Baroda and Sahel Sahara Bank and Merchant Bank are 
excluded. 
4 
4 Sample after this step  23 
5. Exclude Banks having less than 5 continuous years of data.  
Therefore Energy Bank licensed in 2010, Royal Bank in 2012 
and First Capital Plus Bank in 2013 are excluded. 
3 
6.  Final Sample  20 
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Appendix 5.2: Asset Categories and Risk Weights 
 
Category Definition Risk-weight 
Category 1 Cash funds, investment in government and Bank 
of Ghana securities, balances and deposits with 
well rated banks – Risk free 
0% 
Category 2 Placements with discount houses  - Low Risk 20% 
Category 3 Home mortgage loans – Modest Risk 50% 
Category 4 All other assets, including customer loans, credit 
and receivables (other than home mortgage 
loans), fixed assets, current assets and deposits 
with poorly rated banks – Normal Risk 
100% 
Category 5 Off-balance sheet transactions, particularly those 
involving financial guarantees and other non-
funded exposures – Normal Risk 
100% 
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Appendix 5.3: The list of Participating or Sampled Banks  
Number  Name of Licensed Bank Ownership changes and control of 
Quasi-State institutions in determining 
regulatory independence 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
1 Guaranty Trust Bank Ghana Limited(GT) P P P P P 
2 United Bank for Africa (UBA) P P P P P 
3 Standard Chartered Bank Ghana Limited P P P P P 
4 Barclays Bank of Ghana Limited P P P P P 
5 Ghana Commercial Bank Limited (GCB) S S S S S 
6 Access Bank Ghana Limited P P P P P 
7 CAL Bank Limited S S S S S 
8 Ecobank Ghana Limited P P P P P 
9 Stanbic Bank Ghana Limited P P P P P 
10 Zenith Bank (Ghana) Limited P P P P P 
11 SG P P P P P 
12 HFC Bank Limited S S S S S 
13 UT Bank Limited P P P P P 
14 Fidelity Bank Ghana Limited S S S S S 
15 Agricultural Development Bank Limited 
(ADB) 
S S S S S 
16 uniBank P P P P P 
17 First Atlantic Bank Limited(FABL) P P P P P 
18 Prudential Bank Limited P P P P P 
19 National Investment Bank Limited (NIB) S S S S S 
20 International Commercial Bank Limited (ICB) P P P P P 
Key P= Private Ownership having controlling interest 
S= Significant Government, Quasi –State and BOG Control or holding of over 20% 
share and/ as single majority shareholder. 
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Appendix 5.4 
Diagnostic Analyses of OLS and Panel Data Assumptions (Annex to 
Chapter 7) 
Table A presents OLS regression of the first model where the linear association 
of bank stability with bank-level risk management and regulatory variables are 
accounted for. 
The first Pooled OLS Model 
OLS on Z-score 
Variable  OLS 1 
 Coefficient  P(values) 
Size -0.1877*** 0.002 
Interbank  -0.0086*` 0.073 
NPL -0.0039 0.339 
Risk Governance 0.0725* 0.094 
Regulatory Independence -0.3936*** 0.002 
Origin  0.7100*** 0.000 
Constant 5.9467*** 0.000 
Number of Observations  100  
F(6, 93) 8.40  
Prob > F 0.0000  
R-squared (R²) 0.3515 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3096 
Legend : * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.10 
Note: As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** 
indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates significance at I% level. 
 
The F tests of the OLS regression model indicate that the fit of the model as a 
whole is good, which shows that there might not be a problem of specification. 
However, from the very low R-squared statistic is 35% and the adjusted R-
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squared is 30%. They indicate that a low part of the variation in Z-score is 
explained by the included independent variables in the model. This can be the 
first signal showing that OLS estimators might not be efficient and OLS cannot 
be the appropriate estimation method. Hence, in order to choose the 
appropriate estimation methods, we first make diagnostic analyses of the OLS 
assumptions so as to check whether the normally and independently distributed 
(NID) assumptions of OLS are met. 
 
Normality of residuals 
An assumption of the regression model (OLS) that impact the validity of all 
tests(p, t and F) is that residuals behave normal.  Residuals (here indicated by 
the letter ‘e’) are the difference between the observed values(Y) and the 
predicted values (Yhat): e=Y- Yhat. 
If residual do not follow a ‘normal’ pattern then we should check for omitted 
variables, model specification, linearity, functional forms. In sum, we may need 
to reassess our model/theory.  Normality is problem when dealing with small 
samples. 
A non-graphical test is the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality.  It tests the 
hypothesis that the distribution is normal, in this case the null hypothesis is that 
the distribution of the residuals is normal. 
The numerical tests for normality of the residuals by the Shapiro- Wilk W test for 
the null hypotheses of normal distribution yields the p-values is 0.16 and 
therefore we failed to reject the null hypotheses at 90%, 95% and 99%.  We 
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conclude that the residuals are normally distributed.  This indicates that we 
have to accept the null hypothesis, i.e., normality of residuals. 
Table B: Test for Normality of Data 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data for Model 1 
Swilk e 
Variable  Observations W V Z Prob>z 
e 100 0.98107 1.563 0.991 0.16089 
 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data for Model 1 
Swilk  r 
Variable Observations W V Z Prob>z 
r 100 0.98107 1.563 0.991 0.16089 
Source: STATA 12 
 
 
Homoskedasticity of Residuals 
A non-graphical way to detect heteroskedasticity is the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-
Weisberg test.  It tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance are all equal 
versus the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative function of 
one or more variables. 
 
For example, in the default hattest command shown below, the alternative 
hypothesis stated that the error variances increase (or decrease) as the 
predicted values of Y increase.  That means the bigger the predicted value of Y, 
the bigger the covariance is.  A large chi-square would indicate that 
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heteroskedasticity was present.  In this example, the chi-square value was 
small, indicating heteroskedasticity was probably not a problem (at least that if it 
was a problem, it was not a multiplicative function of the predicted value). 
 In this test, if the chi-square obtained exceeds the critical chi-square value at 
the chosen level of significance, the conclusion is that there is 
heteroskedasticity.  The chi-square is less than the critical at the chosen level of 
significance at 90%, 95% and 99%.  This indicates that the residuals have a 
homogeneous variance.  Hence, the numerical tests and the nature of panel 
data, the sounding judgment is that the residuals are homoskedastic.  The 
implication is that if the variances were heteroskedastic, we may have the 
wrong estimates of the standard errors for the coefficients and therefore their t-
values. 
Table C: Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for Heteroskedasticity 
estat hettest 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
H0= Constant variance 
Variables: fitted value of Z-score 
Chi 2(1)  0.29 
Prob > chi 2  0.5911 
Source: STATA 12 
  
Multicollinearity 
As a first step in checking for multicollinearity between the independent 
variables, Pearson’s pair-wise correlation result is presented as in Table 6.3. 
It can be observed from the table that almost all of the correlations between 
pairs of the variables are less than 0.60, which shows that they have no 
problem of multicollinearity.   In order to test for multicollinearity in the residuals, 
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assessment of the variance inflation factor (VIF) is made to check for the level 
of multicollinearity. The VIF, which leads us to the tolerance level of 
multicollinearity, 1/VIF, of the model (Table E) shows a mean VIF of 1.47 
(Models 1).  A VIF greater than (>) 10 or 1/ VIF less than 0.10 indicates a 
multicollinearity problem.  Since the model has a VIF that is less than 10 and (1/ 
1.47) is 0.68 and is far greater than 0.10, and it is more than 0.10. This shows 
that there is no multicollinearity problem. 
Table D: Variance inflation factor, VIF, and tolerance using STATA12 
Estat vif  
Model 1 and 2 
Variables  VIF 1/VIF 
Size  1.20 0.832029 
Interbank borrowing 1.08 0.922237 
NPL 1.05 0.952962 
Risk Governance 1.34 0.747306 
Regulatory Independence  2.07 0.484102 
Origin  2.07 0.482512 
Mean VIF 1.47  
Source: STATA 12 
 
Independence of errors 
In the panel data values that come from the same variable overtime and when 
there can be some form of homogeneity among the elements in a group, it is 
more likely that the errors of different observations can be correlated 
(autocorrelation of errors) with the adjacent time or group than those separated 
in time or in heterogeneity.  
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The Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation is used due to its robustness. 
Table E illustrates the results of the test. 
Table E: Breusch – Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation 
Lags(p) Chi2  df Prob. chi 2 
1 10.512 1 0.0012 
6 39.448 6 0.0000 
Source: STATA 12 
 
The table shows that the probability a chi-square value as much as 10.512 or 
greater is only 0.0012.  To achieve chi –square value of 39.448, must be 
extremely small or the actual p-value is almost zero.  The result is that at least 
one of the six autocorrelations must be non-zero. 
 
This implies that we need to find out if the autocorrelation is pure 
autocorrelation and not as a result of misspecification of the model.  Again if it is 
pure autocorrelation one can use appropriate transformation of the original 
model so that in the transformed model, we do not have the problem of (pure) 
autocorrelation.  Gujirati and Porter(2009), Battaglia and Gallo(2015)  show that 
in the case of autocorrelation, one can make use of the generalised least 
squares (GLS) method.  
 
Model specification test  
The last diagnostic test on the model is to ensure whether the appropriate 
variables are included and/ or omitted from the model. This is important since, 
first, if one or more of the relevant variables are omitted, the common variance 
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they share with the rest in the model may be wrongly attributed to the included 
variables, and the error term is inflated, and second, if the irrelevant variables 
are included, the common variance they share with the rest in the model would 
wrongly be attributed to the irrelevant. The model specification problems or 
errors would affect the estimated regression coefficients substantially, and it is 
difficult to know the exact influence contributed by a predictor variable on the 
dependent variable. 
 
One of the methods of detecting specification errors is by using the predicted 
values and the square of the predicted values and regress them on the 
dependent variable as predictors and check their significance.  
The premise is that when the regression model is properly specified, there 
should not be any additional predictor variables that are significant. The post 
estimation linktest (Table F, Panel A) is therefore used to check whether we 
need more variables in our model by running a new regression with the 
observed Y (Z-score) and Y hat –squared as independent variables.  The thing 
to look for here is the significance of _hat sq.  The null hypothesis is that there 
is no specification error.  If the p-value of _hatsq is not significant then we fail to 
reject the null and conclude that our model is correctly specified. 
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Table F: Panel A: Linktest  
Linktest Model 1 
Source SS df MS Number of obs. = 100 
F(2, 97)               = 28.04 
Prob > F             =0.0000 
R-squared          =0.3663 
Adj. R-squared   = 0.3532 
Root MSE             = 0.41079  
Model 
Residual 
9.4621163 
16.3685744 
2 
97 
4.73105815 
0.168748189 
Total 26.926275 99 0.260916067 
Z-score Coef.  Std. Err. t P> t 95% Conf. Interval  
_hat -1.415615 1.608969 -0.88 0.381 -4.608972 1.777743 
_hatsq 0.5306563 0.3521832 1.51 0.135 -0.1683299 1.229642 
_cons 2.69996 1.818075 1.49 0.141 -0.908415 6.308335 
Source: STATA 12 
 
 
Table F: Panel B: Ramsey Ovtest  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The other specification test, called the Ramsey RESET test (Table F: Panel B), 
is another test for omitted variables. It creates new variables based on the 
predictors and refits the model using the new variables and test if any of them 
would be significant. In STATA, the ovtest command (a postestimation 
command) executes this test.  
 
  estat ovtest 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of zscore 
 𝑯𝟎: model has no omitted variables  
  F(3, 90) =2.03 
  Prob > F=0.1157 
Source: STATA 12 
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Testing for omitted variable bias is important for our model since it is related to 
the assumption that the error term and the independent variables in the model 
are not correlated (E(𝑒|𝑋) = 0)   The null hypothesis is that the model does not 
have omitted variables bias, the p-value is higher than the usual thresholds of 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 (90%, 95 % and 99% significance), so we fail to reject the 
null and conclude that we do not need more variables. 
The test, as it can be seen below, shows that the F-test is not significant to 
reject the null hypothesis of no omitted variables. This indicates that there is no 
specification error, thus, omitted variables.   This is what the R-squared 
statistics suggest. Adding more predictors into the model will not improve the R-
squared.  
 
Tests for Linearity  
Here it must be noted that we have a multiple OLS regression where several 
independent variables are involved. In a panel data, linear relationship between 
the dependent and each of the independent variables; and between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables collectively were carried out.  
Hence, the check for linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables cannot be straightforward. This check on individual 
independent variables shows that many of the variables show no clear 
departure from linearity. The plotting the standardized residuals against each 
predictor variable in the model to check for linearity between the predictors and 
the response variable show that they show some patterns of linearity as shown 
in Figures A and B. Figure C shows the partial regression plots (or added-
variable plots) which plot the relationship between the Z-score and an 
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independent variable when the effect of other variables are removed and it is 
also good for diagnosing outliers. Figure D(i- vi) show the twoway scatter 
graphs with graphical assessment of linearity of the Z-score in predictors , with 
line and lowess fits.  The lowess lines for size, interbank borrowing, risk 
governance, regulatory independence and origin look reasonably linear.  That of 
the NPL also looks reasonably linear, albeit being pretty flat.  The minor splitting 
gap at the beginning or at the end of the NPL line is not a big problem since 
there might be some influential observations that cause divergence.  So, we 
conclude that linearity assumption is fulfilled.  However, it is difficult to establish 
the linearity by using plots and there is also a room for non-linearity.  
 
 
Figure A: Residuals –versus – fitted plots 
 
Source: Stata 12  
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Figure B: Z-score: Residuals(Close to normality) 
 
Source: Stata 12 
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Figure C: Partial Regression Plot (avplots) 
 
 
Source: Stata 12 
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Figure D(i-iv) :Assessment of Linearity 
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Source: STATA 12 
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APPENDIX 5.5: PANEL DATA DIAGNOSTICS AND PANEL RESULTS  
To test for use of either the fixed effects or random effects model is appropriate, 
and against the violations to OLS conditions discussed in Appendix 5.4, the 
Breusch – Pagan and Hausman tests are presented in the Tables G and H 
below. 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
Zscore [idno, t] =xb +u[idno] + e[idno, t] 
Table G: Estimated Results: Breusch - Pagan Tests 
  Variable  Sd=sqrt(Var) 
 zscore 0.2609196 0.5107994 
 e 0.1419688 0.3767875 
 u 0.0496507 0.02228243 
Tests  Var(u) =0   
 Chibar 2(01) 7.31  
 Prob > chibar  0.0034  
Source: STATA 12 
 
The results from Table G show that fixed effects and random effects estimation 
techniques are preferred to pooled OLS estimation method.  The choice 
between fixed effects and random effects is determined by using the Hausman 
test as shown in Table H.   The results show that the random effects estimation 
is preferred to the fixed effects estimation because there are some panel effects 
which can be efficiently dealt with using the GLS random effects and the GMM 
estimation techniques. 
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TABLE H: Hausman Test (Fixed effects or fe) 
Coefficients 
Variables  (b) 
fe 
(B) (b-B) 
Difference 
Sqrt(diag(v_b-
V _B)) S.E. 
Size -0.0827647 -0.1556267 0.728619 0.0843695 
Interbor -0.0075798 -0.0076185 0.0000387 0.0028731 
Nplrat -0.0016234 -0.0030257 0.00140023 0.0040525 
Riskgov 0.0822781 0.0845132 -0.0022352 0.0257186 
Reind  -0.394088 -0.374121 -0.0207878 0.1586511 
Origin 0.5573168 0.6686556 -0.1113388 0.2399175 
. b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficient not systemic 
Chi2 (6)     = (b- B) ‘ [(V_b – V_B^(-1)] ( b- B) 
                   = 3.14 
Prob > chi2= 0.7915 
Source: STATA 12 
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TABLE I: ESTIMATION RESULTS AND FORECASTING PERFORMANCE 
Pooled OLS 
Regress zscore size interborr nlprat riskgov reind origin 
Source  SS df MS  Number of Obs =100 
Model 
Residual 
9.0790023 6 1.51316705  F(6, 93)                 =8.40   
16.7516884 93 0.180125682  Prob > F          = 0. 0000 
Total  25.8306907 99 0.260916067  R-squared       = 0.3515 
     Adj R-squared =0.3096 
     Root MSE     = 0.42441 
       
Z-Score Coef. Std. Err t p>|𝒕| [95% Conf. Interval ] 
       
Size  -0.1877299 0.059083 -3.18 0.002 -0.305057 -0.0704028 
Interbor -0.0086661 0.0047713 -1.82 0.073 -0.018141 0.0008088 
nplrat -.00039067 0.046123 -0.85 0.399 -0.0130657 0.0052524 
risgov 0.072503 0.042844 1.69 0.094 -0.0125766 0.1575826 
reind -0.3936727 0.1263422 -3.12 0.002 -0.6445632 -0.1427822 
origin 0.7100346 0.1221979 5.81 0.000 0.4673737 0.9526954 
_cons 5.946702 1.1912 4.99 0.000 3.581251 8.312188 
 
Forecasting Performance: Coefficient of Variation of the Root Mean Square (CVRMSE) 
 
Estimate: di 100* e(rmse)/ r(mean) 
= 18.991908 
Source: STATA 12 
 
Fixed Effects Model  
Xtreg  zscore size interborr nlprat riskgov reind origin, fe 
Group variable : idno     Number of Obs =100 
R-sq: within= 0.1368   Number of groups =20   
between 0.4811   Obs per 
group  
Min=5 
Avg=5.0 
Max=5 
overall 0.3137   F(6, 74)    =1.96 
Corr(u_i, Xb)=0.1983    Prob > F           =0.0831 
      
       
Z-Score Coef. Std. Err t p>|𝒕| [95% Conf. Interval ] 
       
Size  -0.0827647 0.1106363 -0.75 0.457 -0.3032123 0.1376828 
Interbor -0.0075798 0.0056336 -1.35 0.183 -0.0188051 0.0036455 
nplrat -0.0016234 0.0065133 -0.25 0.804 -0.0146014 0.0113547 
risgov 0.0822781 0.048526 1.70 0.094 -0.0144122 0.1789683 
reind -0.3949088 0.2176464 -1.81 0.074 -0.8285786 0.038761 
origin 0.5573168 0.2848914 1.96 0.054 -0.0103418 1.124975 
_cons 3.810011 2.178602 1.75 0.084 -0.5309479 8.15097 
       
Sigma _u 0.28132736  
 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Sigma _e 0.37678754 
rho 0.35793803 
 
Forecasting Performance: Coefficient of Variation of the Root Mean Square (CVRMSE) 
 
Estimate: di 100* e(rmse)/ r(mean) 
= 16.860766 
Source: STATA 12 
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Random  Effects Model  
Xtreg  zscore size interborr nlprat riskgov reind origin, re 
Random Effects GLS Regression  
Group variable : idno  
 Number of Obs =100 
R-sq: within= 0.1290 Number of groups =20   
Between= 0.5482 Obs per 
group  
Min=5 
Avg=5.0 
Max=5 
Overall= 0.3476 Wald chi2(6)= 30.55 
Corr(u_i, X)=0 (assumed)  Prob > F           =0.0000 
      
       
Z-Score Coef. Std. Err. z p>|𝒕| [95% Conf. Interval ] 
       
Size  -0.1556267 0.715693 -2.17 0.030 - 0.2959 -0.0153534 
Interbor -0.0076185 0.004846 -1.57 0.116 -0.0171164 0.0018795 
nplrat -0.0030257 0.0050991 -0.59 0.553 -0.0130196 0.0069683 
risgov 0.0845132 0.0411501 2.05 0.040 0.0038605 0.1651659 
reind -0.374121 0.1489954 -2.51 0.012 -0.6661476 0.0820944 
origin 0.6686556 0.1536317 4.35 0.000 0.3675431 0.9697681 
_cons 5.246363 1.428695 3.67 0.000 2.446172 8.046555 
       
Sigma _u 0.22282428  
 
(fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Sigma _e 0.37678754 
rho 0.25911068 
 
Forecasting Performance: Coefficient of Variation of the Root Mean Square (CVRMSE) 
 
Estimate: di 100* e(rmse)/ r(mean) 
= 16.667408 
Source: STATA 12 
 
The random effects model has a smaller coefficient of variation and therefore 
predicts values that are closer to the actual values. 
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS: GMM ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Number of Moments=8 
Initial weight Matrix: Unadjusted 
GMM weight matrix: Robust Number of Obs = 100 
       
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Errors 
z p>|𝒛| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Constant  6.163883 1.19595 5.15 0.000 3.819864 8.507903 
Bank Size -.1993271 .0563869 -3.53 0.000 -.3098435 -.0888108 
Interbor -.0075266 .0048648 -1.55 0.122 -.0170615 .0020083 
nplrat -.0041746 .0057314 -0.73 0.466 -.0154079 .0070587 
Risgov .0802107 .036487 2.20 0.028 .0086975 .151724 
Reind -.3235763 .1183429 -2.73 0.006 -.555524 -.0916285 
Origin .6120424 .1119499 5.47 0.000 .3926246 .8314603 
Instruments for equation 1: forn local size interbor nplrat risgov reind _cons 
 
Estat overid 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansen’s J Chi2(1) = 2.43408 (p=0.1187) 
Source: STATA 12 
 
 
GMM Estimation 
Number of parameters =7 
Number of Moments=8 
Initial weight Matrix: Unadjusted 
GMM weight matrix: HAC Bartlett 98 Number of Obs = 100 
       
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Errors 
z p>|𝒛| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Constant  6.084057 1.417121 4.29 0.000 3.30655 8.861563 
Bank Size -.1946026 .0660303 -2.95 0.003 -.3240197 -.0651856 
Interbor -.0087301 .0064926 -1.34 0.179 -.0214555 .0039952 
nplrat -.0044806 .0063358 -0.71 0.479 -.0168986 .0079373 
Risgov .0851716 .0340024 2.50 0.012 .0185281 .151815 
Reind -.341382 .1530599 -2.23 0.026 -.6411301 -.0411463 
Origin .6307298 .1374132 4.59 0.000 .3614049 .9000546 
HAC standard errors based on Bartlett kernel with 98 lags 
Instruments for equation 1: forn local size interbor nplrat risgov reind _cons 
 
Estat overid 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansen’s J Chi2(1) = 1.09195 (p = 0.2960) 
Source: STATA 12 
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GMM Estimation 
Number of parameters =7 
Number of Moments=8 
Initial weight Matrix: Unadjusted 
GMM weight matrix: HAC Barlett 20  
(lags chosen by Newey-West 
Number of Obs = 100 
       
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Errors 
z p>|𝒛| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Constant  6.085701 1.414968 4.30 0.000 3.312414 8.858987 
Bank Size -.1947722 .0659677 -2.95 0.003 -.3240666 -.0654779 
Interborr -.0086386 .0064131 -1.35 0.178 -.0212081 .0039308 
nplrat -.004449 .0062728 -0.71 0.478 -.0167434 .0078454 
Risgov .084811 .0345422 2.46 0.014 .0171095 .1525126 
Regind -.3394553 .1506939 -2.25 0.024 -.63481 -.0441006 
Origin .6296771 .1361913 4.62 0.000 .362747 .8966071 
HAC standard errors based on Bartlett kernel with 20 lags. 
Instruments for equation 1: forn local size interbor nplrat risgov reind _cons 
 
Estat overid 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansen’s J Chi2(1) = 1.1215 (p=0.2896) 
Source: STATA 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
